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ABSTRACT 
In studies of culture and communication, it is widely believed that (a) cultures can be 
distinguished according to the use of direct and indirect style (e.g. Adair and Brett 
2004; Brew and Cairns 2004; Cohen 2004; Ting-Toomey 1999); (b) culture is closely 
related to communication style (e.g. Fujishin 2007; Neuliep 2006; Pekerti and 
Thomas 2003); and (c) there are differences in interpretation between people from 
different cultures (e.g. Cohen 2004; Gao and Ting-Toomey 1998; Scollon and Scollon 
1995; Ting-Toomey 1999). Drawing on Relevance Theory, I argued that 
communication styles in cultures that have been categorised as using direct and 
indirect style are both indirect, and that there is no direct connection between culture 
and communication style. Specifically, I proposed that the claim that there are 
differences in interpretation between people with diverse cultural backgrounds can be 
more effectively addressed by focusing on contextual assumptions people draw on in 
response to an utterance. To investigate how cultural differences are realised by 
focusing on native speakers of Mandarin Chinese and British English, this study 
adopted a qualitative technique to analyse data in order not only to reveal how or 
whether cultural differences are realised through the use of communication style, but 
also to provide an in-depth understanding of contextual assumptions that hearers draw 
on and their relationship with cultural difference.  
This study involved two sets of radio talk shows broadcast in China and Britain. It 
also involved a series of interviews with hearers from China and Britain. The main 
findings from the study are: (1) styles of speakers of Mandarin Chinese and British 
English are both indirect; (2) there is no direct correlation between culture and 
communication style, and (3) cultural differences are realised if hearers from different 
cultures draw on different contextual assumptions in response to an utterance. This 
research has important implications for researchers in the area of culture and 
communication in understanding cultural differences in communication, and for 
research into contextual assumptions in intercultural encounters. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Aims and rationale 
As we enter the 21
st
 century, the emergence of a global culture has changed people‟s 
lives in many ways. One direct impact that the global culture has on our daily lives is 
illustrated by one simple example given by Ting-Toomey and Chung (2005, 3) below: 
We find ourselves having increased contact with people who are culturally 
different…. In what was once a homogeneous community, we may now find 
more diversity and cultural values in flux.  
The frequency of such contacts helps to integrate people with diverse cultures into a 
global community and therefore facilitates the exchange of ideas, yet it is also seen as 
a source of cultural divergence, leading to „intercultural misunderstanding‟ (House 
2000, 145). In order to communicate effectively with people from other cultures and 
avoid or minimize misunderstanding in intercultural encounters, scholars in the area 
of culture and communication have brought the issue of culture differences in 
communication into focus. As Hall (1983, 185) concludes,  
Human beings are such an incredibly rich and talented species with potential 
beyond anything it is possible to contemplate that … it would appear that our 
greater task, our most important task, and our most strategic task is to learn as 
much as possible about ourselves [and others] …. My point is that as humans 
learn more about their incredible sensitivity, their boundless talents, and manifold 
diversity, they should begin to appreciate not only about themselves but also 
about others. 
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In order to learn as much as possible about ourselves and others with diverse cultural 
backgrounds (Hall 1983, 185), scholars engaged in the study of culture and its 
relationship with communication have invested enormous energy to theorise cultural 
differences. My present study has grown out of a review of previous literature that 
addresses cultural differences and their relationship with communication.  
My review of past literature indicated that scholarship in the area of cultural 
differences falls into two strands. One line of research tends to work on the 
assumption that understanding styles of speakers with different cultural backgrounds 
provides a means of distinguishing cultures (e.g. Adair and Brett 2004; Cohen 2004; 
Fujishin 2007; Neuliep 2006; Pekerti and Thomas 2003; Ting-Toomey 1999). In these 
studies, relevant scholars argue that the distinction between direct and indirect 
communication can be used to differentiate cultures, in that a direct style tends to 
predominate in Western cultures and an indirect style tends to predominate in Eastern 
cultures. I now use two examples from the literature to illustrate how the direct and 
indirect distinction is used to characterize cultures. The first example is from a study 
carried out by Fujishin (2007). In this study, Fujishin argues that in a business 
context, in response to a question of whether a negotiator wants to do business with 
another, negotiators from Japan and England or America tend to use different styles to 
express a refusal, in that a Japanese negotiator will use an indirect style to say 
something like (b), whereas a negotiator from England or America will say something 
like (a), as shown in [1.1]. 
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[1.1] 
Direct Style (used in America and England) 
(a) No.  
Indirect style (used in Japan) 
(b) You have a good product. 
(Fujishin 2007, 69-70) 
Similarly, Adair and Brett (2004) claim that in the context of business negotiation, in 
response to a question of whether a negotiator wants to buy the product being offered, 
negotiators from Western cultures tend to use a direct style to say something like (a) 
to express their intention that the price of the product being offered is too high. To 
imply the same meaning, negotiators from Eastern cultures prefer to use an indirect 
style to produce an utterance like (b), as shown in [1.2].  
 [1.2] 
Direct style (used in Western cultures) 
(a) My company is financially weak, so without a good price, my company will not be 
able to buy the product at all (adapted from the original). 
Indirect style (used in Eastern cultures) 
(b) We‟ve had a bad quarter, and our acquisition budget is extremely limited. 
(Adair and Brett 2004, 162) 
According to Adair and Brett (2004), if negotiators from Western cultures say 
something like (a), this implies that the negotiators want to buy the product at a lower 
price. In contrast, negotiators from the East tend to say something like (b) to imply the 
same meaning. 
 4 
 
However, in both cases, these scholars do not actually explain how they come to 
categorise one style as being „direct‟ and another style as being „indirect‟.  
A second line of research addresses cultural differences by pointing out that there are 
differences between people with distinct cultural backgrounds in the way they are 
likely to interpret a given utterance in a specific context (e.g. Cohen 2004; Gao and 
Ting-Toomey 1998; Scollon and Scollon 1995; Ting-Toomey 1999). In these studies, 
the differences in interpretation are attributed to the variations in the cultural 
backgrounds of the interlocutors. For example, according to Ting-Toomey (1999, 
125), intercultural misunderstanding can easily occur when a Japanese speaker utters 
„hai, hai‟ as shown in [1.3]. 
[1.3] 
If Japanese say „hai, hai’, Westerners think that the Japanese have actually signalled 
„yes‟ to a contract agreement, while the Japanese think that they have merely 
acknowledged hearing the speaker‟s statement (Ting-Toomey 1999, 125). 
What Ting-Toomey suggests here is that Westerners and Japanese interpret the 
utterance „hai, hai‟ in radically different ways, and such differences are caused by the 
differences between Japanese and Westerners in their respective cultural backgrounds. 
However, Ting-Toomey does not actually explain how culture impacts on 
interpretation. 
In my research, I argue that if we accept the general claims made by existing studies 
of culture and communication that cultures vary according to the use of style, it is 
necessary to provide an explanation for how one style can be categorized as direct and 
another as indirect. Only when we have a clear idea of how such categorizations are 
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made, can we be in a position to determine whether or not cultural differences are 
realised through the use of communication style. I further argue that if we accept the 
claim made by existing studies of culture and communication that differences in 
interpretation are caused by the cultural backgrounds of the interlocutors, it is 
necessary to explain how cultural background relates to interpretation. With these 
concerns in mind, I argue that in order to address the relationship between culture and 
communication, we must focus on the complete act of communication: how an 
utterance is produced and how the utterance is interpreted. I argue that a methodology 
based on Sperber and Wilson‟s (1986/1995) inferential model can provide a more 
detailed description of what both speaker and hearer do in the process of 
communication. I also argue that the adoption of Hong‟s (2009) dynamic 
constructivist view of culture as a supplementary approach in the process of 
exploration can make explicit the dynamic nature of cultural knowledge. My goal in 
this thesis is to make explicit what actually happens in the process of communication 
in order to explore how communication styles can be best studied, and how culture 
has an impact on interpretation.  
1.2Theoretical departure 
I believe that Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995) provides a 
descriptive vocabulary and an explanatory framework that would enable me to 
explain how the direct and indirect distinction as shown in [1.1] and [1.2], as well as 
how differences in interpretation as shown in [1.3] may be addressed. My thesis takes 
the following axiomatic premises based on Sperber and Wilson‟s (1986/1995) 
Relevance Theory: 
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(1) All human communication is a matter of degree. As a result, communication is 
explicit to a greater or lesser degree; 
(2) In an act of communication, a speaker‟s behaviour is used as evidence by a   
hearer in the construction of assumptions about her meaning; 
(3) There is no such thing as direct communication at all. Understanding utterances 
always requires the hearer to carry out inferences.  
 (4) A hearer needs to draw on context in order to interpret the utterances produced 
by the speaker. Context is not limited to information about the immediate 
physical environment or previous utterance; it also includes such things as 
general cultural assumptions. 
I apply insights from Relevance Theory to my own investigation of cultural 
differences in communication in real life interactions, and adopt Hong‟s (2009) 
dynamic constructivist view of culture as a supplementary approach for the 
exploration of cultural difference. I hypothesise: 
In a study of communication in a given culture, it will be possible to demonstrate that: 
(a)  Communication in the culture is explicit to a greater or lesser degree; 
(b) An utterance produced by a speaker from the culture is merely a piece of       
evidence that a hearer uses in the construction of the assumptions about the 
speaker‟s meaning; 
(c)  Understanding utterances produced by a speaker from the culture requires a 
hearer to carry out inferences; 
(d) A hearer of the culture needs to draw on context, including cultural   
knowledge, to interpret an utterance.  
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In the light of above hypotheses, I adopted a qualitative approach to study whether or 
not cultures vary according to the use of style, and how differences in interpretation of 
an utterance between interlocutors are related to the cultural backgrounds of the 
interlocutors, by focusing on China and Britain. I collected and analysed two sets of 
data from radio programmes broadcast in China and Britain respectively. I also 
carried out a series of interviews to identify the contexts that hearers of Mandarin 
Chinese (henceforth MC) and British English (henceforth BE) were accessing when 
they interpreted utterances produced by callers in the radio talk shows. In particular, I 
sought to identify whether or not the two sets of hearers interpreted the utterances 
differently, and whether or not the differences were related to variations in the 
contexts the hearers had accessed. I asked the respondents two sets of questions. The 
first set of questions focused on some specific utterances heard from the programme. 
The second set of questions focused on the entire conversation between the caller and 
the host, in which I asked the respondents what problem they thought the caller 
wanted to solve.  
My analysis shows that the relevance theoretic approach and the dynamic 
constructivist approach are supplementary to each other, in that they both provide 
some useful insights in my analysis of cultural differences in communication and 
enable me to address issues that existing studies of culture and communication 
cannot. 
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1.3 Structure of the thesis 
In the remaining seven chapters of this thesis, the structure is as follows: 
In Chapter Two, I critically evaluate previous studies of culture and communication, 
and argue that they leave unexplained many claims they make about cultural 
differences in communication. 
In Chapter Three, I explain how a relevance theoretic approach may provide a 
solution to issues that have been left unexplained, and define the specific research 
questions that my present study addresses. 
In Chapter Four, I describe in detail the research procedure I designed to address the 
research questions.  
Chapters Five and Six form the heart of this thesis. In Chapter Five, I analyse the set 
of caller‟s utterances to show that utterances produced by callers from both China and 
Britain require some degree of inference on the part of a hearer, and both sets of 
callers use specific linguistic devices to guide the interpretation process. In Chapter 
Six, I analyse the context that hearers draw on in response to the utterances produced 
by the callers to show that different interpretations are available if hearers draw on 
different contexts.  
In Chapter Seven, I summarise and discuss the significance of my findings in the light 
of what they add to the findings of the existing scholarship. I also discuss how the 
issue of cultural differences in communication might be theorised.  
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Finally in Chapter Eight, I conclude the whole thesis by summarising the 
contributions that my thesis makes to the area of culture and communication, and 
point to potential scope for a further study in a similar area.  
Throughout the thesis, references are made to transcripts. These are located in the 
appendices (numbers 1-13). Among the thirteen appendices, the first appendix is 
about transcription conventions, and the remaining twelve appendices are transcripts 
of the English and the Chinese data, from my empirical study.  
In this thesis, I have referred to the speaker as she and the hearer as he, following the 
convention of Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995), without intending 
any contextual implications. Since in this thesis a caller who phones in to a radio 
advice talk programme is studied as the speaker who constructs problems in order to 
seek advice on the problem, and the host as well as overhearing audience as the 
hearer, I have referred to a caller as she and a host and overhearing audience as he, 
unless otherwise stated (e.g., when in a direct quotation, or when the context identifies 
the gender of both speaker and hearer). 
1.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have introduced the aims and rationale of the research reported in 
this thesis, and have summarised the procedures through which my research is 
conducted. In the next chapter, I review previous studies of culture and 
communication that address cultural differences in communication. 
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Chapter Two: Previous Approaches to Culture and Communication 
Introduction 
This chapter has two main aims. My first aim is to evaluate studies that address the 
relationship between culture and communication, in order to argue that there are two 
key approaches to the study of cultural differences, namely, approaches that draw on 
the distinction between high and low context communication, as proposed by Hall 
(1976), and approaches that draw on the dimension of individualism and collectivism 
identified by Hofstede (1980). According to the literature, Hall and Hofstede share a 
concern to theorise how cultures affect the way people communicate. Hofstede‟s 
study, which I will evaluate in Section 2.2.1.1, is influenced by Hall‟s theoretical 
model, as described above.  
To date, a considerable amount of scholarship has been invested in studying cultural 
differences in communication. Much of the literature on culture and communication 
tends to address cultural differences according to style. One example of such a 
theorisation can be seen in the argument made by Ting-Toomey (1999, 103), as 
follows: 
[I]n individualistic cultures, people tend to…emphasise the preferential use of 
direct talk. In contrast, in collectivistic cultures, people tend to…emphasise the 
preferential use of indirect talk. 
In my subsequent discussion, I will demonstrate that many studies take this stance.  
As my evaluation will show, studies that have applied and developed the two 
approaches are problematic insofar as while they apply the two key approaches to 
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studying cultural differences, they do not make explicit the criteria they are using 
when they are making claims about the possible cultural differences they are 
addressing. My aim in evaluating the literature is to argue that because of this, these 
studies do not have sufficient grounds to be able to support their claims.  
My overall intention here is to make the point that if we accept the general claims 
about cultural differences in communication in the existing studies of culture and 
communication, it is necessary to develop a more precise theoretical perspective from 
which cultural differences in communication can be investigated. My present thesis 
attempts to develop such a theoretical framework and demonstrates how it can be 
applied to the investigation of cultural differences by focusing on China and Britain. 
In addressing these aims, this chapter begins with a definition of some of the key 
concepts that recur in the literature. 
2.1 Defining concepts 
In this section, I define three key concepts that recur throughout my literature review. 
They are: 
(a) Culture; 
      (b) Cross-cultural communication; 
(c) Communication styles. 
In the following three subsections, each of these issues will be dealt with briefly. 
2.1.1 Culture 
Aneas and Sandin (2009, 3) argue that „there have been numerous attempts to define 
the meaning of the term of culture‟; however, „no consensus has been achieved when 
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it comes to formulating an interdisciplinary definition which can be accepted across 
the diverse fields of study‟. From the early 1960s, one definition of culture has 
focused on the links between culture and communication. For example, Hall (1959, 
191) argues that „culture is communication and communication is culture‟. This 
definition appears to be tautological, but it indicates Hall‟s view of the inseparable 
nature of culture and communication. Similarly, Smith (1966, 7) maintains that 
Culture is a code we learn and share, and learning and sharing require 
communication. And communication requires coding and symbols, which must 
be learned and shared. Communication and culture are inseparable. 
In addition to the importance attached to the link between communication and culture, 
Smith suggests that culture is learned. If culture is indeed learned, it follows that 
culture is a form of knowledge distributed within populations, and it should therefore 
be understood in terms of sharing.  
In the last two decades, however, largely as a result of the classic work of Hofstede 
(1980), many culture and communication researchers characterise this form of 
knowledge distributed in populations as a set of static, fixed values and norms shared 
among a social group such as national, ethnic or racial groups (e.g. Bond 1991; 
Gudykunst and Kim 2003; Hofstede 1980; Lindsey et al. 1999; Lustig and Koester 
1999; Spencer-Oatey 2008; Triandis 1995). For example, Lustig and Koester (1999, 
30) define culture as 
[A] learned set of shared interpretations about beliefs, values, and norms, which 
affect  behaviours of a relatively large group of people. 
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Similarly, Spencer-Oatey (2008, 3) conceptualises culture as 
A set of basic assumptions and values, orientations to life, beliefs, policies, 
procedures and behavioural conventions that are shared by a group of people, and 
that influence (but not determine) each member‟s behaviour and his or her 
interpretation of the „meaning‟ of other people‟s behaviour.  
The shared perceptions of values, beliefs and norms are assumed to affect us in the 
way we interact with our environment, which influences how we act in different 
situations. This perspective may be characterised by the definition provided by Aneas 
(2003, 120, cited by Aneas and Sandin 2009, 4) below: 
[Culture can be defined as] the set of knowledge, values, emotional heritage, 
behaviour and artifacts which a social group share, and which enable them to 
functionally adapt to their surroundings. 
More specifically, it has been argued that national culture has a great impact on one‟s 
communicative behaviour, particularly in the use of communication style (e.g.  
Bennett 1998; Gudykunst 2004; Gudykunst and Kim 1992; Gudykunst and Ting-
Toomey 1988; Hofstede and Hofstede 2005; Zhu et al. 2006). For example, 
Gudykunst draws on the findings by Levine (1985, 25) about the differences in the 
use of styles between Amhara culture in Ethiopia, a collectivistic culture and the 
United States, an individualistic culture to argue that: 
The Amhara‟s basic manner of communicating is indirect…the speaker … may 
not reveal what is really on his or her mind…The dominant North American 
temper calls for clear and direct communication (Gudykunst 2004, 51).  
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Gudykunst‟s point here is that people‟s respective cultural values such as 
individualism and collectivism (I discuss the two terms in some detail in Section 
2.2.2) influence and shape their use of „direct‟ and „indirect‟ styles. This implies that 
when interacting with culturally dissimilar others, people must understand the 
differences in the use of styles in different cultures in order to engage in effective 
communication. 
In my study, I take the view that if we accept the general claims about cultural 
differences in communication in the existing scholarship of culture and 
communication, we need not only a different methodology but also a more precise 
definition of culture. 
In recent years, scholars in the area of culture and communication have argued that 
existing culture and communication research fails to acknowledge the dynamic nature 
of culture, and that researchers must focus on the interaction between social cultural 
values and norms and psychological processes in order to understand how culture 
influences an individual‟s communicative behaviour. These scholars include Hong 
and her colleagues (e.g. Hong and Chiu 2001; Hong et al. 2000; Hong et al. 2003; 
Hong and Mallorie 2004). The main contribution of these scholars to the study of 
culture and communication is that they define culture from a dynamic constructivist 
perspective. They argue that earlier research does not attempt to understand the 
process through which culture influences affect, cognition and behaviours. Rather, it 
describes the unique characteristics of people from different nations and then 
attributes the observed similarities and differences between cultures to traits that are 
deeply rooted within the groups belonging to cultures in terms of, for example, 
individualism and collectivism. Hong and her colleagues further argue that existing 
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culture and communication research can benefit from a dynamic constructivist 
approach, which looks at how culture influences communicative behaviour from the 
perspective of cultural psychology (Hong and Chiu 2001; Hong et al. 2000). Although 
several other contemporary anthropologists (e.g. D‟Andrade 1995; Shore 1996; 
Sperber 1996) and sociologists (e.g. DiMaggio 1997) adopt a similar view, Hong et 
al. (2000, 716) claim that their own dynamic constructivist approach has an advantage 
over others, in that: (a) it „goes beyond these other constructivist approaches to culture 
in its emphasis on the dynamics of knowledge activation‟; (b) it provides a clear 
explanation for how „specific pieces of cultural knowledge become operative in 
guiding the construction of meaning from a stimulus‟ (Hong et al. 2000, 709); and (c) 
it points out that all individuals are capable of representing multiple cultures in their 
mind, and switching between representation of cultures. In this dynamic constructivist 
approach, 
[Culture has been defined] as knowledge, consisting of learned routines of 
thinking, feeling and interacting with other people, as well as a corpus of 
substantive assertions and ideas about aspects of the world (Hong 2009, 4). 
Conceptualizing culture in this way makes it clear that cultural differences are not 
explained by value orientations, but rather,  
[C]onceptualized as differences in systems of shared meaning among members of 
different cultural groups. To the extent that a given meaning system is widely 
shared among members of a cultural group, it would be frequently used in 
communication among members and thus become chronically accessible (Hong 
and Mallorie 2004, 63).  
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Viewing culture as a shared „meaning system‟, as advocated here, stands in direct 
opposition to those that define culture as systems of values, beliefs and norms, as 
discussed above. According to Hong et al. (2003, 454), „the critical way in which this 
dynamic approach differs is its assumption that culture is internalized in smaller 
pieces, in the knowledge structures or mental constructs that social perceivers use to 
interpret ambiguous stimuli‟. Hong et al. (2004, 63) explain that „stimuli‟ are „cultural 
clues‟, including, for example, utterances or icons. In essence, according to this 
dynamic constructivist approach, 
(1) Culture can be seen as a shared „knowledge structure or construct‟ of ideas, 
values and beliefs (i.e. a shared cultural meaning system). The internalized 
construct „does not continuously guide our information processing‟ but rather 
does so when triggered or activated in response to a stimulus (Hong et al. 
2003, 454).  
(2) Bicultural or multicultural individuals „can hold more than one cultural 
meaning system‟ and shift between these systems in response to cultural clues 
in the environment (a process called cultural frame-switching) (Hong et al. 
2004, 63).  
(3) A given cultural meaning system can have profound influences on one‟s 
judgements or behaviour when, in particular situations, the relevant implicit 
theories or shared assumptions are cognitively accessible, salient and 
applicable (i.e. relevant) in the situation (e.g. Hong and Chiu 2001; Hong et 
al. 2003).  
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What all this indicates is that when this meaning system is triggered or activated in 
response to a cultural clue, it will make intra- and intercultural communication 
possible. It also indicates that a dynamic approach to culture is a meaning-based 
approach.  
In my study, I will show that the dynamic constructivist approach to culture has the 
benefit of addressing cultural differences in communication, in that it has implications 
for the theorisation of how cultural knowledge might impact on bicultural individuals. 
So far, I have pointed to a distinction between two ways of theorising culture: (a) as a 
static, fixed set of values and norms; and (b) as a type of knowledge that is activated 
in the dynamics of meaning production. I will show later in Section 2.2 that the two 
key approaches to cultural differences proposed respectively by Hall (1976) and 
Hofstede (1980) favour the former, rather than the latter. In this and the following 
chapter, I make a case for the benefits of adopting a dynamic constructivist model that 
addresses the dynamic nature of culture. 
2.1.2 Cross-cultural communication  
Scollon and Scollon (2003, 539) argue that cross-cultural communication research 
refers to „the independent study of the communicative characteristics of distinct 
cultural or other groups‟. It involves comparing and contrasting communication 
patterns of people of one culture with that of people from a different culture. What is 
distinctive about this area of research is that „the members of distinct groups do not 
interact with each other within the study‟ (Scollon and Scollon 2003, 539). Thus, for 
example, if Chinese are compared with English with the aim of finding some 
similarities and differences in some aspects of communication, the resulting study can 
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be labelled cross-cultural communication research when comparable „individuals 
interact with members of their own culture‟ (Gudykunst 2000, 314).   
Many publications use the term „cross-cultural‟ interchangeably with the term 
„intercultural‟ communication, however, it has been argued (e.g. Gudykunst 2000, 
314; Otten et al. 2009, 2; Scollon and Scollon 2003, 539) that these terms are 
conceptually different. According to Gudykunst (2000, 314), intercultural 
communication research involves „examining behaviour when members of two or 
more cultures interact‟. So, for example, if one examines self-disclosure when 
Japanese and Americans communicate with each other, then the resulting study can be 
labelled intercultural communication research. According to Gudykunst (2000, 314), 
the relationship between the two types of research is that „understanding cross-
cultural differences in behaviour is a prerequisite for understanding intercultural 
behaviour‟. What this indicates is that a lack of awareness of cross-cultural 
differences can make it difficult for people with distinct cultural backgrounds to 
interact with each other. Consequently, the interaction between them may lead to 
various forms of intercultural misunderstanding. In order to build cross-cultural 
understanding, my study attempts to examine cross-cultural differences in 
communication when comparable individuals interact with members of their own 
culture, namely, a cross-cultural comparative study. I also show how members of one 
culture understand an utterance produced by a member of the other culture, and 
whether there are differences between members from different cultures in interpreting 
the utterance. 
In my study, I will be accepting the general claims about cultural differences in 
communication in the existing literature of culture and communication，and I will 
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argue that if these claims are accepted, it is necessary to develop a more precise 
theoretical perspective through which cultural differences can be investigated.  
To date, there have been numerous studies that focus on cultural differences or 
similarities in communication within or between East and West (e.g. Bilbow 1996, 
1997; Brew et al. 2001; Goodwin and Lee 1994; Li et al. 2001; Loh 1993; Luke 1996; 
Oguri and Gudykunst 2002; Spencer-Oatey and Xing 2004; Zhang 2006). As I show 
in the literature review below, many studies are premised on the assumption that 
cultural differences or similarities in communication can be explained according to 
style.  
Given that studies of culture and communication have proposed that cultural 
differences in communication can be explained according to style, in the next section, 
I address how communication styles are conceptualized in the existing literature.  
2.1.3 Communication styles 
It is widely accepted that the study of style is a huge area, and it usually falls under 
the rubric of „stylistics‟. In my study, I focus on two main ways of theorising styles, 
because, as I will show in my later discussions, they will enable me to talk about how 
style is an issue of culture. My goal in this section is to address how the two ways of 
theorising styles are defined in the existing literature.  
As early as 1976, Hall made a proposal that culture has a direct effect on people‟s 
communicative behaviour, in that it influences the way people communicate (1976, 
91). In proposing this, Hall (1976, 91) makes a distinction between high and low 
context communication styles. I will discuss this distinction in some detail in Section 
2.2.2, when I evaluate Hall‟s basic argument about the influence of culture on 
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communication. Briefly, Hall‟s point is that in the process of communication, if 
people in one culture rely more on what is explicitly said in the interaction, rather than 
on what is implied, then this culture can be characterized as a low context culture. 
Conversely, if people in another culture rely on information that is not explicitly 
expressed in words, then this culture can be characterized as a high context culture. 
Hall‟s (1976) distinction between high and low context cultures has sparked a great 
deal of culture and communication research. Hofstede (1991) draws on the work by 
Hall (1976) in which he develops such a distinction to argue that all of the cultures 
Hall labels as high-context are collectivist, and all of the cultures Hall labels as low-
context are individualist, as follows:  
A high-context communication … [is the] type of communication … frequent in 
collectivist cultures…. A low-context communication…is typical for individualist 
cultures (Hofstede 1991, 89).  
The proposals made respectively by Hall (1976) and Hofstede (1991), as described 
above, have been applied extensively to the study of cultural differences (see for 
example, Gao 1998; Gao and Ting-Toomey 1998; Samovar et al. 2009). In terms of 
application, much of the relevant literature provides evidence that indicates that Hall‟s 
model of high and low context communication is used to address cultural differences 
in terms of whether the style of a specific culture is direct or indirect. This is evident 
in the statement made by Samovar et al. (2009, 217) below: 
[T]he Asian mode of communication (high context) is often vague, indirect, and 
implicit, whereas Western communication (low-context) tends to be direct, and 
explicit.  
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On a more general level, communication style has also been addressed by scholars 
engaged in pragmatic studies, and in particular, relevance scholars like Blakemore 
(1992) and Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995).They argue that from the perspective of a 
relevance-theoretical framework, the style of a speaker is connected with the 
speaker‟s choice of how to formulate her utterance in such a way that a hearer is able 
to identify easily the intention the speaker is attempting to convey. This is clear in the 
argument that Blakemore makes below: 
Talk of style normally occurs when a writer or speaker is perceived as having 
done something special, to have put a certain amount of time and effort into the 
formulation of their message….Style consists in the choices that speaker and 
writer make in communicating their thoughts… [It is a speaker‟s] decision about 
what to make explicit and what to leave implicit (1992, 173). 
According to relevance scholars (e.g. Blakemore 1992; Sperber and Wilson 
1986/1995), a speaker aiming at relevance should try to formulate her utterance in 
such a way that the first line of interpretation to occur to the hearer is the one intended 
by the speaker.  
Viewed in this way, style is not described as being direct or indirect as proposed by 
culture and communication scholars, but as a speaker‟s endeavour to guide a hearer to 
identify the intention of the speaker. In this and the following chapter, I argue that 
there are clear benefits in addressing style in relation to a speaker‟s effort to formulate 
her utterance, as proposed by relevance scholars. I go on to show how seeing style as 
a speaker‟s choice of formulating her utterance can bring into view some of the 
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problems that arise from the definition of style that informs the work of many scholars  
who focus on culture and communication research.  
Thus far, I have pointed to two ways of defining communication styles: (a) as a means 
of distinguishing cultures according to the use of direct and indirect communication, 
and (b) as a consequence of a speaker‟s decision about what to make explicit and 
what to leave implicit when formulating her utterance. I will show later that the 
studies based on the approaches proposed by Hall (1976) and Hofstede (1980) all 
favour the former, rather than the latter. I will also show that there are benefits in 
addressing style as a speaker‟s effort to help hearers identify the intention of the 
speaker. 
2.1.4 Summary 
In this section, I have pointed to the distinction between two ways of theorising 
culture and I will show in my subsequent literature review that my study argues for 
the dynamic constructivist approach to culture, because it will help to address the 
limitations of those studies that take culture as a fixed set of values and norms. I have 
pointed to two ways of defining communication styles and I will show in this and the 
following chapter that my study argues in favour of seeing style as the result of a 
speaker‟s decision about how to formulate her utterance. This is because seeing style 
as the result of a speaker‟s decision about how to formulate her utterance can bring 
into view some of the problems that stem from studies in favour of style as a way of 
distinguishing cultures.  I have also defined cross-cultural communication research as 
a study in which the members of distinct cultural groups do not interact with each 
other and established the difference between cross-cultural and intercultural 
communication study.  
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In the next section, I evaluate studies based on the approaches proposed respectively 
by Hofstede (1991) and Hall (1976) to address cultural differences in communication, 
in order to argue that for the claims about cultural differences made by existing 
studies on culture and communication to be supported, we need a more precise 
methodology from which cultural differences can be investigated.  
2.2. Evaluation of studies drawing on the two key approaches 
Cultural differences in communication have been explored extensively in linguistics 
and cultural anthropology (e.g. Blum-Kulka and House 1989; Gumperz 1982; Hall 
1976; Hecht et al. 1993; Hofstede 1980; Hofstede and Hofstede 2005; Patricia 1997; 
Ting-Toomey 1999; Ting-Toomey and Kurogi 1998; Wierzbicka 2005), and there are 
many sound conceptual and applied perspectives revolving around cultural 
differences in communication. Writing in the late 1980s, Gudykunst and Ting-
Toomey (1988, 45) make the point that among the different orientations, there are two 
related but somewhat different approaches that have been regarded as two „broad 
dimensions of cultural variability that influence many aspects of interpersonal 
communication‟. There is evidence that this view continues to hold in more recent 
studies. For example, Cardon (2008, 399) argues that these two approaches „are 
fixtures in nearly all of the academic literature having anything to do with cross-
cultural comparisons, particularly in the management and communication field‟. One 
of the dimensions that Cardon (2008) and Gudykunst and Ting-Toomey (1988) refer 
to is the dimension of individualism and collectivism, developed by Hofstede (1980). 
The second dimension that these scholars refer to is the model of high and low 
context communication, as proposed by Hall (1976).  
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Given the widespread acceptance of the two approaches, it is reasonable to assume 
that although the two approaches were proposed decades ago, they remain highly 
influential. It is for this reason that in the next two subsections, I take both of them as 
a starting point in order to review the subsequent literature.   
2.2.1 Evaluation of studies based on Hofstede’s approach 
In this section, I evaluate the literature that addresses cultural differences drawing on 
Hofstede‟s (1980) approach. Firstly, in Section 2.2.1.1, I review Hofstede‟s basic 
claims, in order to argue that Hofstede‟s approach assumes that culture is a fixed set 
of values and norms; and it also assumes that people who belong to a specific culture 
are a homogeneous group, and therefore it does not include people who hold 
bicultural meaning systems. Then in Section 2.2.1.2, I evaluate literature that draws 
on Hofstede‟s approach to exploring cultural differences, in order to argue that 
relevant studies make the claim about the use of direct and indirect style in 
individualistic and collectivistic cultures; however, they do not make explicit the 
criteria they have used to categorise these two types of style. 
2.2.1.1 Hofstede’s dimension of individualism and collectivism 
Individualism-collectivism is one of the major dimensions of cultural variability 
isolated by Hofstede (1980, 1991). He suggests that this dimension represents broad 
differences among nations, particularly, in organizational behaviours. To uncover 
differences in „work related values‟ between IBM employees, in 1967, Hofstede and 
his team surveyed IBM employees in different parts of the world (Hofstede 1980). 
After analysing data relating to 53 countries and three regions (in the report of 2005, 
he analysed data for 74 countries and regions), Hofstede attributed some of his 
findings to cultural differences. One of his findings is the difference between 
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individualism and collectivism. A central issue that underlies the individualism and 
collectivism dimension is the relative importance attached to ingroups. Hofstede and 
Hofstede (2005, 76) describe this dimension as follows: 
Individualism pertains to societies in which the ties between individuals are 
loose: everyone is expected to look after himself or herself and his or her 
immediate family. Collectivism as its opposite pertains to societies in which 
people from birth onward are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which 
throughout people‟s lifetimes continue to protect them in exchange for 
unquestioning loyalty.  
Hofstede‟s approach provides valuable insights into cultural differences, in that it 
assumes that in a collectivist culture, people pay attention to ingroup goals, such as 
family harmony, integrity and well-being of the ingroup. In contrast, in an 
individualistic culture, personal goals which are motivated by self-interest are valued 
highly. To this extent, Hofstede addresses culture as a fixed, static set of values and 
norms underlying people‟s actions. I will show later in this chapter that Hofstede‟s 
static view of culture causes problems to subsequent scholars, in that when they 
follow Hofstede (or both Hofstede and Hall) to address cultural differences, they 
assume that the context in which an utterance is produced is determined before the 
process of comprehension. Consequently, their methodologies do not allow an analyst 
to explain the assumptions activated in on-going interactions. Hofstede‟s approach 
also assumes that people who belong to a specific culture are a homogeneous group, 
and therefore does not include those who hold bicultural meaning systems. For 
example, people from China who have learned English, or have been exposed to 
English culture, and vice versa, are not considered in Hofstede‟s approach. I will 
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show in this chapter that because of this, when Hofstede‟s followers address cultural 
differences in intercultural interactions, they are unable to address how culture 
informs the behaviours of those bicultural individuals.  
Hofstede has gone on to characterise national cultures surveyed as being either 
individualistic or collectivistic. For example, based on the most recent individualism 
index scores for 74 countries and regions provided by Hofstede and Hofstede (2005), 
China scores very low in the individualism scale (ranks 56-61 out of 74). In contrast, 
Britain scores very high in the individualism scale (ranks 3 out of 74). These scores 
indicate that China and Britain are seen to differ in their cultural orientations, with 
China being a collectivistic culture and Britain being an individualistic one.  
Since its first publication in 1980, Hofstede‟s dimension of individualism and 
collectivism has been applied to a wide variety of contexts. In the section that follows, 
I review some studies that have applied Hofstede‟s approach to addressing cultural 
differences in communication, in order to argue that relevant studies do not make 
explicit the criteria they are applying when they make claims about the possible 
cultural differences they are addressing.  
2.2.1.2 Evaluation of studies applying Hofstede’s approach 
Although Hofstede‟s approach has generated a large body of research, in application, 
studies addressing cultural differences in communication tend to rely on this single 
broad dimension to account for one main issue: the differences between individualism 
and collectivism according to the distinction between direct and indirect style.  
In the literature of culture and communication, the distinction between direct and 
indirect style refers to the extent to which speakers reveal their intentions through 
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explicit communication (e.g Adair and Brett 2004, 165; Gudykunst and Ting-Toomey 
1988, 100; Ting-Toomey 1999, 103). For example, writing over two decades ago, 
Gudykunst and Ting-Toomey (1988, 100) categorise this distinction as follows: 
The direct verbal style refers to verbal messages that embody and invoke 
speakers‟ true intentions… the indirect verbal style, in contrast, refers to verbal 
messages that camouflage and cancel speakers‟ true intentions. 
What Gudykunst and Ting-Toomey actually argue here is that if the set of 
propositions or assumptions that a speaker is attempting to convey to her audience are 
explicitly expressed by the words the speaker uses, then the style of the speaker is 
direct. Conversely, if the set of propositions or assumptions are expressed by the 
context in which the words are communicated, then the speaker‟s style is indirect. 
There is evidence that recent studies on culture and communication still draw on this 
distinction to address cultural differences. For example, in accounting for differences 
between high context and low context cultures (I will discuss the two terms in Section 
2.2.2.1), Adair and Brett (2004, 161) argue that:   
[An indirect style refers to the assumption that], meaning is conveyed not just by 
a person‟s words or acts, but also by the contexts in which those words or acts are 
communicated. [A direct style refers to the assumption that], meaning is 
embedded in words or acts. 
As I show in my subsequent literature review, while theorising cultural differences 
according to this distinction, relevant studies have revealed many problems in terms 
of the theories they apply and the methods of analysis they use. In this section, I 
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evaluate four examples of research on culture and communication that addresses 
cultural differences based on Hofstede‟s approach.  
The first example I focus on is conducted by Adair and Brett (2004). In this account, 
in order to examine cultural differences, Adair and Brett focus on the use of direct and 
indirect styles between individualistic and collectivistic cultures in the context of 
negotiation. They argue that the styles of negotiators from individualistic cultures are 
direct, whereas the styles of negotiators from collectivistic cultures are indirect. As 
proof of this, Adair and Brett use the following evidence. 
According to Adair and Brett (2004), in response to a question of whether negotiators 
want to accept the price of the product being offered, a negotiator from an 
individualistic culture might say something like (a) to express that the price of the 
product being offered is too high to be accepted, whereas a negotiator from a 
collectivistic culture might say something like (b) to express the same meaning, as 
shown below: 
 Direct style  
(a) My company is so financially weak, so without a good price, my company will not 
be able to buy the product at all (adapted from the original). 
 Indirect style  
(b) We‟ve had a bad quarter, and our acquisition budget is extremely limited. 
 (Adair and Brett 2004, 162) 
In consequence, Adair and Brett (2004, 162) characterise (a) as being direct and (b) as 
being indirect.   
 29 
 
We can see that (a) is not a direct quotation of an utterance made by the negotiator 
from an individualistic culture. It is not clear what actual utterance could be, and 
therefore the reliability of such data needs to be questioned. Despite this, however, if 
we accept the claim in this study that there are differences in the use of direct and 
indirect style between individualistic and collectivistic cultures, the immediate 
question one may ask is how this claim can be substantiated. As Brown and Levinson 
(1987, 55) point out: 
[When discussing spoken data], descriptions will have uncertain status and must 
be taken on the assumption that other observers so placed would similarly 
observe. 
The argument Brown and Levinson make here is that, for an analyst himself or herself 
to understand a speaker involved in the study is not sufficient; it is also necessary for 
the analyst to justify his or her claim by explaining how the claims are generated at a 
specific context. 
It might be easy to make a case for why one style is more indirect than the other. For 
example, according to speech-act theory (e.g. Austin 1975; Searle 1980), in any 
communicative event, speakers come to perform acts through their use of utterances. 
When Adair and Brett characterise (a) as direct and (b) as indirect, they seem to 
assume that if one hears (a), one may make the assumption that the propositional 
content of (a) pretty much maps onto what the speaker is trying to convey here, which 
is without a good price, my company is not able to buy the product at all. Equally, if 
one hears (b), one would assume that the propositional content of (b) can be taken to 
convey a range of different things: it could potentially indicate that (i) we are not able 
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to buy anything because of a bad quota and a limited budget; or that (ii) we could only 
buy products at a lower price. Because the propositional meaning expressed in (b) 
does not map onto what I take to be the speaker‟s meaning as in (i) and (ii), (b) is 
therefore indirect.  
With regard to categorising styles, I agree with Adair and Brett that (b) is indeed 
indirect, because it could potentially generate a range of implicatures like (i) and (ii). 
What I do not agree with is their categorising (a) as being direct. In my view, (a) is 
not direct, because the utterance itself does not explicitly state the meaning the 
utterance is intended to have, in that it does not explicitly state the speaker‟s meaning 
which I would argue is something like „you have to offer us a better price if you want 
us to buy your product’. To work out the intended meaning, one has to go beyond the 
literal meaning of the uttered sentence in (a) to do some inferential work.  Because of 
this, I argue that both (a) and (b) are indirect. What this means is that Adair and Brett 
are applying specific criteria when distinguishing between (a) and (b). However, 
Adair and Brett (2004) do not make explicit the criteria underlying their 
categorisation process. Without explaining how the two types of style are categorised, 
one can only assume that, for Adair and Brett, what counts as direct and indirect 
forms of style is self-evident to a hearer. As I have just shown, what they categorise as 
„direct‟ is not direct.  Because Adair and Brett do not actually show how they come to 
categorise (a) and (b) as direct and indirect respectively, according to Brown and 
Levinson (1987), this study does not justify its claim about the possible difference 
between individualistic and collectivistic cultures in the use of styles with supporting 
evidence. 
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This problem is not specific to Adair and Brett‟s work. A similar example can be seen 
in the work by Ting-Toomey (1999). In this study, Ting-Toomey draws on Hofstede‟s 
distinction between individualism and collectivism to examine cultural differences 
between America and Japan in the use of styles in conflict situations. According to 
Ting-Toomey (1999, 103):  
[I]n individualistic cultures, people tend to encounter more situations that 
emphasize … direct talk…. In contrast, in collectivistic cultures, people tend to 
encounter more situations that emphasize…indirect talk….The direct and indirect 
styles differ in the extent to which communicators reveal their intentions through 
the straightforwardness of their content message.  
Ting-Toomey uses the following example to illustrate how differences in the use of 
direct and indirect styles between Americans and Japanese are realised in conflict 
situations: 
Dialogue 1 (A dispute between two European American neighbours) 
Jane (knocks on her neighbour’s open window): Excuse me, it is 11 o‟clock already, 
and your high-pitched opera singing is really disturbing my sleep. Please stop 
your gargling noises immediately! I have an important job interview tomorrow 
morning, and I want to get a good night sleep. I really need this job to pay my 
rent. 
Diane (resentfully): Well, this is the only time I can rehearse my opera! I‟ve an 
important audition coming up tomorrow. You‟re not the only one that is 
starving, you know. I also need to pay my rent. Stop being so self-centred! 
 32 
 
Jane (frustrated): I really think you‟re being very unreasonable. If you don‟t stop your 
singing right now I‟m going to file a complaint with the apartment manager and 
he could evict you… 
Diane (sarcastically): OK, be my guest…Do whatever you want. I‟m going to sing as 
I please.  
Dialogue 2 (two Japanese housewives talking about Mrs B‟s daughter‟s piano lesson) 
Mrs. A: Your daughter has started taking piano lessons, hasn‟t she? I envy you, 
because you can be proud of her talent. You must be looking forward to her 
future as a pianist. I‟m really impressed by her enthusiasm – every day, she 
practices so hard, for hours and hours, until late at night.  
Mrs. B: Oh, no, not at all. She‟s just a beginner. We don‟t know her future yet. We 
hadn‟t realized that you could hear her playing. I‟m so sorry you have been 
disturbed by her noise.  
(Naotsuka et al. 1981, 70, cited by Ting-Toomey 1999, 101-2). 
An issue that arises from the above examples is that there is no reference to indicate 
whether the data Ting-Toomey uses is naturally occurring interaction, elicited data, or 
invented data, so this is again an issue of reliability that is not established. 
Nevertheless, Ting-Toomey‟s point in citing the above set of examples is to argue that 
there are differences between Japan and America, in that the styles of the two 
Americans are „direct, to the point, bluntly contentious‟, whereas the two Japanese 
ladies „are practising the high-context communication style‟, which implies that their 
styles are indirect. 
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If we accept the claim Ting-Toomey makes that Americans and Japanese differ in 
their use of styles, this then raises the question of the grounds on which Ting-Toomey 
is claiming that one set of utterances is direct and the other is indirect.   
It is possible to assume that when Ting-Toomey claims that utterances produced by 
the American ladies are direct, she seems to assume that if one hears an utterance like 
„Please stop your gargling noises immediately‟, one would assume that this utterance 
is functioning as a command, in that Jane may be using that form of words to tell 
Diane that she should stop singing immediately. It can be assumed that Diane‟s 
response that „Well, this is the only time I can rehearse my opera‟ is functioning not 
to comply with Jane‟s request since this type of non-compliance implies a refusal to 
obey that command. For Ting-Toomey, the utterances produced by Jane and Diane 
are both direct because the propositional content of what the American ladies said 
appear to map onto the meaning  the speakers are trying to convey here. However, I 
argue that neither of the utterances is direct, in that neither actually states the meaning 
it is intended to have. For example, neither explicitly states „I hereby command you to 
stop‟ and „I hereby refuse to obey your command‟. Therefore, the American ladies 
actually use indirect communication that requires some degree of inferencing on the 
part of a hearer. 
I agree with Ting-Toomey‟s claim that the style used by the Japanese ladies is 
indirect. It seems obvious that if one hears an utterance produced by Mrs. A that „I’m 
really impressed by her enthusiasm – every day, she practices so hard, for hours and 
hours, until late at night‟, one would assume that this utterance appears to function as 
a compliment. However, it does not explicitly indicate the meaning it is intended to 
have, in that it does not actually say „I hereby compliment your daughter on her piano 
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skills‟, one may therefore assume that the utterances made by Mrs. A may not be 
intending to express a compliment, but are implying the opposite of what Mrs. A has 
said, in that she may be using this form of words to tell Mrs. B indirectly that she has 
been disturbed. On this basis, one may draw the conclusion that what Mrs. A has said 
is intended to make an indirect complaint. The interpretation that Mrs. A is 
complaining can be supported by the apology of Mrs. B. An apology would not be an 
appropriate response if the utterance were actually interpreted as a compliment.  
Thus, both Japanese and American ladies use indirect communication that requires the 
generation of implicatures. My point is that Ting-Toomey must have applied some 
sort of criteria to enable her to categorise the utterances made by the American and 
the Japanese ladies as being direct and indirect respectively, although it is not made 
explicit what the criteria are. In the absence of a theoretical criterion by which Ting-
Toomey can make such categorisations, like Adair and Brett (2004), Ting-Toomey 
suggests that what counts as direct and indirect is self-evident to a hearer. Because 
Ting-Toomey does not actually do what Brown and Levinson (1987) suggest that we 
do, in that she does not explain how she categorises one style as direct and another 
style as indirect, the claim this study makes is not justified.  
A third study I review in relation to its approach to cultural differences in 
communication is seen in the work by Brew and Cairns (2004). Drawing on the 
theoretical frameworks by Hofstede (1980) and Hall (1976), Brew and Cairns‟ study 
sets out to examine the interaction between cultural orientation and three situational 
constraints (i.e. time urgency, cultural identity of the other and work status of the 
other). Specifically, they attempted to investigate the choice of direct and indirect 
style and conflict management behaviour for three conflict scenarios in a multicultural 
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workplace located in Singapore and Bangkok. For this purpose, Brew and Cairns 
carried out separate interviews with two groups of employees from countries in East 
Asia and Australia: two cultures that have been regarded, according to Hofstede 
(1980), as a collectivistic and an individualist culture respectively. In this interview, 
the participants were asked to choose one response (from three or four different 
communication approaches) which best reflected how they would really act if faced 
with such a situation. The following example of the responses is provided by Brew 
and Cairn, who categorise the responses (I only use two as an illustration) into direct 
and indirect style respectively: 
 Direct style 
(a) Tell your boss in precise words why you think the features will detract from the 
promotion. 
Indirect style 
(b) Tell your boss in a diplomatic and subtle manner why you think the features       
will detract from the promotion.  
     (Brew and Cairns 2004, 338) 
On the basis of their analysis, Brew and Cairns make the claim that  
The overall hypothesis that East Asian host-nationals are generally more likely 
than expatriates from Australia to choose indirect communication strategies 
across all situations was only supported when dealing with a supervisor, 
particularly a Westerner (2004, 345-6). 
Therefore, what Brew and Cairns actually argue here is that there are similarities in 
the two cultures in the use of style, except that „East Asians only managed conflict 
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more indirectly than Australians with supervisors, particularly a Western supervisor‟ 
(2004, 331). 
If we accept Brew and Cairns‟ above claim, this again raises the question of the 
grounds on which Brew and Cairns are claiming that one set of utterances is direct 
and the other is indirect. 
However, there is no evidence to indicate how Brew and Cairns come to categorise 
(a) and (b) as a reflection of using direct and indirect style respectively. Without such 
an explanation, one can only assume that Brew and Cairns are suggesting that what 
counts as direct and indirect is self-evident to a hearer. However, as I have shown 
earlier, this distinction is not self-evident. One may take Brew and Cairns‟ 
categorising (a) as a reflection of using direct style as an example. When making such 
a categorisation, Brew and Cairns seem to assume that if an individual chooses the 
response described in (a), this individual prefers to express his meaning in „precise 
words‟. Although Brew and Cairns do not clarify what they mean by the term „precise 
words‟, based on the way they categorise (a) as direct,  I assume this term refers to the 
set of propositions or assumptions that a speaker is attempting to convey to her 
audience is expressed explicitly in words the speaker uses. In my view, even where a 
speaker is attempting to convey to her „boss‟ a set of propositions or assumptions 
expressed explicitly in words, the speaker might still use an indirect style. For 
example, a speaker might say: „Boss, these features will make us lose our customers‟; 
or „Boss, these features will not give good impressions to our customers’. In both 
cases, the propositional content of what is said appears to map onto what the speaker 
is attempting to convey here. However, in neither of them is meaning self-evident in 
that neither explicitly states the meaning it is intended to have. For example, neither 
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says explicitly the speaker‟s meaning which I would argue is something like „Boss, 
these features are bad features‟. Hence, both of them are indirect that require the 
inferential work on the part of a hearer. What my analysis indicates is that Brew and 
Cairns must have applied specific criteria to categorise (a) and (b) as a reflection of 
using direct and indirect style respectively. Since Brew and Cairns‟ account does not 
make explicit the criteria, their study is therefore another example of not being able to 
support their claim about the use of direct and indirect style with clear evidence. 
A fourth example I review is conducted by Cohen (2004), who focuses on analysing 
cultural differences in diplomatic negotiations. Cohen argues that communication 
styles differentiate between collectivistic and individualistic cultures like Japan and 
America, as follows: 
The Japanese particularly take pride in their familial skill at reading between the 
lines, at intuiting the intention behind an elliptical hint. They even have a term for 
it: haragei – communicating from the belly, that is, reading the other‟s mind, or 
talking around an issue until a consensus emerges. In view of the American 
preference for straight talking, however, Americans may take subtlety and 
opacity for evasiveness and insincerity (Cohen 2004, 146-7). 
What Cohen actually argues here is that the style of Japanese is indirect, whereas the 
style of Americans is direct. To support this argument, Cohen cites the following 
example: on the eve of the departure of Prime Minister Eisaku Sato of Japan for a 
crucial summit with President Richard M. Nixon in 1970, Sato released the remark as 
in (a) to the press. However, in response to Sato‟s remarks, Nixon said something like 
(b) as shown below: 
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 Indirect style  
(a) Since Mr. Nixon and I are old friends, the negotiations will be three parts talk     
and seven parts haragei. 
Direct style  
(b) Nixon insisted he agree to an explicit five-point proposal as the basis for a 
settlement. 
     (Cohen 2004, 145) 
Cohen (2004, 147) argued that when saying (a), the Japan‟s prime minister indirectly 
communicated that „he could have a heart-to-heart talk with the leader of his 
country‟s closest ally, a man he considered a personal friend‟. This indicates that 
Cohen categorises (a) as indirect which requires the inference on the part of a hearer. 
Cohen further argued that the difference in the use of direct and indirect style between 
Japan and the United States posed a major barrier to effective diplomatic negotiations 
in this instance. This implies that while categorising (a) as indirect, Cohen categorised 
(b) as direct. 
One issue that arises from Cohen‟s examples is that (a) appears to be a direct 
quotation of an utterance, whereas (b) is the report of an utterance carried out by 
Nixon.  It is therefore unclear whether they are invented data, elicited data or naturally 
occurring data. This, again, leads us to question the issue of the data Cohen uses. 
Despite this, however, if we accept Cohen‟s (2004) claim that there are differences in 
the use of direct and indirect style between Americans and Japanese, the question then 
arises: on what ground is Cohen claiming that one set of utterances is direct and the 
other is indirect? 
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It can be assumed that when categorising (a) as indirect, Cohen seems to assume that 
(a) could potentially indicate a range of implicatures. For example, it might imply that 
(i) the negotiations between us will not be based on policies but on our interpersonal 
relationship; it might also imply that (ii) the negotiations between us will not be as 
formal as expected.  Because the propositional content of what is said in (a) is distinct 
from what is implied as in (i) and (ii), (a) is indirect. My view is that it is appropriate 
for Cohen to categorise (a) as indirect, because I believe (a) could indeed generate 
different interpretations like (i) and (ii). However, I do not agree with Cohen‟s 
categorising of (b) as being direct. It might seem obvious that if one hears (b), the 
immediate assumption one would make in this context is that Nixon‟s utterance does 
not appear to be a direct statement of non-cooperation, but appears to express some 
form of justificatory remark which implies a refusal to negotiate in a way suggested 
by Sato. Since (b) does not explicitly state the meaning the utterance is intended to 
have, in that it does not actually say I refuse to negotiate on the basis of three parts 
talk and seven parts haragei, (b) is therefore indirect. 
Again, it appears that Cohen is applying specific criteria which would enable him to 
categorise (a) as being indirect and (b) as being direct. However, because Cohen does 
not actually explain what criteria he is using, as with those studies I have reviewed so 
far, he is not able to support the claim that there are differences in the use of style 
between Japan and America with clear evidence.  
2.2.1.3 Summary 
In this section, by reviewing relevant literature on culture and communication, I have 
argued that applying Hofstede‟s approach to examining cultural differences reveals 
that relevant studies make claims for the use of direct and indirect styles in 
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individualistic and collectivistic cultures, but they do not provide sufficient grounds 
for being able to justify such claims.  
In the next section, I review the literature based on Hall‟s approach to the study of 
cultural differences in communication, in order to argue that relevant scholarship has 
limitations in explaining the relationship between culture and communication.  
2.2.2 Evaluations of studies based on Hall’s approach 
Hall‟s model of high- and low-context communication has been widely accepted and 
applied when comparing differences in communication among various cultures. In 
application of this model, the relevant literature falls into two main research strands: 
(a) addressing cultural differences by assuming that there is a correlation between 
culture and communication style, and (b) addressing cultural differences by assuming 
that there is a correlation between interpretation and one‟s cultural background. In this 
section, I shall evaluate each by showing how it fits into a particular trend in 
scholarship. The aim of this evaluation is to point to problems with literature in its 
theorization of cultural differences.  
I begin in Section 2.2.2.1 with my evaluation of Hall‟s basic claims, in order to argue 
that Hall‟s approach also assumes that culture is a fixed set of norms and values, and 
that people who belong to a specific culture are a homogeneous group. Here, I also 
argue that Hall‟s approach assumes that there is a correlation between high context 
cultures and indirectness. Then in Section 2.2.2.2, I review the literature that has 
applied Hall‟s approach to addressing cultural differences, in order to argue that 
studies make claims that there is a connection between culture and communication 
style, however they frequently omit explanations for how culture and the use of 
 41 
 
communication style are connected. In Section 2.2.2.3, I review literature that has 
applied Hall‟s approach to addressing differences in interpretation between people 
with distinct cultural backgrounds. In this section, I argue that whilst the relevant 
literature makes claims about the differences in interpretation between cultures, the 
way in which cultures impact on interpretation remains unexplained.  
2.2.2.1 Hall’s model of high and low context communication 
Hall (1976) argues that culture influences the way people communicate. In arguing 
this, Hall draws a distinction between high and low context communication, claiming 
that this is one way to understand cultural differences in communication. Hall 
illustrates the distinction in the following way: 
A high-context (HC) communication or message is one in which most of the 
information is either in the physical context or internalized in the person, while 
very little is in the coded, explicit, transmitted part of the message. A low-context 
(LC) communication is just the opposite; i.e., the mass of the information is 
vested in the explicit code (Hall 1976, 91). 
In the above quotation, Hall uses the term „the coded, explicit transmitted part of the 
message‟. At the time of Hall‟s (1976) research, the idea that meaning must be 
interpreted in a specific context, which was first proposed by Grice (1957, 1967, 
1975, 1989), was not well developed, and the pragmatic theories that Hall could draw 
on were limited. I therefore assume that Hall‟s use of „explicit code‟ refers to the set 
of propositions or assumptions expressed explicitly in the words a speaker uses.  
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In order to illustrate the distinction between HC and LC communication, Hall (1976, 
58-64) uses the following anecdote he observed in Japan, a HC culture within his 
„high- and low-context continuum‟, as an example: 
Hall once had an experience of staying in hotels in Japan. During his stay there, Hall 
found himself moved from one hotel to another without being told the reason, and 
„the whole matter of being moved like a piece of derelict luggage puzzled me‟ (Hall 
1976, 61). As someone who sees himself as a member of a low-context culture, 
America, Hall (1976, 61) did not expect to be moved unless the reasons for the move 
were explained to him. „To move someone without telling him is almost worse than 
an insult, because he is below the point at which feelings matter‟ (Hall 1976, 61). 
Therefore, Hall „had no notion of the meaning attached to being moved from hotel to 
hotel in Japan‟ (1976, 62). After further experiences in Japan and many discussions 
with Japanese friends, Hall finally understood that in Japan, „as soon as you register at 
the desk, you are no longer an outsider; instead, for the duration of your stay you are a 
member of a large, mobile family. You belong‟ (Hall 1976, 65, emphasise original). 
According to Hall, the fact that he was moved was tangible evidence that he „was 
being treated as a family member - a relationship in which one can afford to be 
relaxed and informal and not stand on ceremony‟ (Hall 1976, 65).  
If members of a culture, as this Japanese example shows, depend less on the meaning 
explicitly communicated in words, but more on existing knowledge about a particular 
event, Hall characterises this culture as a high context culture. Conversely, if 
members of a culture like America depend more on the meaning communicated 
explicitly in words, Hall characterises this culture as a low context culture. 
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Hall‟s example indicates that the impact that the Japanese culture had on the 
communicative behaviour of the hotel staff led to them withholding communication. 
It also indicates that, as with Hofstede, Hall‟s approach assumes that culture is a fixed 
set of norms and values, and that people who belong to a specific culture are a 
homogeneous group, in that they all appear to conform to these norms.  
According to Hall‟s high and low context continuum, China is located at the high-
context end of the continuum, whereas Britain is located at the low-context end of the 
continuum. They are therefore regarded as high and low context cultures respectively.  
Whilst arguing that cultural differences may be explained by the model of HC and LC 
communication, Hall highlights the importance of context in communication. This is 
evident in Hall‟s (1976, 92) remarks below: 
The level of context determines everything about the nature of the 
communication and is the foundation on which all subsequent behaviour rest.  
To illustrate this, Hall (1976, 86) uses the following anecdote as an example: 
In the fifties, the United States Government spent millions of dollars developing 
systems of machine translation…. [However], it was finally concluded that the 
only reliable, and ultimately the fastest, translator is a human being deeply 
conversant not only with the language but with the subject as well. The 
computers could spew out yards of print-out but they meant very little. The words 
and some of the grammar were all there, but the sense was distorted.  
Consequently, Hall (1976, 86) concludes: 
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The problem lies not in the linguistic code, but in the context, which carries 
varying proportions of the meaning. Without context, the code is incomplete 
since it encompasses only part of the message.  
Hall‟s point here is that to understand what is literally said involves not only knowing 
the meaning of words themselves in an utterance, one must know why these words are 
used in this way and in this particular circumstance. Moreover, by using the phrase 
„without context, the code is incomplete‟, Hall suggests that in order to understand a 
speaker‟s meaning in an utterance, one must look simultaneously at the meaning, the 
words and context in which an utterance takes place. This further suggests that 
understanding the context is the key to understanding communication within a culture.  
In arguing that understanding the context is crucial to communication, Hall defines 
the notion of context in the following way: 
[Context] is information that surrounds an event; it is inextricably bound up with 
the meaning of the event (Hall and Hall 1990, 9). 
However, Hall does not clarify the surrounding information that constitutes the 
context, but distinguishes between „internalized contexting‟ and „external contexting‟ 
(Hall 1976, 95). In making this distinction, Hall argues that the former refers to 
schematic constructs or background knowledge stored in people‟s brains, while the 
latter depends on the use of deixis (i.e. time and place of an utterance).  
According to Hall (1976, 95), contexting is the process of how context is drawn upon 
in order to understand an event. He argues that there are differences in drawing upon 
contextual information between high and low context cultures, in that HC cultures 
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draw upon „internalized‟ information whilst LC cultures draw upon „external‟ 
information. By formulating this argument, Hall seems to imply that the differences in 
drawing upon these two types of information exist before the process of interpretation 
takes place. Such an implication causes much confusion among Hall‟s followers. I 
will show later in Section 2.2.2.3, while adopting Hall‟s approach to theorising 
cultural differences, scholars focusing on culture and communication tend to see 
context as a fixed feature that pre-exists an interpretation process. Because of this, 
they are unable to explain how meaning is generated in a specific context.  
While stressing the differences in depending on contextual information between 
different cultures, Hall (1976) goes on to argue that it is essential for people from 
different cultures to understand these differences. He states that when people with 
distinct cultural backgrounds interact with each other, a „failure to take contexting 
differences into account can cause problems‟ (Hall 1976, 113). 
To illustrate this point, Hall (1976, 113) uses the following example: 
People raised in high-context systems expect more of others than do the 
participants in low-context systems. When talking about something that they have 
in their minds, a high-context individual will expect his [sic] interlocutor to know 
what‟s bothering him [sic], so that he [sic] doesn‟t have to be specific. The result 
is that he [sic] will talk around and around the point, in effect putting all the 
pieces in place except the crucial one. 
In the above quotation, although Hall does not explicitly state that communication 
style of a HC culture is indirect, the distinctive characteristics identified throughout 
Hall‟s explanation include: „he will talk around and around the point, in effect putting 
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all the pieces in place except the crucial one‟. This suggests that what Hall actually 
argues here is that there is a correlation between high context cultures and 
indirectness. In fact, this is how it has been interpreted and widely accepted by 
subsequent scholarship (e.g. Adair et al. 2001; Brew and Cairns 2004;  Cohen 1991; 
Fujishin 2007; Gao 1998; Gao and Ting-Toomey 1998; Gudykunst 1998c; Hammer 
2005; Hecht et al. 1993; Kapoor et al. 2003; Nelson et al. 2002; Pekerti and Thomas 
2003; Ting-Toomey 1999; Trubisky et al.1991).   
In the next section, I review four studies I am citing here in further detail, so as to 
argue that relevant studies make claims that culture is closely connected to 
communication style used by members of that culture; however, they do not actually 
explore how the connection is made. 
2.2.2.2 Evaluation of studies applying Hall’s approach  
The first study I review is carried out by Fujishin (2007), who examines differences 
between Japan, America and England in the use of communication style in a business 
context. According to Fujishin (2007, 69): 
In a low-context style, verbal communication is very direct, precise, explicit and 
literal….[In HC cultures] verbal communication is indirect, subtle, implicit and 
figurative….you are expected to read between the lines and understand what the 
speaker is intending to communicate without being told or instructed with explicit 
details.  
To support this argument, Fujishin cites the following anecdote as evidence: 
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In response to a question of whether one wants to do business with another in a 
business context, a negotiator from a HC culture like Japan tends to say something 
like (b) in order to express a refusal, whereas a negotiator from a LC culture like 
America and England tends to say something like (a) to express the same meaning.   
Direct style: 
(a) No. 
Indirect style: 
 (b) You have a good product. 
  (Fujishin 2007, 69). 
That a Japanese negotiator expresses a refusal in such a way, as Fujishin (2007, 69-
70) claims, „is understood in the context of Japanese business… [Because] it would be 
considered rude, or offensive to be too direct, explicit, inquisitive or verbally 
persistent‟. The point Fujishin (2007) makes here is therefore that the style used by 
the negotiator from America or England is direct, whereas the style used by the 
Japanese negotiator is indirect. This indicates that what Fujishin actually argues here 
is that culture has an impact on how utterances are produced and interpreted.  
This study appears to chart a correlation between culture and communication style 
used by members of that culture. However, Fujishin takes the correlation to be an 
explanation, and the whole explanation is clearly predicated on the assumption that 
Japanese negotiators communicate indirectly because they are from high context 
cultures or that negotiators from America and England communicate directly because 
they are from low context cultures. This explanation is in fact an example of what 
Cameron calls the „correlation fallacy‟ (1990, 85). According to Cameron (1990, 85), 
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a „correlation fallacy‟ refers to the assumption that „the purported explanation does 
not in fact explain anything‟. For example, if someone explains the correlation 
between a speaker‟s use of language and her social identity, then he or she is expected 
to explain how the speaker‟s use of language reflects her social status. This is 
because, as Cameron (1990, 85) argues, to explain the correlation is to „ask in virtue 
of what the correlation might hold‟. Any account which does not go on to take this 
further step has fallen into „the correlational fallacy‟ (Cameron 1990, 85), I argue that 
the study by Fujishin (2007) is a case in point. My point is that although Fujishin 
makes the claim that there is a correlation between culture and communication style, 
he does not provide any information to indicate how the correlation is made. That is, 
he does not actually show how culture has an impact on the way people produce and 
interpret an utterance in a specific context. In the absence of this further level of 
information, the claim Fujishin makes in this study that culture is closely related to 
communication style can only be considered speculative, since it is not justified with 
evidence.  
The problem indicated in Fujishin‟s work is also revealed in a number of other studies 
which address cultural difference in communication. The second study I review is 
carried out by Pekerti and Thomas (2003). Drawing on the theoretical frameworks of 
Hall (1976) and Hofstede (1980), Pekerti and Thomas‟ study seeks to account for 
differences in styles in an intercultural interaction between participants from Eastern 
Asia and those from Anglo-European New-Zealand (i.e Pakeha), two cultures 
regarded as collectivistic (HC) and individualistic (LC) according to Hofstede (1980) 
and Hall (1976). In this account, Pakerti and Thomas first claim that East Asians and 
New Zealanders differ, in that the former has a tendency to use indirect style, whilst 
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the later prefers to use direct style. They then test whether individuals from the two 
cultures in the intercultural interaction „will alter their communication styles to be 
more like that of the other cultural participants‟ or „to be more representative of their 
own cultures‟ (Pakerti and Thomas 2003, 142). This indicates that the participants of 
the study are at least bicultural individuals, living in an ethnically diverse 
environment. 
In order to do the test, Pekerti and Thomas videotaped an experimental task, in which 
participants were asked to complete a consensus decision-making task that required 
communication with one other participant. On the basis of their analysis of the 
observed behaviours of the participants, Pekerti and Thomas argue that  
Overall, the results of our analysis provide support for hypothesis … [that there 
are ] cultural differences in communication styles, as indicated by both frequency 
and intensity of behaviour, were evident across cultures. An idiocentric 
communication style was dominant for Pakeha. That is, they were more 
expressive, dominant, aggressive, opinionated, and argumentative…In contrast, a 
sociocentric style was dominant for Asians. They were more accommodating, 
avoided arguments, and were more inclined to shift opinions (2003, 145). 
Pekerti and Thomas (2003, 141) use the terms „sociocentric‟ and „idiocentric‟ in their 
account. Since they apply the former to behaviours indicated by „high-context, and 
indirect actions‟, and the latter to behaviours indicated by „low-context, direct 
actions‟, I understand that the two terms refer to the same notions as indirect and 
direct styles, as proposed by other culture and communication studies. For ease of 
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reference, I show the differences in the use of communication styles between the 
cultures in consideration that this study claims as follows:  
Direct style (New Zealanders) 
 (a)  They were more expressive, dominant, aggressive, opinionated, and   
argumentative.  
  Indirect style (East Asians) 
   (b) They were more accommodating, avoided arguments, and were more inclined to 
shift opinions.  
       (Pekerti and Thomas 2003, 149) 
It should be apparent that by categorising (a) as behaviours (of New Zealanders) that 
reflect the use of direct style, and (b) as behaviours (of East Asians) that reflect the 
use of indirect style, Pekerti and Thomas suggest that there is a strong correlation 
between culture and communication style reflected in a specific behaviour of 
members in that culture. However, similar to that of Fujishin (2007), Pekerti and 
Thomas‟ explanations for the correlation are clearly predicted on the assumption that 
the communicative behaviours of East Asians reflect the use of indirect style because 
they are from collectivistic (HC) cultures, or that communicative behaviours of New 
Zealanders reflect the use of indirect style because they are from an individualistic 
(LC) culture. There is no specific data offered which would give a clear indication of 
how culture and the use of communication style are connected. Therefore, this is 
another example of „the correlational fallacy‟ (Cameron 1990, 85). I argue that the 
reason that Pekerti and Thomas (2003) do not in fact explain how culture and 
communication style are connected is a direct consequence of their methodology. In 
their methodology, people who belong to a culture are a homogeneous group, and 
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therefore those who have been exposed extensively to two different cultures, namely, 
bicultural individuals, are not included. Consequently, when bicultural individuals are 
involved in a study, this methodology does not enable authors to explain how culture 
might inform the behaviours of the bicultural individuals. I argue that in the era of 
rapid globalization, it is an increasing phenomenon that more and more people have 
become bicultural. On this premise, if researchers who focus on cultural differences in 
communication address cultural differences solely from the perspective of a culture as 
a homogeneous group, only a very limited explanation of cultural difference in 
communication can be expected. Only when bicultural individuals are taken into 
account, can potential differences in communication between cultures be explained 
more fully. I also argue that the limitations imposed by Pekerti and Thomas‟ account 
can be avoided if their study were to draw on an alternative approach to culture: 
Hong‟s (2009) dynamic constructivist view of culture. Since Pekerti and Thomas do 
not actually provide the level of information about how culture and communication 
style are connected, they are therefore unable to justify their claim, namely that there 
is a correlation between culture and communication style. 
A third example may be seen in the work of Adair and Brett (2004, 162), who claim 
that communication style of HC cultures is indirect, whereas communication style of 
LC cultures is direct. To support this claim, Adair and Brett use a conversation 
between a seller from a HC culture such as Japan or China, and a buyer from a LC 
culture such as USA or Germany. Adair and Brett (2004) argue that in the context of 
business negotiation, in response to a question of whether a seller wants to sell his or 
her product at the price being offered, the seller from a high-context culture  tends to 
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say something like (a). Upon hearing (a), a buyer from low context cultures tends to 
respond by saying something like (b).  
Indirect style – A HC culture 
 (a) We are an award-winning film studio and therefore get higher prices for our 
production.  
Direct style – A LC culture 
 
 (b) Even though your studio has won awards for its film series, you‟ve moved this 
series into syndication a year early, so you cannot expect a high price under those 
market conditions. 
     (Adair and Brett 2004, 165) 
According to Adair and Brett, by saying (a), the seller indirectly communicates that 
the price of the product is too low to be accepted; by saying (b) the buyer is making a 
direct refusal to offer a higher price for the product.  
In arguing that a negotiator from a HC culture is using an indirect style, whereas a 
negotiator from a LC culture is using a direct style, Adair and Brett attempt to make 
the point that there is a correlation between culture and the use of communication 
style. However, I argue that in order to understand similarities or differences in the 
use of style across cultures, it is necessary to have a way of talking about how culture 
is related to communication style. It does not make any sense to say, as Adair and 
Brett actually do here, that negotiators from USA and Germany use direct style 
because they are from LC cultures or that negotiators from Japan and China use 
indirect style because they are from HC cultures. This does not tell us how, or if, 
culture and communication style are linked. If Adair and Brett are correct, then there 
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must be some aspects of the cultures in USA and Germany or Japan and China that 
are different and this difference, in turn, explains why negotiators from USA and 
Germany communicate indirectly and people from Japan and China communicate 
directly. Therefore, while Adair and Brett offer interesting data, without this further 
level of information, their claim that there is a correlation between culture and 
communication style is not supported with convincing evidence. As a result, Adair 
and Brett‟s (2004) work also falls into the category of „the correlational fallacy‟ 
(Cameron 1990, 85).  
A fourth example I consider is that of Neuliep (2006, 61), who argues that a person in 
a low-context culture uses „a direct style of communication whereas a high-context 
person prefers indirectness‟. The evidence Neuliep uses to support this argument is 
the conversation between Mr. Hutchinson, the head of Information Technology (IT) 
within his organization, from a low context culture, and Mr. Wong, a lead computer 
programmer who was born and raised in Malaysia, a high-context culture. Therefore, 
although Neuliep does not acknowledge this, it is clear to me that Mr. Wong is a 
bicultural individual who is exposed to a culture foreign to his own. In what follows, I 
use only part of their conversation which I assume to be relevant to my analysis: 
Mr. Hutchinson: The program looks good and passed the test run with only minor 
errors. When do you think you can put it into production? I don‟t 
see any production schedule here. The changes need to go into the 
system by the end of the month. Is that possible? When do you want 
to go with this? 
Mr. Wong: Maybe I should review the requirements.  
 54 
 
Mr. Hutchinson: The errors were minor. Quality Control needs to know when it will 
go into production. Let‟s set the production date now. Just tell me 
when you‟ll fix the errors. I‟ll tell QC.  
Mr. Wong: Perhaps I can email you an estimate. I‟ll talk to the team.  
Mr. Hutchinson: Couldn‟t you just tell me when you‟ll have them fixed? Here, it‟s no 
big deal. (Hands Mr. Wong the program) Don‟t they seem like easy 
fixes? 
(Neuliep 2006, 61) 
On the evidence such as above, Neuliep (2006, 62) argues that  
When Mr. Wong indicates that setting a date is difficult and will require some 
expertise, he is indirectly telling Mr. Hutchinson that he is not in a position to 
make the decision on his own and would prefer to discuss with his team.  
The point Neuliep makes here is that the style of members from LC cultures, 
represented by Mr. Hutchinson, is direct, whereas the style of members from HC 
cultures, represented by Mr. Wong, is indirect. This indicates that what Neuliep 
actually argues is that culture is correlated with communication style. However, rather 
like all the other studies I have discussed in this section, there is no specific evidence 
in this account to indicate how such a correlation is made. I argue that the reason that 
Neuliep does not explain how culture and communication style are correlated with 
each other is that Neuliep is limited by the methodology he employs. It should be 
clear that, similar to that of Pekerti and Thomas (2003) I discussed earlier, Neuliep‟s 
account works on the assumption that people who belong to a specific culture follow a 
fixed set of norms and values. Therefore, those who have been exposed to two or 
more cultures are not taken into account. When bicultural individuals do appear in a 
study like the one carried out by Neuliep, the author feels unable to explain how 
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culture may inform communicative behaviours of the bicultural individuals. Again, I 
argue that if Neuliep adopted a dynamic constructivist approach to culture, the 
problem revealed in this study could be solved. Since Neuliep does not actually 
provide specific information to indicate how culture and communication style are 
connected, therefore, this is another example of a study not justifying its claim about 
the correlation between culture and communication style.  
I have reviewed four studies that have sought to apply Hall‟s approach to addressing 
cultural differences. Evidence suggests that studies have accepted Hall‟s account that 
high context cultures are more indirect and low context cultures are more direct. 
However, they do not actually explore how culture and communication style are 
connected. On this basis, I have argued that the claims these studies make that there is 
a correlation between culture and communication style are not justified.  
In the next section, I review literature that has extended Hall‟s approach to the study 
of inference involved in understanding an utterance, in order to explain why the points 
I have made in this section about the lack of evidence regarding the correlation 
between culture and communication style are significant when studying the 
relationship between culture and communication.   
2.2.2.3 Studies extending Hall’s approach to address differences in 
interpretations 
My goal in this section is to review studies of culture and communication in order to 
argue that studies make the claim that there are differences in interpretation between 
people with distinct cultural backgrounds. However, they do not actually explain how 
culture impacts on interpretation. 
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Among those scholars who focus on theorising cultural differences according to styles, 
Adair and Brett (2004), Adair et al. (2001), Brett (2000, 2007), Gao and Ting-
Toomey (1998), Gudykunst (1998b), Ting-Toomey (1999), take Hall‟s argument one 
step further, by pointing out that communication style of HC cultures is indirect, and 
that hearers have to infer what a speaker intends to communicate in her utterances. In 
their view, style in LC cultures is direct, and hearers can derive the intention of a 
speaker by simply decoding what is said. When making these claims, although it is 
not made explicit, I argue that the terms they use, and the way in which they express 
their concern all imply that inference is only required for communication in HC 
cultures, but is not involved in identifying a speaker‟s intention for hearers in LC 
cultures. For example, Ting-Toomey (1999, 100-101) claims that  
[LC] refers to communication patterns of direct verbal mode…, the speaker is 
expected to be responsible for constructing a clear, persuasive message that the 
listener can decode easily. [HC] refers to communication patterns of indirect 
verbal mode …the receiver or interpreter of the message assumes the 
responsibility to infer the hidden or contextual meaning of the message.  
Ting-Toomey‟s point here is that hearers in HC cultures need to „infer‟ the meaning 
of the message. In comparison, she uses the expression „to decode‟ to describe the 
way through which hearers in LC cultures interpret „a clear, persuasive message‟. 
Drawing on recent developments in pragmatics showing that decoding is the recovery 
of a message that is made available (i.e. recovering the phonetic representation of the 
sentence uttered and decoding it into the associated semantic representation), and it 
cannot account for how assumptions are communicated, I argue that if a speaker‟s 
message is clearly constructed, and what hearers do is just to „decode‟ a message, this 
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means that hearers do not need to infer the meaning of a speaker. This is because 
within pragmatics, inferencing is seen as the process of working from a premise or 
evidence through reasoning to reach a conclusion (Sperber and Wilson 1995, Ch.2). 
More specifically, what Ting-Toomey suggests here is that an inferential process is 
only required for communication in HC cultures, but may not be required for 
communicators in LC cultures.  
Similarly, Brett (2000), Adair et al. (2001) and Gudykunst (2004) use such terms as 
„explicit message‟ (Brett 2000, 101), „accurate message‟ (Adair et al. 2001, 372), and 
„direct, precise and clear message‟ (Gudykunst 2004, 57) to describe the way in which 
speakers in LC cultures formulate their messages. This indicates that what these 
scholars suggest is that in LC cultures, the set of propositions or assumptions that a 
speaker is attempting to convey to her addressees are explicitly expressed by the 
words the speaker uses, and the intention of the speaker can simply be decoded. As a 
result, inference becomes unnecessary.  
To illustrate the point that inference is only involved in understanding communication 
in HC cultures, I now use the following data from Gao and Ting-Toomey (1998, 76, 
also used in Ting-Toomey 1999, 104):  
Scene 1 
American 1: We‟re going to New Orleans this weekend.  
American 2: What fun! I wish we were going with you. How long are you going to be    
there? [If she wants a ride, she will ask.] 
American 1: Three days. By the way, we may need a ride to the airport. Do you think 
you can take us? 
American 2: Sure. What time? 
American 1: 10:30 p.m. this coming Saturday. 
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Scene 2 
Chinese 1: We‟re going to New Orleans this weekend. 
Chinese 2: What fun!  I wish we were going with you. How long are you going to be 
there? 
Chinese 1: Three days [I hope she‟ll offer me a ride to the airport]. 
Chinese 2: [She may want me to give her a ride] Do you need a ride to the airport? I‟ll 
take you. 
Chinese 1: Are you sure it‟s not too much trouble? 
Chinese 2: It‟s no trouble at all 
The above example consists of a pair of contrastive „airport ride request‟ scenes 
between two Chinese and two Americans. In Scene 1, the way the Americans ask for 
a favour, according to Gao and Ting-Toomey (1998, 76), „is reflective of its low-
context communication character‟, in that their statements are „clear and direct‟ and 
therefore „reveal the intention of the speaker‟. What is implied here is that inferential 
work on the part of a hearer is unnecessary. However, I feel that the claim Gao and 
Ting-Toomey make is contradictory in some way. On the one hand, they assume that 
the process of inference is not required. On the other hand, they attribute their own 
inferred meaning If she wants a ride, she will ask to the utterances produced by 
American 2, as shown in the brackets. What this indicates is that understanding an 
utterance produced by an American does, indeed, need inference. Moreover, although 
Gao and Ting-Toomey attribute their own inferred meaning to the utterance, there is 
no evidence to indicate how that inference is drawn. I argue and I will explain later 
that all these problems are caused by the methodology Gao and Ting-Toomey 
employed in this study.  
If we accept that only HC communication requires a process of inference, whereas LC 
communication does not, this may predict that in LC cultures, the process of meaning 
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construction is seen as self-evident. However, a fundamental tenet of pragmatics, as 
pointed out by many researchers in the past, is that interpretation is not a self-evident 
matter. For example, writing over thirty years ago, Wunderlinch (1980, 298) argues 
that it is not always clear what the meaning of the words and phrases in a sentence 
actually is, because their meaning often depends on the context of the utterance. This 
is significant insofar as where the meaning of an utterance is taken to be self-evident, 
this means that a hearer does not need to engage with the context in which meaning is 
produced. The implication is that without reference to contextual information, the 
hearer would automatically know the intended meaning of the utterance. This is 
highly problematic from the perspective of pragmatics. My point is that the reason 
that scholars like Gao and Ting-Toomey make the assumption about LC cultures not 
relying on inference is a consequence of their methodology, which is premised on the 
assumption that culture is a fixed set of values and norms, and that the differences in 
drawing upon the assumptions about these values in the process of communication 
exist before any communication takes place. In other words, context in which an 
utterance is produced is determined in advance of the process of interpretation. 
Because of this, this methodology does not allow an analyst to explain how meaning 
is generated in a specific context. In order for an analyst to explain how meaning is 
generated in a specific context, we need a methodology that allows us to address the 
dynamics of meaning generation. Without employing such a methodology, Gao and 
Ting-Toomey‟s aim of addressing differences between HC and LC cultures cannot 
provide evidence which would make their account explanatory. 
The limitations of Gao and Ting-Toomey‟s methodology are also revealed in Scene 2, 
where Chinese 1 does not directly express his or her concern over the ride to the 
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airport. According to Gao and Ting-Toomey (1998, 77), „in Chinese culture, such 
requests for help are likely to be implied rather than stated explicitly and directly‟.  
The point Gao and Ting-Toomey (1998) make is that the way in which Chinese ask a 
favour is a typical indirect style of communication because the speaker‟s actual 
intention is „camouflaged‟. In arguing this, they suggest that since the intention of 
asking a favour is implied, hearers need to undertake some inferential work in order to 
identify this intention. Gao and Ting-Toomey go on to argue that the differences 
between Americans and Chinese in interpreting a speaker‟s meaning in this particular 
context are caused by the differences in their respective cultures, in that „north 
Americans believe in the need for individual autonomy, whereas Chinese hold that a 
direct request often poses an undesirable imposition, which is damaging to the 
harmonious human relationship‟ (1998, 77). This seems to suggest that people from 
the same culture will generate the same interpretation for the same utterance. 
However, as I will show in the following chapter, a single utterance will generate 
different interpretations for different hearers.  
Whilst arguing that differences in interpretation between Chinese and Americans in 
this context may be attributed to differences in their respective cultures, Gao and 
Ting-Toomey appear to assume that when interlocutors interpret each other‟s 
utterances, they draw on a separate set of assumptions, which in this case appear to be 
based on their existing cultural knowledge which informs them of what to expect and 
how to behave in a particular situation. For example, if a Chinese interlocutor hears 
the utterance „we are going to New Orleans this weekend‟, she or he would then make 
the assumption that „she may want me to give her a ride, and even if she has such a 
request for help, it would not be polite for her to ask, therefore I need to ask in order 
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to show respect‟. This interpretation is supported by the subsequent question „do you 
need a ride to the airport’ raised by Chinese 2. However, if an American interlocutor 
hears the same propositional content of the utterance, she or he would make the 
assumption that „they will have a great time in New Orleans‟, and this interpretation is 
supported by the utterance „what fun‟ produced by American 2. Such differences in 
interpretation, according to Gao and Ting-Toomey, result from differences in 
interlocutors‟ cultural backgrounds. This is significant, in that in making this 
argument, Gao and Ting-Toomey have pointed to a correlation between cultures and 
differences in interpretation. 
If we accept the claim made by Gao and Ting-Toomey that differences in 
interpretation of a given utterance between people from different cultures are indeed 
caused by cultures, this then raises the question of how culture impacts on 
interpretation. However, Gao and Ting-Toomey do not actually address this. I argue 
that, this, again, is constrained by their methodology, which is premised on the 
assumption that the context in which an utterance is determined in advance of the 
process of interpretation.  
Therefore, although Gao and Ting-Toomey make an interesting point about 
differences in interpretation between cultures, their account still has limitations, in 
that: (a) they do not acknowledge that the process of inference is required for all 
communication of cultures that have been characterised as HC and LC, (b) they do 
not acknowledge that an utterance will generate different interpretations for different 
hearers, (c) they do not explain the process of how a hearer undertakes the inferential 
process despite their claim that understanding communication in HC cultures involves 
inference, and (d) they do not provide any explanation for how culture impacts on 
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interpretation despite their claim that there are differences in interpretation between 
cultures. Without these levels of information, the argument this study makes, namely 
that there are variations in interpretation between people from diverse cultures, can 
only be considered as speculative, since it is not substantiated. 
Studies that make the claim about the differences in interpretations between people 
with distinct cultural backgrounds are not limited to the one by Gao and Ting-Toomey 
(1998). A number of other culture and communication studies also adopt the same 
position. For example, in analysing diplomatic negotiation processes in different 
cultures, Cohen (2004) provides much evidence that the dispute between cultures 
„was clearly a classic cross-cultural clash between high- and low-context cultures‟ 
(Cohen 2004, 39). One case from Cohen‟s (2004, 39) data is the difference in 
interpretation of a set of utterances between Malaysia and Australia, two cultures that 
„are shown to be virtually polar opposites in their ranking‟ on Hall‟s high and low 
context continuum. According to Cohen (2004, 38-39), Prime Minister Mahathir 
Mohamad of Malaysia, a major advocate of the idea of an ASEAN-type trading group 
(ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) refused to attend a trade 
summit in Seattle in November 1993 of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
Forum (APEC), since he felt that the United States and its partners had been 
unenthusiastic about the idea he proposed. When asked about the Malaysian prime 
minister‟s presence, Prime Minister Paul Keating of Australia gave the following 
reply: 
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I don‟t know and I don‟t care. I am sick of asking [sic] questions about Dr. 
Mahathir. Everyone has a chance to come here. If he didn‟t come, that‟s his 
business. The thing about it was there was just a very historic meeting. Please 
don‟t ask me any more questions about Dr.Mahathir. I couldn‟t care less, frankly, 
whether he comes or not (Cohen 2004, 39, emphasise original). 
 Cohen (2004, 41) argues that,  
Aggressive behaviour, outspokenness, and crude directness are completely 
unacceptable [in Malaysia]. Unfortunately, these were precisely the qualities 
displayed by Prime Minister Keating in his „recalcitrants‟ outburst. In this he was 
doing no more than acting in conformity with the accepted, low-context norms of 
Australian public life.  
What Cohen actually claims here is that Malaysia prefers the use of an indirect style, 
whereas Australia is used to a more direct one. 
Cohen (2004, 41) goes on to argue that for Malaysians, „Keating‟s comments had 
humiliated Dr. Mahathir and the Malaysian nation‟. In contrast, for Australians, in 
Keating‟s words, his remarks „were not meant to be offensive‟ (Cohen 2004, 41). This 
suggests that what Cohen actually argues here is that there are differences between the 
two countries in their interpretation of Keating‟s remarks.  
It may be assumed that when making the above argument, Cohen seems to assume 
that when people from different cultures interpret Keating‟s utterance, they draw on a 
separate set of assumptions, which in this case appear to be based on their respective 
cultural knowledge which informs them of what to expect in this particular situation. 
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For example, according to Cohen (2004, 41), if a Malaysian hears the utterance I 
don’t know and I don’t care about Malaysia’s prime minister’s presence, the 
Malaysian would make the assumption that this was to insult the prime minister of 
Malaysia and Malaysia as a country, and if an Australian hears the same propositional 
content of the utterance, the Australian would make the assumption that this kind of 
outspoken language is acceptable in Australian society. Such differences in 
interpretation, according to Cohen, are caused by cultures. Moreover, by arguing that 
there are differences in interpretation of Keating‟s utterances, Cohen, like Gao and 
Ting-Toomey, suggests that people from the same culture will produce the same 
interpretation for the same utterance.  
If we accept Cohen‟s claim that there are variations in interpretation between people 
from different cultures, this also raises the question of how culture impacts on 
interpretation. However, Cohen leaves this unexplained.  
The problems that arise from Cohen‟s work are also revealed in studies carried out 
respectively by Ting-Toomey (1999) and Scollon and Scollon (1995). For example, 
Ting-Toomey (1999, 125) argues that in intercultural communication between 
Japanese and Westerners, intercultural misunderstanding can easily occur when the 
Japanese make the following utterance: 
Japanese: hai, hai   (Ting-Toomey 1999, 125). 
According to Ting-Toomey, if a Japanese hears the above „vocal pause-filler cues‟ 
(Ting-Toomey 1999, 125) such as „hai, hai‟, the initial assumption the Japanese is 
expected to make is that the speaker is signalling „I am hearing you‟. Since the literal 
translation of „hai, hai’ means „yes‟ to Westerners, if a Westerner hears „hai, hai‟, the 
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immediate assumption the Westerner may make is that the Japanese has actually 
signalled „yes‟ to a contract agreement. Such differences in interpretation, as Ting-
Toomey (1999) argues, result from differences in interlocutors‟ cultural backgrounds. 
However, Ting-Toomey does not address how the differences in interpretation 
actually occur. In other words, Ting-Toomey does not explain how culture impacts on 
interpretation.  
Similarly, Scollon and Scollon (1995, 5) use the following anecdote to illustrate the 
differences in interpretation between a Westerner and an Asian:  
Mr. Wong is an Asian and Mr. Richardson is a Westerner, and they have a 
conversation together. Mr. Richardson has enjoyed this conversation and when they 
are ready to part he says to Mr. Wong that they should get together to have lunch 
sometime. In response to Mr. Richardson, Mr. Wong says that he would enjoy this. 
After a few weeks Mr. Wong begins to feel that Mr. Richardson has been rather 
insincere, because he has not followed up his invitation to lunch with a specific time 
and place.  
According to Scollon and Scollon, the source of the problem between Mr. Wong and 
Mr. Richardson is the difference expected by Asians and Westerners in this particular 
context. For Asians like Mr. Wong, they assume that „this mention of lunch at the end 
of the conversation is of some importance to Mr. Richardson‟, and they would also 
assume that „Mr. Richardson is seriously making an invitation to lunch‟. However, for 
Westerners like Mr. Richardson, the mention of lunch „does not signify any more than 
that he has enjoyed his conversation with Mr. Wong‟, and is „just a conventional way 
of parting with good feelings towards the other‟ (Scollon and Scollon 1995, 5).  
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An issue that arises from Scollon and Scollon‟s above example is that the data are an 
indirect report of utterances, rather than actual utterances, made by Mr. Wong and Mr. 
Richardson, therefore, the validatity of such data is not established. However, the 
point that Scollon and Scollon make here is significant, in that they point to „the 
difference in discourse patterns expected‟ by people with distinct cultural 
backgrounds. What this implies is that a difference in cultures has caused differences 
in interpretation of a specific utterance. However, Scollon and Scollon do not explain 
how culture impacts on interpretation. Therefore, Scollon and Scollon (1995), as well 
as all the other scholars I have discussed in this section, do not provide clear evidence 
to justify their claim that there are differences in interpretation of a given utterance 
between people with distinct cultural backgrounds. 
To sum up, I have reviewed four studies that have moved from addressing cultural 
differences according to styles to the focus on differences in interpretation. I have 
shown that these studies share the same problems, in that they make claims about the 
differences in interpretation, but do not explain how culture impacts on interpretation.  
2.2.2.4 Summary 
In this section, I have reviewed two strands of scholarship based on Hall‟s approach 
to address cultural differences in communication. I have shown that both lines of 
literature have limitations in explaining the relationship between culture and 
communication: (a) studies make claims that culture is closely related to the use of 
communication style (e.g. Fujishin 2007; Adair and Brett 2004; Pekerti and Thomas 
2003; Neuliep 2006), however, they do not actually explore how culture and  
communication style are linked, and (b) studies make claims about the differences in 
interpretation between people with distinct cultural backgrounds (e.g. Cohen 2004; 
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Gao and Ting-Toomey 1998; Ting-Toomey 1999; Scollon and Scollon 1995), 
however, explanations for how culture impacts on interpretation are omitted. 
In the next section, I conclude this part of the literature review by summarising the 
arguments I have set up in this section, in order to argue that the limitations indicated 
in the literature can be avoided if we adopt a different theory and use a different 
method for analysis.  
2.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have reviewed the available studies on culture and communication 
which have applied the two key approaches proposed respectively by Hall (1976) and 
Hofstede (1980, 1991) to addressing cultural differences. Based on my literature 
review, I have set up the following two arguments in relation to the issues being 
reviewed: 
(a) Previous studies (e.g. Adair and Brett 2004; Brew and Cairns 2004; Cohen 
2004; Ting-Toomey 1999) make claims about the use of direct and indirect 
style in individualistic (LC) and collectivistic (HC) cultures. However, they do 
not actually show, by using the theoretical criteria they have applied, how they 
come to categorise one style as being direct and another style as being indirect.  
 
(b) Previous studies (e.g. Cohen 2004; Gao and Ting-Toomey 1998; Scollon and 
Scollon 1995; Ting-Toomey 1999) make claims about the differences in 
interpretation between people with distinct cultural backgrounds. However, 
they do not actually explain how culture impacts on interpretation of a given 
utterance. 
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I argue that the fundamental reason for the above limitations is that relevant studies 
are limited by the theories they apply and the methods of analysis they use. My study 
is designed to address these limitations by asking the following two questions: 
(1) If we accept the claim that China is a collectivistic culture with a high context 
culture communication style, and Britain is an individualistic culture with a 
low context culture communication style, this would imply that the 
communication styles of speakers from these two cultures are indirect and 
direct respectively. However, as I indicated above, studies that make these 
claims do not actually show how an utterance comes to be characterised as 
direct or indirect. 
This raises the question: can these claims be substantiated? 
(2) If we accept the claim that differences in interpretation of a given utterance 
between people from different cultures are caused by differences in their 
cultural backgrounds, this would imply that it is culture as „a given meaning 
system [which] is widely shared among members of a cultural group‟ (Hong 
and Mallorie 2004: 63) that has an impact on interpretation. However, as I 
indicated above, studies that make the claims do not actually explain how 
culture impacts on interpretation.  
This raises the question: can these claims be substantiated? 
I argue that a methodology based on Sperber and Wilson‟s inferential model of 
communication makes it possible to address my first question, in that it might provide 
an account that uncovers the relationship between speakers as a social entity and their 
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use of communication style in a way that none of the existing studies of culture and 
communication can achieve. 
I also argue that Sperber and Wilson‟s (1986/1995) Relevance Theory allows a way 
of accounting for the hearer‟s contribution to the interpretative process, which would 
be able to address my second question, in that it provides a fuller account of how 
interpretations are generated in a specific context, what contextual assumptions are 
generated, and consequently how culture might impact on interpretation of a given 
utterance.  
In the chapter that follows, I show how Relevance Theory might help me to explain 
these socio-cultural phenomena, and therefore address the two questions I asked 
above. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 70 
 
Chapter Three: Relevance Theory 
Introduction 
In Chapter Two, I showed that studies of culture and communication (e.g. Gao and 
Ting-Toomey 1998; Cohen 2004; Ting-Toomey 1999; Scollon and Scollon 1995) 
make claims that differences in interpretation of a given utterance between people 
with distinct cultural backgrounds are caused by cultures. One of my aims in this 
chapter is to draw on Relevance Theory in order to argue that these claims can be 
addressed by focusing on the cognitive environments of the addressees. This is 
because, according to Sperber and Wilson (1995, 59), communication „is a matter of 
degree‟ or „manifestness‟. If hearers generate the same interpretations in response to 
an utterance, relevance theorists posit that there must be some degree of overlap in 
their cognitive environment, since hearers draw on this when generating contextual 
assumptions. If the above is accepted, then this would predict that people whose 
cognitive environments do not overlap with each other will interpret a given utterance 
in different ways. 
In Chapter Two, I also showed that culture and communication literature (e.g. 
Fujishin 2007; Brew and Cairns 2004; Adair and Brett 2004; Ting-Toomey 1999; 
Pekerti and Thomas 2003) makes claims about the use of direct and indirect styles in 
individualistic (LC) and collectivistic (HC) cultures. My second aim in this chapter is 
to draw on Relevance Theory in order to argue that these claims can be addressed by 
focusing on markers of procedural meaning. This is because, according to Sperber and 
Wilson, all communication involves a mixture of decoding and inference, and 
therefore there is no such thing as direct communication. In order for a hearer to 
interpret the meaning a speaker is attempting to convey, relevance theorists posit that 
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the hearer has to be able to work out which aspects of context are relevant in 
generating such an interpretation. The argument of relevance theorists is that the 
search for a relevant context is guided by what they call „markers of procedural 
meaning‟. If this is accepted, this will predict that markers of procedural meaning are 
therefore going to occur in all languages, including those that culture and 
communication literature has defined as using „direct style‟. This is because if a style 
is direct, in this context, markers of procedural meaning will be redundant. The 
occurrence of markers of procedural meaning in an utterance will indicate that the 
hearer has to carry out inferential work, which in turn indicates that the utterance does 
not „encode‟ the meaning the speaker is attempting to communicate.  
In order to address these two arguments, I draw on two aspects of Relevance Theory 
that I feel are pertinent to the questions I asked at the end of Chapter Two. These are: 
a relevance-theoretic approach to the impact culture has on interpretation of a given 
utterance and a relevance-theoretic approach to communication style. 
3.1 A relevance-theoretic approach to the impact culture has on 
interpretation 
Relevance Theory argues that what a speaker communicates is a thought (or a 
proposition or an assumption) – a representation of the state of affairs the speaker 
takes the hearer to be presenting as true (Sperber and Wilson 1995, 2). An utterance, 
according to Sperber and Wilson (1995, 2), is a „physical stimulus‟ that communicates 
a „thought‟. The propositional form of an utterance resembles the propositional form 
of a thought it represents, this is evident in Sperber and Wilson‟s remarks below:  
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[C] ommunication can be successful without resulting in an exact duplication of 
thoughts in communicator and audience. We see communication as a matter of 
enlarging mutual cognitive environments, not of duplicating thoughts (1995, 
193).  
I will provide some detailed explanation of the term „cognitive environment‟ in 
Section 3.1.2. What I want to suggest now is that the argument Sperber and Wilson 
make above is that what a speaker means on a particular occasion is not exhausted by 
the proposition she is taken to have expressed. In other words, what a speaker conveys 
in an utterance is a set of propositions or assumptions, and the proposition expressed 
directly through the meanings of the words a speaker uses is merely a piece of 
evidence that a hearer uses in order to infer the proposition intended by the speaker.  
In Section 2.2.2.3, I have shown that studies by Gao and Ting-Toomey (1998), Cohen 
(2004), Ting-Toomey (1999) as well as Scollon and Scollon (1995) argue that there 
can be differences in the interpretation of a given utterance between people with 
distinct cultural backgrounds. „A given utterance‟ in the context of cross-cultural 
communication is often spoken in two or more different languages. For example, 
when a native speaker of English produces an utterance „hello‟, the propositional 
content of the utterance is equivalent to that of the utterance „你 好‟ made by a 
native speaker of Chinese. Therefore, what I am talking about when referring to „a 
given utterance‟ is the case where the propositional content is the same in utterances 
in two or more languages. I have also shown that these studies do not justify their 
claim by explaining how culture has an impact on interpretation of the propositional 
content of an utterance within a specific context. The lack of such an explanation can 
be addressed by Sperber and Wilson‟s (1995) inferential model of communication, 
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which provides a way of accounting for these socio-cultural phenomena from a 
relevance theoretic perspective.  
My goal in this section is to draw on the argument postulated by Sperber and Wilson, 
namely that communication is a matter of degree, in order to argue that the impact a 
culture has on interpretation can be addressed by focusing on the cognitive 
environments of the addressees. In order to make this argument, this section begins 
with a brief introduction to the relevance theoretic approach to communication. 
3.1.1 The inferential approach to communication 
In Section 2.2.2.3, I have shown that scholars in the field of culture and 
communication (e.g. Adair and Brett 2004; Adair et al. 2001; Brett 2000, 2007; Gao 
and Ting-Toomey 1998; Gudykunst 1998b; Ting-Toomey 1999) claim that a process 
of inference is only required for communication in HC cultures, and it is not 
necessary for communication in LC cultures. What these other theorists claim but I 
disagree with is that the intention of a speaker from LC cultures can be decoded. 
According to Relevance Theory,  
The addressee can neither decode nor deduce the communicator‟s communicative 
intention. The best he can do is construct an assumption on the basis of the 
evidence provided by the communicator‟s ostensive behaviour (Sperber and 
Wilson 1995, 65).  
Therefore, from a relevance theoretic point of view, the process of inference is 
involved in all communication, in spite of the fact that, in Clark‟s (2009a, 176) words, 
most people „never or rarely think about the fact that a large amount of what they 
understand from utterances is inferred rather than explicitly communicated‟. In 
 74 
 
relation to the issue of communication in individualistic (LC) and collectivistic (HC) 
cultures, this means that understanding an utterance produced by a speaker from both 
types of culture involves some degree of inference.  
The idea that inference is necessary for all communication is evident in the argument 
made by Sperber and Wilson (1995, 3) that „communication can be achieved by 
coding and decoding messages, and it can be achieved by providing evidence for an 
intended inference‟. In arguing this, they explain that the whole process of 
communication is based on ostension and inference, as in the following: 
Inferential communication and ostension are one and the same process, but seen 
from two different points of view: that of the communicator who is involved in 
ostension and that of the audience who is involved in inference (Sperber and 
Wilson 1995, 54).  
What Sperber and Wilson mean by „ostension‟ is a „behaviour that makes manifest 
the intention to make something manifest‟ (Sperber and Wilson 1995, 49). It is this 
„behaviour‟ that provides two layers of information to be picked up by an audience if 
any communication is to take place. These two layers of information are: (a) 
informative intention as evidence, and (b) the intention to communicate that evidence. 
According to Relevance Theory, the latter (i.e. the communicative intention) is to 
make manifest the former (i.e. informative intention). Or in Sperber and Wilson‟s 
(1995, 155) own words: 
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The communicator produces a stimulus (e.g. an utterance) which makes it 
mutually manifest to communicator and audience that the communicator intends, 
by means of this stimulus, to make manifest or more manifest to the audience a 
set of assumptions. 
What this means, as I explained briefly earlier in this section, and in Sperber and 
Wilson‟s (1995, 27) own words, is that   
[T]he linguistic meaning of an uttered sentence falls short of encoding what the 
speaker means: it merely helps the audience infer what she means. The output of 
decoding is correctly treated by the audience as a piece of evidence about the 
communicator‟s intention.  
In relation to my discussion of culture and communication in Chapter Two, the above 
claim indicates that an utterance produced by a speaker from either individualistic 
(LC) cultures or collectivistic (HC) cultures is merely a piece of evidence of the 
speaker‟s assumption or „thought‟ that a hearer uses in producing an interpretation. 
This implies that hearers of both types of cultures need to use an utterance as evidence 
to draw some degree of inference in order to identify the meaning intended by a 
speaker. 
Moreover, in explaining that an utterance is a piece of evidence, Sperber and Wilson 
are suggesting that addressees assume that, in claiming their attention through 
ostensive behaviour, communicators have something of relevance to impart to their 
addressees, and this is evident in Sperber and Wilson‟s remark below: 
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Ostensive behaviour provides evidence of one‟s thoughts. It succeeds in doing so 
because it implies a guarantee of relevance. It implies such a guarantee because 
humans automatically turn their attention to what seems most relevant to them 
(1995, 50).  
The „guarantee‟ used by Sperber and Wilson in the above quotation is about the 
relevance of what is communicated, in that hearers make the assumption that what is 
said will be relevant to them, and because of that assumption, they will undergo a 
process of utterance interpretation. Therefore, the point Sperber and Wilson make 
here is that it is the hearers‟ assumption that what is said will be relevant to them that 
triggers the process of utterance interpretation. Without such an assumption, a hearer 
would not be motivated to interpret the utterance.  
As indicated above, Sperber and Wilson argue that a communicator who produces a 
stimulus intends „to make manifest or more manifest to the audience a set of 
assumptions‟ (1995, 155). In saying this, Sperber and Wilson are suggesting that 
communication is a matter of degree. This is explained more fully when they propose 
that „an utterance which explicitly expresses one thought may implicitly convey 
others‟ (1995, 11). That is, what is said by a speaker might not actually be what the 
speaker means. An example would be the implications of what a Japanese negotiator 
says to a product supplier in a business context in the case of Fujishin (2007), the 
example I cited in Section 2.2.2.2, as illustrated below: 
[3.1] 
A Japanese negotiator: you have a good product. 
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According to Sperber and Wilson (1995, 56), there is no precise assumption, apart 
from the one explicitly expressed, which in this case the Japanese negotiator can be 
said to have intended the interlocutors to share. Yet this negotiator clearly intends the 
product supplier to draw not merely any relevant conclusion, but a specifically 
intended one. Therefore, as Sperber and Wilson argue (1995, 59), it is not that an 
assumption is either communicated or not communicated, it would be more 
appropriate to say that there is a set of assumptions which as a result of 
communication become manifest or more manifest to the hearer in varying degree. 
Manifest assumptions, according to Sperber and Wilson (1995, 39), are facts that 
individuals are capable of representing mentally and accepting as true, or probably 
true. Therefore, manifestness is seen as a matter of degree and which assumptions are 
more likely to be accessible to someone at a particular time will depend on this 
individual‟s physical environment and cognitive abilities. For Sperber and Wilson, to 
be manifest „is to be perceptible or inferable‟ (1995, 39). It may be assumed that in 
this particular case, what is made strongly manifest to the product supplier is that s/he 
has a good product. What is less manifest to the product supplier is what this indicates 
about what the Japanese negotiator plans to do with this product (e.g. to buy or not to 
buy). Hence, communication is a matter of degree. 
To sum up, in this section, I have shown that, unlike studies of culture and 
communication which assume that the process of inference is only required for 
communication in HC cultures, what Sperber and Wilson posit is that all 
communication is a matter of degree, and therefore all communication involves a 
process of decoding and inference. If Sperber and Wilson are correct, this will 
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indicate that communication of both HC and LC cultures requires a hearer to draw on 
a degree of inference in order to recognise the intention of a speaker.  
In the next section, I show, by drawing on Relevance Theory, how the argument that 
communication is a matter of degree informs my current research on the impact that a 
culture has on interpretation. 
3.1.2 Cognitive environment 
In the previous section, I suggested that within Relevance Theory, communication is 
seen as a matter of degree. This is based on Sperber and Wilson‟s argument that a 
communicator‟s informative intention is not to modify the „thought‟ but the cognitive 
environment of the addressee, „hoping that its (i.e. a stimulus‟) perception by 
members of the audience will lead to a modification of their cognitive environment 
and trigger some cognitive processes‟ (1995, 150). 
According to Sperber and Wilson (1995, 39), „a cognitive environment of an 
individual is a set of facts that are manifest to him‟. The total cognitive environment 
of a person consists of all the information accessible to the person, either from 
perception, memory or by inference. In defining this, Sperber and Wilson point out 
that this characterisation does not only hold for facts, but for all kinds of assumptions, 
whether „true‟ or „false‟, because 
From a cognitive point of view, mistaken assumptions can be indistinguishable 
from genuine factual knowledge, just as optical illusions can be indistinguishable 
from true sight (Sperber and Wilson 1995, 39).  
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Moreover, they argue that for the comprehension of a particular utterance, not all of 
the infinite number of assumptions that make up an individual‟s cognitive 
environment are used. What an individual has access to is merely the subset of all the 
existing assumptions manifest to the individual. Within Relevance Theory, the subset 
of information is called „context‟ or „a contextual assumption‟ (or a set of contextual 
assumptions) (Sperber and Wilson 1995, 15-16). In explaining context, Sperber and 
Wilson argue that context is not fixed or given in advance of the comprehension 
process, but a product that results from the dynamic process of selecting. Viewing the 
context as a product of dynamic process of selecting adds an extra level of 
explanation that helps to account for the view held by studies of culture and 
communication that context is given or fixed before the process of interpretation takes 
place. As I have shown in Section 2.2.2.1, when Hall argues that there are differences 
in drawing upon contextual information (i.e internalised or external information) 
between high and low context cultures, Hall seems to imply that within an act of 
communication, the difference in drawing upon contextual information exists before 
the process of interpretation takes place. Because of this, as I showed later in Section 
2.2.2.3, when Hall‟s followers (e.g. Cohen 2004; Gao and Ting-Toomey 1998; Ting-
Toomey 1999; Scollon and Scollon 1995) adopt Hall‟s approach to address cultural 
differences, they assume that context in which an utterance is produced is determined 
before the comprehension process gets under way. Consequently, a methodology 
predicated on such an assumption does not allow these scholars to be able to address 
how meaning is generated in a specific context, to the extent that they assume that the 
meaning of an utterance is self-evident, and even without engaging in the context in 
which an utterance is produced, one would automatically know the intended meaning 
of that utterance. 
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However, a model premised on the assumption that context is a product that results 
from the dynamic process of selecting, as Sperber and Wilson argue here, provides a 
solution to the apparent problem encountered by these scholars, in that it addresses the 
question of how, if context is not predetermined, the addressee comes to select a 
context (from either encyclopaedic memory, previous utterances or from the 
immediate physical environment) which bears out the guarantee of relevance of the 
utterance. This is evident in the description by Sperber and Wilson below: 
[P]eople hope that the assumption being processed is relevant (or else they would 
not bother to process it at all), and they try to select a context which will justify 
their hope: a context which will maximise relevance. In verbal comprehension in 
particular, it is relevance which is treated as given, and context which is treated as 
a variable (1995, 142).  
The claim that the choice of context is driven by the principle of relevance is based on 
Sperber and Wilson‟s argument that „human cognition is relevance-oriented‟ (1995, 
46). When it comes to communication, it is also relevance-driven, in that people only 
automatically turn their attention to what seems most relevant to them in order to 
modify and improve an overall representation of the world. What this indicates is that 
if an utterance is perceived by a hearer to be relevant, it is always the result of the 
interaction between a stimulus and the cognitive environment of the hearer. 
According to Sperber and Wilson, an improvement in an individual‟s representation 
of the world is the consequence of inference. This implies that if a hearer does not 
start from the assumption that a speaker‟s ostensive stimulus is relevant to him, then 
his inferential process will not be triggered. Consequently, the speaker cannot modify 
the hearer‟s cognitive environment by means of this stimulus. To achieve relevance, a 
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stimulus processed in a cognitive environment (i.e. context) should have at least one 
„contextual effect‟, since within Relevance Theory,  
[H]aving contextual effects is a necessary condition for relevance, and ….other 
things being equal, the greater the contextual effects, the greater the relevance 
(Sperber and Wilson 1995, 119).  
In explaining the relationship between relevance and contextual effects, Sperber and 
Wilson (1995, 144) also argue that the processing of the stimulus costs energy, and 
the benefits of the effects are always balanced against the effort it takes to process 
them. Relevance, then, decreases to the extent that the effort invested in interpreting 
the stimulus is large. Consequently, relevance is always a function of a cost-benefit 
balance. In relation to my discussion of the airport ride request, it might be easy to 
assume that, for a Chinese interlocutor, the immediate contextual assumptions, made 
manifest by the utterance „We’re going to New Orleans this weekend‟ are that (a) if 
the speaker is going to New Orleans this weekend, she may want me to give her a 
ride; and (b) even if she would like a ride, it would not be polite to request one. 
Processed in the context containing the assumptions (a-b), the utterance would yield 
the contextual effect (c) I need to ask if she needs a ride in order to show respect. In 
this scenario, it is hard for the Chinese interlocutor to pin down what other 
interpretation would be relevant enough to justify the speaker‟s utterance, and the 
interpretation (c) is basically the only possible one. Therefore, the utterance achieves 
the best possible balance of effort against effect, in that it achieves an adequate range 
of contextual effects for no unjustifiable effort (Sperber and Wilson 1995, 156). In 
Sperber and Wilson‟s (1995, 153) terms, the interlocutor has optimally processed the 
assumption (i.e. the utterance).  
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In the next section, I show, by drawing on Relevance Theory, how cognitive 
environment relates to interpretation.  
3.1.3 Cognitive environment relates to interpretation 
In section 2.2.2.3, I have shown that scholars in the area of culture and 
communication (e.g. Adair and Brett 2004; Adair et al. 2001; Gao and Ting-Toomey 
1998; Gudykunst 2004; Ting-Toomey 1999) claim that communication in HC cultures 
requires some degree of inference, however, they do not make clear how an analyst or 
a hearer draws the inference (see my discussion of the two „airport ride request‟ 
scenes in Section 2.2.2.3). If the arguments of Sperber and Wilson‟s Relevance 
Theory are accepted, then the hearer‟s process of inference is to be carried out based 
on the following „deductive device‟:  
[A] deduction based on the union of new information P and old information C is 
a contextualization of P in C (Sperber and Wilson 1995, 108).  
Sperber and Wilson distinguish between „new‟ and „old‟ information in this way: the 
former refers to perceptual information including visual, auditory and linguistic 
perception, while the latter refers to the assumptions which the deductive device has 
processed and stored in encyclopaedic memory. The latter provides a contextual 
background against which the former is interpreted. The derivation of new 
information, according to Sperber and Wilson, is spontaneous, automatic and 
unconscious, and it yields conclusions in the cognitive environments of an audience 
when the audience processes new information that either strengthens, or contradicts 
and eliminates, or combines with the existing assumptions the audience holds. The 
point Sperber and Wilson make here is therefore that the conclusion, also termed „a 
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contextual implication‟ or „a contextual effect‟ (1995, 109), is deducible from new 
information and old information together, but from neither new nor old information 
alone. What this adds to the „airport ride request‟ scene is that upon hearing the 
utterance – the new information (or the shared propositional content of the utterance) 
we are going to New Orleans this weekend, each interlocutor is expected to activate a 
contextual assumption (or a set of assumptions) – old information in his or her 
cognitive environment made manifest by the utterance. For Chinese interlocutors, the 
immediate contextual assumptions activated by the utterance may include something 
like: she may want me to give her a ride, and even if she would like a ride, it would 
not be polite to request one. A synthesis of new and old information would lead the 
Chinese interlocutor to draw the conclusion that I have to ask if she wants me to give 
her a ride in order to show respect. For American interlocutors, in contrast, the 
immediate contextual assumptions activated by the utterance may be something like: 
the speaker is initiating a small talk. By combining the old and new information, the 
American interlocutors would draw the conclusion that I have to say something to 
maintain the conversation. As a result, the process of how hearers from different 
cultures interpret the airport ride request scene becomes clear. As my analysis has 
shown, both American and Chinese interlocutors appear to draw on their respective 
cultural specific assumptions to interpret what the speaker has said. This indicates that 
there is a strong connection between culture and interpretation. 
As I have shown in Section 2.2.1.2, when culture and communication studies address 
cultural differences, they tend to assume that what counts as direct and indirect is self-
evident. However, the above illustration indicates how it is that a single utterance can 
be interpreted differently. As I have shown above, the meaning of an utterance cannot 
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be generated if a hearer does not make the new information interact with information 
already in his cognitive environment (i.e. old information) by either strengthening, or 
contradicting and eliminating, or combining with the existing assumptions the hearer 
holds.  
What the above illustration also indicates is that the notion of the cognitive 
environment is central to Sperber and Wilson‟s Relevance Theory, in that it is part of 
the Mandarin Chinese speaker‟s cognitive environment that asking for a ride is not 
polite.  
Whilst emphasising the importance of cognitive environment in an act of 
communication, Sperber and Wilson (1995, 41) also argue that „the same facts and 
assumptions may be manifest in the cognitive environments of two different people‟. 
In this case, the two people can have a mutual cognitive environment (what actually 
intersects in the cognitive environments of two people), but it would be impossible for 
the two people to have exactly identical cognitive environments. Sperber and Wilson 
argue that 
[T]o say that two people share a cognitive environment does not imply that they 
make the same assumptions: merely that they are capable of doing so (1995, 41).   
This suggests that what Sperber and Wilson actually postulate is therefore that in 
order for hearers to generate the same contextual implications in response to an 
utterance, there must be some degree of overlap in their cognitive environments, since 
hearers draw on this when generating contextual assumptions.  
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If Sperber and Wilson are correct, the above postulate would predict that people 
whose cognitive environments do not overlap with each other will interpret the 
propositional content of an utterance in different ways. It is reasonable to argue that 
people who have been brought up in China do not overlap in their cognitive 
environments with people who have been brought up in Britain. As a result, according 
to Sperber and Wilson (1995, 38), „they can construct different representations and 
make different inferences‟. When interpreting „a given utterance‟, Chinese and 
English hearers will interpret it in different ways, in that they may activate contextual 
assumptions that are available to hearers of one culture alone, but may not be 
available to hearers of another culture under study.  In relation to the airport ride 
examples I have just discussed, this means that because Chinese and American 
interlocutors activate different contextual assumptions in response to the utterance 
„We‟re going to New Orleans this weekend‟, they interpret the utterance in different 
ways. For Chinese, asking for a ride is not polite. In contrast, for Americans, the 
speaker is merely initiating small talk. Consequently, they interpret the propositional 
content of the utterance in different ways: for Chinese, the hearer needs to ask if the 
speaker needs a ride to the airport in order to show respect; for Americans, the hearer 
needs to maintain the conversation. 
If this is true, then the question I asked at the end of Chapter two of how culture has 
an impact on interpretation of „a given utterance‟ can be addressed by focusing on the 
contextual assumptions activated in response to the utterance. This is because, if 
hearers of either culture activate contextual assumptions that are available to hearers 
of one culture alone, but may not be available to hearers of another culture under 
study, this means that culture has a direct impact on the interpretation. This, in turn, 
 86 
 
indicates that cultural differences between China and Britain are realised through 
activating different contextual assumptions in response to an utterance.  
3.1.4 Summary 
In this section, by drawing on the argument Sperber and Wilson make that 
communication is a matter of degree, I have argued that the question of how culture 
impacts on interpretation can be addressed by focusing on contextual assumptions 
activated in response to an utterance. I have shown that if different contextual 
assumptions are activated in response to an utterance that expresses the same 
propositional content, then culture has a direct impact on interpretation. 
3.2 A relevance-theoretic approach to communication styles 
In Section 2.3, on the basis of my literature review, I have argued that although earlier 
studies of culture and communication (e.g. Cohen 2004; Brew and Cairns 2004; Adair 
and Brett 2004; Ting-Toomey 1999) make claims about the use of direct and indirect 
style in individualistic (LC) and collectivistic (HC) cultures, they do not actually 
explain the criteria they are applying to categorise one style as being direct and 
another style as being indirect. The problems faced by these studies can be resolved 
by the adoption of Sperber and Wilson‟s inferential model of communication, which 
suggests a relevance-theoretical solution. 
My goal in this section is to draw on Sperber and Wilson‟s argument that there is no 
such thing as direct communication, in order to argue that the claims that cultures can 
be distinguished according to direct and indirect style can be addressed by focusing 
on markers of procedural meaning. In order to make this argument, I draw on those 
aspects of Relevance Theory that I feel are relevant to the issue of communication 
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style. These are also the aspects of Relevance Theory that I feel are the most 
significant to my subsequent illustration of the way Relevance Theory can be applied 
in my analysis of communication style. They are: (a) a relevance-theoretic approach 
to explicit and implicit communication, and (b) a relevance theoretic approach to 
procedural meaning. 
3.2.1 A relevance-theoretic approach to explicit and implicit 
communication 
In Section 2.2.1.2, I have shown that the literature of culture and communication uses 
the distinction between direct and indirect style as a way to theorise cultural 
differences. However, Sperber and Wilson provide an account that problematises this 
distinction.  
As indicated in Section 3.1.1, according to Sperber and Wilson, communication is a 
matter of degree or manifestness. They argue that „no assumption is simply decoded, 
and that the recovery of any assumption requires an element of inference‟ (Sperber 
and Wilson 1995, 182). This indicates that all communication is indirect, because it 
all involves a degree of inference. 
In arguing this, Sperber and Wilson offer an account that explains the distinction 
between explicit and implicit communication from a relevance-theoretic perspective. 
To understand this distinction, it is firstly necessary to deal with another dichotomy 
they identify, namely between conceptual and procedural information.  
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According to Wilson and Sperber:  
An utterance can be expected to encode two basic types of information: 
representational and computational, or conceptual and procedural – that is, 
information about the representations to be manipulated, and information about 
how to manipulate them (1993, 2). 
The distinction between conceptual and procedural encoding is introduced by 
Blakemore (1987) to account for the meaning of discourse connectives. According to 
her analysis, these particles do not encode concepts, and do not contribute to the truth-
conditional content of an utterance, but encode instructions that guide hearers towards 
the intended interpretation. A procedural expression is, therefore, a linguistic device 
that functions as a procedural constraint on the interpretation process being carried out 
on the part of the hearer by restricting the range of possible interpretations. I will 
discuss procedural meaning in more detail in Section 3.2.2. What I want to suggest 
now is that within the framework of Relevance Theory, inferential processes are not 
limited to the identification of what is implicitly communicated, but also take place in 
the determination of what is explicitly communicated. This indicates that the 
identification of explicit content of an utterance is equally inferential. This is because, 
as Sperber and Wilson (1995, 193) argue, sentences are abstract concepts, and their 
meanings are a set of semantic representations which are incomplete logical forms. 
Before sentences can have truth conditions, their logical forms must be developed and 
inferentially completed.  
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In explaining this, Sperber and Wilson argue that all communicated assumptions fall 
into one of the two types of categories: either explicit communication (or 
explicatures) or implicit communication (or implicatures), as follows: 
An assumption communicated by an utterance U is explicit if and only if it is a 
development of a logical form encoded by U.  On the analogy of „implicature‟, 
we will call an explicitly communicated assumption an explicature. Any 
assumption communicated, but not explicitly so, is implicitly communicated: it is 
an implicature (1995, 182).   
More specifically, „a development of a logical form encoded by U‟ within Relevance 
Theory is derived by going through pragmatic processes such as disambiguation, 
reference assignment and enrichment. This indicates that what is explicitly 
communicated is never fully propositional, the processes that lead to the recovery of 
the explicature (i.e. a complete proposition) are not just decoding, but a mixture of 
linguistic decoding and pragmatic inference. In fact, this is how it has been theorised 
in Relevance Theory, as follows: 
An explicature is a combination of linguistically encoded and contextually 
inferred conceptual features. The smaller the relative contribution of the 
contextual features, the more explicit the explicature will be, and inversely. 
Explicitness … is both classificatory and comparative: a communicated 
assumption is either an explicature or an implicature, but an explicature is explicit 
to a greater or lesser degree (Sperber and Wilson 1995, 182).  
While arguing that „an explicature is explicit to a greater or lesser degree‟, Sperber 
and Wilson also make the point that a proposition (or a thought) may be more or less 
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strongly communicated, with indeterminate cases between them. Consequently, 
implicatures are more or less determinate with a varying degree of strength. 
By emphasising that the decoded information must always, to some degree, be 
combined with contextual information as shown in the above quotation, Sperber and 
Wilson are suggesting that even explicatures must, in the last resort, be inferred. An 
illustration of the recovery of explicatures can be seen in Sperber and Wilson‟s 
example of what Mary says to Peter below: 
[3.2]  
 Mary: It‟ll get cold. 
(Sperber and Wilson 1995, 177).  
According to Sperber and Wilson, Mary‟s utterance must be „enriched in various 
ways to yield the propositional form expressed by the utterance‟ (1995, 179). For 
example, Peter must decide, among other things, what „it‟ refers to (e.g. a meal, a 
corpse, or what?); how soon the future in which „it‟ gets cold obtains (e.g. counts by 
minutes, hours, weeks, or what?); the propositional mood of Mary‟s utterance (e.g. a 
declaration or a question?). Peter needs to solve all these problems (via reference-
assignment, disambiguation, recovery of propositional mood etc.) by combining the 
assumption of the utterance with relevant contextual information. In this case, the 
relevant contextual information may include, for example, Peter‟s awareness of Mary 
having cooked dinner, and his knowledge of intonation patterns. The result of all this 
inference is that it is mutually manifest that Mary intended Peter to infer, say, that „the 
dinner will get cold very soon‟ (Sperber and Wilson 1995, 176-181). Sperber and 
Wilson count all this part as the explicit content of Mary‟s original utterance 
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However, in the situation described above, it is more likely that Peter further infers 
that Mary wants him to come and eat dinner at once, and it is mutually manifest that it 
is the last derivation that makes Mary‟s utterance worth Peter‟s attention, to the extent 
that Peter processes Mary‟s whole utterance.  According to Sperber and Wilson, the 
last derivation, however, is not part of the explicit content of an utterance, but part of 
the implicit content of Mary‟s utterance, or an „implicature‟ in the relevance theoretic 
terminology, because it is „recovered by reference to the speaker‟s manifest 
expectations about how her utterance should achieve optimal relevance‟ (Sperber and 
Wilson 1995, 194). In relation to the issue I have raised earlier about „a given 
utterance‟ being interpreted differently in the context of Chinese and British culture, 
what I mean by „a given utterance‟ is actually that it is the case where an explicature 
is potentially the same in a MC utterance and a BE utterance. In other words, since the 
propositional content of what is said does not capture all of the assumptions that the 
speaker is attempting to convey to a hearer, when hearers from both China and Britain 
hear an utterance that expresses potentially the same explicature, they „will develop 
the linguistically encoded logical form to work out what proposition (or propositions) 
it represents‟ (Clark 1996, 164, emphasis original).  
At this point of the argument, therefore, the significance of Sperber and Wilson‟s 
notion of explicatures should become more apparent. What they actually argue is that 
if even the recovery of an explicature needs some inferential work, there is no such 
thing as explicit communication at all in any communication. If Sperber and Wilson 
are correct, then all communication is indirect, because it always requires a degree of 
inference. In relation to the issue of communication styles as a way of theorising 
cultural differences, what Sperber and Wilson‟s argument indicate is that the 
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distinction between direct and indirect communication on which culture and 
communication studies are based so as to address cultural differences, as I have 
indicated on several occasions, does not exist within Relevance Theory.  
While rejecting the direct and indirect distinction, Sperber and Wilson offer an 
alternative account, which allows me to address the issue of communication style 
from a relevance theoretical perspective. In the next section, by drawing on Relevance 
Theory, I show how Sperber and Wilson‟s argument that there is no such thing as 
direct communication informs my current research on communication style used by 
MC and BE speakers.  
3.2.2 A relevance-theoretic approach to procedural meaning 
As suggested in Section 3.2.1, Sperber and Wilson formulate the view that there is no 
such thing as explicit communication at all in any communication. In arguing this, 
they go on to claim that „every utterance has a variety of possible interpretations, all 
compatible with the information that is linguistically encoded‟ (Wilson and Sperber 
1998, 8), this is  
Precisely because utterance interpretation is not a simple matter of decoding, but 
a fallible process of hypothesis formation and evaluation, there is no guarantee 
that the interpretation that satisfies the hearer‟s expectation of relevance will be 
correct, i.e. the intended one (Wilson 1994, 47, emphasise original). 
However, from the standpoint of Relevance Theory, a hearer does not need to 
consider an infinite number of possible interpretations and then decide on the right 
one. This is because in order to help hearers interpret every utterance in the most 
accessible context that yields adequate contextual effects for no unjustifiable effort 
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(Sperber and Wilson 1995, §3.1-2), a speaker aiming at relevance may use linguistic 
devices to direct a hearer towards the intended interpretation, by making a certain set 
of assumptions immediately assessable.  
Procedural information is a term attributed to Blakemore (1987), who argues that 
procedural information includes constraints on all aspects of inferential processing. In 
support of Blakemore, Wilson and Sperber (1993, 11) offer the following explanation: 
[Procedural information does] not contribute to the truth conditions of utterances, 
but constrain[s] the inferential phase of comprehension by indicating the type of 
inference process that the hearer is expected to go through…it contribute[s] to 
relevance by guiding the hearer towards the intended contextual effects, hence 
reducing the overall effort required.   
If this is true, then what procedural encoding does is to encode instructions, rather 
than to encode concepts in utterance interpretation, by providing hearers with the 
optimally relevant information to facilitate their inferential process. 
As indicated in Section 3.2.1, within the framework of Relevance Theory, an 
explicature is explicit to a greater or lesser degree. Since a proposition (or a thought) 
may be more or less strongly communicated, with indeterminate cases between them, 
and consequently, implicatures are more or less determinate, with a varying degree of 
strength. If such views are accepted, this would predict that in the situation where an 
assumption is made strongly manifest to both a speaker and a hearer, the frequency of 
occurrence of markers of procedural meaning will be low. Conversely, in a situation 
where an assumption is made manifest weakly, the frequency of occurrence of 
markers of procedural meaning will be high. It follows that in the latter situation, if a 
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speaker does not succeed in indicating, by means of markers of procedural meaning, 
that what she has to impart is relevant to a hearer, according to Relevance Theory, the 
hearer will not interpret what the speaker means by what she says. In other words, the 
hearer‟s inferential process will not be triggered. However, in the view of Relevance 
Theory, a speaker‟s communicative intention is to have her intention fulfilled or 
recognised (Sperber and Wilson 1995, 30). To this extent, as Sperber and Wilson 
(1995, 251) argue, a speaker actively helps hearers, based on her estimation of the 
hearer‟s cognitive abilities and contextual resources, by formulating her utterance in 
such a way that the first acceptable line of interpretation to occur to the hearer is the 
one intended by the speaker. This perspective is also reflected in the argument 
Sperber and Wilson make about a speaker‟s choice of style below: 
In aiming at relevance, the speaker must make some assumptions about the 
hearer‟s cognitive abilities and contextual resources, which will necessarily be 
reflected in the way she communicates, and in particular in what she chooses to 
make explicit and what she chooses to leave implicit (Sperber and Wilson 1995, 
218).  
The point Sperber and Wilson make here is that the style of a speaker is a 
consequence of the speaker‟s aim of producing an utterance consistent with the 
principle of relevance. What Sperber and Wilson actually argue here is therefore that 
a speaker aiming at relevance must use markers of procedural meaning to guide 
hearers, in order for hearers to generate the contextual implications intended by the 
speaker. 
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In Chapter Two, I have shown that earlier studies of culture and communication argue 
that cultures can be distinguished according to the use of direct and indirect styles. 
However, I have also shown that relevant studies do not actually explain how a set of 
utterances might be characterised as being direct or indirect. On this basis, at the end 
of Chapter Two, I asked the question of whether their claims can be substantiated. In 
the light of my above discussion about the relevance-theoretic approach to markers of 
procedural meaning, I argue that the claims about the use of direct and indirect styles 
used in different cultures can be addressed by focusing on markers of procedural 
meaning. My study is designed to investigate whether or not there are similarities or 
differences in the use of communication styles in individualistic and collectivistic 
cultures by focusing on China and Britain. Applying Relevance Theory to my study, I 
argue that if there is evidence that MC and BE speakers ever use markers of 
procedural meaning in their utterances to guide the interpretation process, this would 
indicate that both MC and BE hearers have to carry out inferential work, which in turn 
indicates that the styles of the two sets of speakers are both indirect. Therefore, if we 
aim to examine whether or not there are similarities or differences in the use of style 
between MC speakers and BE speakers, what we need to do now is to look for 
evidence to indicate whether or not the two sets of speakers ever use markers of 
procedural meaning to guide a hearer‟s interpretation process. However, before I 
come to this, in what follows I briefly discuss the kind of markers of procedural 
meaning earlier studies have pointed to. 
Thus far, linguistic resources that have been analysed in procedural meaning include 
prosody (e.g. Wilson and Wharton 2006; House 2006), discourse connectives (e.g. 
Blakemore 1987, 2002), pronouns, mood indicators and discourse particles (e.g. 
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Wilson and Sperber 1993; König 1991). However, two that are considered to be 
particularly effective in imposing procedural constraints on implicatures are prosody 
(e.g Wilson and Wharton 2006; House 2006) and discourse connectives (e.g. 
Blakemore 1992, 2002). In order to examine whether or not there are differences or 
similarities between MC speakers and BE speakers in terms of communication style, I 
restrict my focus to those linguistic resources that have been examined to trigger 
implicatures. I therefore examine whether prosody and discourse connectives are used 
by MC and BE speakers to guide the interpretation process.  
My focus on these two markers is motivated by two factors. Firstly, prosodic features, 
in particular stress and intonation, have been analysed under the rubric of procedural 
meaning by many scholars (e.g. Baltazani 2006; Blakemore 1987, 2002; Clark 2007; 
Escandell Vidal 1996; Fretheim 1998; House 2006; Wichmann and Blakemore 2006; 
Wilson and Wharton 2006). All these writers acknowledge that one of the important 
functions of prosody is to provide procedural information to a hearer for interpreting 
an utterance. For example, Wichmann and Blakemore (2006, 1537-8) argue that 
[P]rosody plays an important role in many languages in the structuring of    
information within discourse, by lending its psychological salience to certain 
syllables, and manipulating rules in order to indicate broad and narrow focus. 
If the above view is accepted, it is possible that prosody is used by both MC and BE 
speakers to encode procedural information „in order to indicate broad and narrow 
focus‟ (Wichmann and Blakemore 2006, 1538). If this is the case, then the occurrence 
of prosody in the utterances produced by the two sets of speakers would provide 
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strong evidence to show that the styles used by MC speakers and BE speakers are 
both indirect.  
The second factor is to do with discourse connectives. It is generally acknowledged 
that while interpreting an utterance, we should not merely restrict our focus to the 
proposition expressed by every single utterance, but should accommodate the role that 
discourse connectives play, by extending our focus into a discourse unit larger than a 
sentence, because 
What is communicated in discourse is more than the semantic and pragmatic 
meaning of the individual clauses. Part of the meaning of discourse is the 
relationship between sentences and larger discourse units …Discourse 
connectives are then claimed to indicate that two units of discourse stand in a 
particular coherence relation (Unger 1996, 410). 
More importantly, as I indicated earlier in this section, relevance scholars see 
discourse connectives as types of linguistic expressions that do not contribute to the 
truth conditional content of utterances that contain them, but rather, indicate how the 
relevance of one discourse segment is dependent on another. This means that 
discourse connectives „impose constraints on relevance by virtue of the inferential 
connections they express‟ (Blakemore 1987, 141). Discourse connectives with such a 
property, according to Blakemore (1987, 2002), must be analysed as encoding 
procedural information rather than conceptual information. 
Moreover, it has been argued (e.g. Unger 1996; Feng 2008) that all languages have a 
certain set of connectives that correspond in function to encode procedural meaning. 
For example, Feng (2008, 1687) argues that 
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In English and perhaps all other languages, there is a class of expressions which 
has been generally characterized as semantically non-truth-conditional and 
syntactically peripheral…A multiple array of terms have been used…However, 
recently it seems to be narrowing down to „pragmatic marker‟ or „discourse 
markers‟. 
If Feng‟s view is accepted, this would predict that MC and BE must have the same set 
of connectives that enjoy the property of „non-truth-conditional‟ (Feng 2008, 1687), 
and therefore encode procedural meaning in the process of interpretation. If this is 
true, then the occurrence of discourse connectives in the two languages will also be 
strong evidence that the styles of MC and BE speakers are both indirect. 
To sum up, in this section, drawing on the argument in Relevance Theory that there is 
no such thing as direct communication, I have argued that the claim made by existing 
studies of culture and communication, namely that cultures can be distinguished 
according to direct and indirect styles, can be addressed by focusing on markers of 
procedural meaning. I have also argued that my study is designed to investigate 
whether or not there are similarities or differences in communication styles used in 
China and Britain by focusing on prosody and discourse connectives as markers of 
procedural meaning.  
In the next section, I review relevant literature in order to argue that there is already 
evidence that both MC and BE speakers appear to rely on prosody and discourse 
connectives to encode procedural information in an act of communication.  
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3.2.3 Markers of procedural meaning in the two languages 
In this section, by reviewing the literature of prosody and discourse connectives, I aim 
to show that (a) there is evidence that stress and intonation appear to encode 
procedural information in BE, and that although the tone language features of MC 
determine that tone cannot be used to encode procedural information, stress does 
appear to encode procedural meaning in MC, and (b) discourse connectives are used 
by both sets of speakers to guide the interpretation process.  
3.2.3.1 Prosody in the two languages 
In order to show that both MC and BE use prosody to encode procedural information, 
I first review literature on English prosody, followed by my evaluation of scholarship 
on Chinese prosody.   
Prosody in English  
Cruttenden (1997, 172) points out that prosodic features „refer to vocal effects‟ of a 
speech, and they are generally taken to include such major features as intonation, 
stress and tone. Specifically, Cruttenden (1986, 8) claims that „intonation‟ refers to „a 
feature of phrases or sentences‟. A number of other phonology theorists (e.g. 
Gussenhoven 2004, 22; Warren et al. 1995, 458) have provided a more detailed 
description of what intonation is, and argued that English intonation can be 
represented by a linear sequence of pitch accents and a boundary tone, which in effect 
is a sequence of high and low tones. This indicates that „pitch accents‟ and „boundary 
tones‟ are treated as two independent prosodic features and the former is usually 
called stress, whilst the latter is called intonation.  
 100 
 
According to Pierrehumbert & Hirschberg (1990, 272), stress in English is the 
„relative prominence of syllables in an utterance‟. Similarly, Cruttenden (1986, 48) 
notes that at least in English, stress „is realised principally by pitch, length and 
loudness; of these, pitch is undoubtedly the most consistently used feature‟. What 
these scholars imply is that stress is realised differently in different languages. Within 
the literature of phonology, it is generally acknowledged that stress is used either in 
words or in sentences, namely, word stress and sentence stress. Chen et al. (2001, 
1681), for example, claim that word stress is assigned by lexical-phonological rules, 
and it „is concerned with the emphasis of individual syllables comprising a 
polysyllabic word‟. Sentence stress has been defined as the most prominent words in a 
phrase or sentence and the stressed word is usually the most important in a phrase or a 
sentence. This suggests that the study of word stress and the study of sentence stress 
refer to different things. The former is grammar-focused, whereas the latter is 
meaning-focused. As I explained in Chapter two, my present study is primarily 
concerned with the way through which utterances are produced and interpreted in a 
specific context, and it is a meaning-focused study. Because of this, I restrict my 
discussion of stress to phrase or sentence stress, rather than word stress. Since stress, 
tone and intonation are commonly described as prosodic features, in the rest of my 
study, prosodic stress, stress or pitch accent will refer to sentence stress whenever 
they occur.  
In the phonology literature, English stress has been discussed extensively to mark the 
information focus of a sentence (e.g. Dik 1997; Erteschik-Shir 1997; Lambrecht 1994; 
Selkirk 1995; Reinhart 1995; Szendröi 2004). The notion of „focus‟ refers to the 
 101 
 
„information which is relatively the most important or salient in the given 
communicative setting‟ (Dik 1997, 326). Specifically, Lambrecht (1994, 24) argues: 
[I]n English the sentence accent can in principle „move‟ from  right to left, 
allowing for prosodic focus marking in any position in the sentence. Because of 
the importance of sentence accentuation in English, syntactic expression of 
information structure is often unnecessary in this language. 
The point Lambrecht makes here is that prosody is often used to mark focus in 
English, and even when syntactic structure is used to mark focus, it is always 
accompanied by prosodic stress. 
The idea that English stress marks the focus of an utterance is also reflected in the 
proposals given by some other scholars like Selkirk (1995), Reinhart (1995), 
Schwarzschild (1999) and Fėry and Samek-Lodovici (2006). In their respective 
proposals as shown below, these scholars attempt to highlight the important role stress 
plays in marking focus of a sentence:  
Selkirk (1995, 555): 
Basic Focus Rule: An accented word is F(ocus)-marked. 
Reinhart (1995, 62): 
Stress-Focus Correspondence Principle: The focus of a clause is a(ny) constituent 
containing the main stress of the intonational phrase, as determined by the stress 
rule. 
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Schwarzschild (1999, 173): 
Focus: A Focus-marked phrase contains an accent. 
Fėry and Samek-Lodovici (2006, 135-6): 
Stress-Focus: A focused phrase has the highest prosodic prominence in its focus 
domain. 
As we may see, all the above scholars emphasise that the assignment of a stress (an 
accent) to a word entails the focus marking of that word. They all take the view that 
there is a direct link between prosody and the focus of an utterance. This indicates that 
one of the important functions of prosody is to mark information focus. 
The fact that prosody has a function of marking information focus is also accounted 
for by Sperber and Wilson (1995) from a relevance theoretic perspective. They argue:  
[S]tress is a sort of vocal equivalent of pointing, a natural means of drawing 
attention to one particular constituent in an utterance (Sperber and Wilson 1995, 
203). 
The example below is a brief illustration of how Sperber and Wilson‟s approach may 
work: 
[3.3] 
Susan went off to see the FOOTBALL match (Sperber and Wilson 1995, 203). 
Notice that in [3.3], capitalization „football‟ to indicate „focal stress‟ is supplied by 
Sperber and Wilson, who claim that a speaker who puts focal stress on „football‟ may 
be intending to highlight that this is the focus of the utterance. They go on to argue 
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that „the focally stressed constituent rarely determines the unique focus', but that it is 
„to show how an actual focus is chosen from a range of potential foci‟ (Sperber and 
Wilson 1995, 203). This indicates that by stressing the word „football‟, a speaker 
gives her audience instructions to infer that what Susan went off to see is 
FOOTBALL match, rather than other kinds of matches.  Hearers are then directed by 
the stressed word to process the utterance in the context which is made accessible. 
Consequently, hearers‟ processing effort is reduced.  
Sperber and Wilson‟s (1995, 203) above argument that stress is „a natural means of 
drawing attention to one particular constituent in an utterance‟ has been applied by a 
number of scholars to the study of prosody as encoding procedural meaning (e.g. 
Clark and Wharton 2009; Fretheim  1998; House 1990, 2006; Imai 1998; Vandepitte 
1989; Wilson and Wharton 2006). These theorists all take the view that prosody is a 
widely accepted linguistic device that is used not to encode conceptual meaning, but 
to provide instructions about how an utterance is to be processed.  
In the light of the literature reviewed above, it is clear that English prosodic stress 
encodes procedural meaning. However, prosodic features used to mark procedural 
meaning in English are not limited to stress alone. The relevant literature (e.g. Clark 
2007; Clark and Lindsey 1990; Escandell-Vidal 1998, 2002; House 2006) suggests 
that English intonation (i.e. pitch variations) is also used to perform this function, 
independently of stress. Clark (2007, 74), for example, argues that „intonational 
meaning is procedural, i.e. it encodes procedures which help to constrain or guide 
inferential processes‟. Similarly, House (2006) claims that boundary high rising tone 
encodes procedural meaning in the process of utterance interpretation, as follows: 
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A procedural hypothesis concerning the high boundary tone (H%) itself is that it 
encodes an instruction to interpret the preceding phrase as part of a larger piece of 
structure… and indicating a wider context. The hearer must use her cognitive 
environment to make appropriate inferences about the speaker‟s intentions, to 
work out what the wider context might be (House 2006, 1554).    
To illustrate that intonation functions to encode procedural meaning, I use an example 
from House (2006, 1553) below: 
[3.4] 
/
Coffee  
H* H H%    
(H* stands for extra High, H stands for relatively High, and H% stands for high 
boundary tone). 
House (2006) makes the point that the above utterance is realised with a rising tone, 
which may instruct the hearers to interpret it as a question, but in this particular case, 
a range of other interpretations is possible, depending on what is accessible in the 
context. House goes on to argue that the speaker may be in the process of making 
suggestions, where the high boundary merely signals non-finality, or that the speaker 
may also be using high rising tone to express uncertainty of the status of the current 
intonational phase, and the hearer will select the first interpretation that is relevant 
enough to yield cognitive effects. In arguing this, House is suggesting that in all these 
possible interpretations, what intonation does is to encode procedural information. 
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House‟s view that intonation encodes procedural information is shared by a range of 
relevance theorists (e.g. Clark 2007; Escandell Vidal 1998; Fretheim 2002; 
Vandepitte 1989). Specifically, Wilson and Wharton (2006, 1571) comment that 
The function of such „procedural‟ expressions would be to facilitate the 
identification of the speaker‟s meaning by narrowing the search space for 
inferential comprehension, increasing the salience of some hypotheses and 
eliminating others, thus reducing the overall effort required…both „natural‟ (e.g. 
an angry tone) and properly linguistic prosodic singles (e.g. stress and intonation) 
are procedurals in this sense. 
In the light of the arguments I have reviewed so far, it is clear that there is a great deal 
of evidence that intonation and stress are used to encode procedural meaning in 
English. Although syntactic structure is also one way of marking the information 
focus, evidence suggests that when it is used to perform such a function, it cannot do 
it independently, but must be accompanied by prosodic stress.  
Prosody in Chinese 
In the phonology literature, Chinese is a typical example of a tonal language with four 
lexical tones (not including the neutral tone) (e.g. Chao 1948, 1956, 1968; Lin 1965, 
1988; Li and Thompson 1981; Howie 1976; Cruttenden 1997; Tench 1996). 
According to Cruttenden (1997, 8-9), tone is „a feature of lexicon, being described in 
terms of prescribed pitches for syllables or sequences of pitches for morphemes or 
words‟. Unlike that of BE, whose pitch variations express syntactic and pragmatic 
meaning, in a tone language such as MC, the changes of pitch serve to distinguish 
word meaning. For example, what might seem to BE speakers to be a single MC 
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lexical item „ma‟ means four different things, depending on the associated tone, as 
shown below: 
Ma¹ (with high level pitch)                                     „mother‟ 
Ma² (with high rising pitch)                                    „hemp‟ 
Ma³ (with low, or falling then rising, pitch)            „horse‟ 
Ma
4
 (with falling pitch)                                           „scold‟ 
(McCawley 1978, 120 cited by Clark et al. 2007, 338). 
What the above literature suggests is that prosodic systems of MC and BE are 
typologically distinct, in that MC tone and BE intonation are two different types of 
pitch variations. The latter can be used to encode procedural meaning, while the 
former cannot. If such views are accepted, this would predict that speakers of MC and 
BE may use prosody in different ways. Consequently, prosody as a marker of 
procedural meaning may not be used in the same way in the two different language 
systems.  
However, a considerable amount of literature suggests that English type stress is also 
present in the production of MC (e.g. Chao 1932; Chun 1982; Duanmu 2005;  
Grandour et al. 2007; Shen 1993; Xu 1999). Specifically, studies focusing on stress 
production in MC have shown that stress in MC is manifested by lengthening and 
duration (e.g. Shen 1993; Chao 1932; Chun 1982; Lin et al. 1984). For example, Shen 
(1993) reports that the role of duration is the most important cue to identify stress in 
MC. In a more recent study, Gandour et al. (2007, 95) offer the following remark to 
acknowledge the existence of sentence stress in MC: 
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Although Mandarin, a tone language, and English, a non-tone language, differ  
structurally in their use of prosody at the word level, both languages exploit 
prosody at the sentence level to distinguish sentence focus (sentence initial vs. 
sentence final position of contrastive stress) and sentence type (declarative vs. 
interrogative modality).  
It should by now be clear that although MC is a tone language, it shares the property 
of having sentence stress with BE. It is less clear, however, whether stress is also used 
in MC „to distinguish sentence focus‟ (Gandour et al. 2007).  
Earlier in this section, I have shown that from a relevance theoretical perspective, 
stress is used to indicate procedural meaning in English by marking the focus of an 
utterance, in order to constrain a hearer‟s interpretation process. In what follows, I 
review the relevant literature on Chinese prosody, in order to show that this is also the 
case for sentence stress in MC. 
The notion of information focus in MC has been the concern of a number of 
researchers (e.g. Xu Yi 1999; Xu liejong 2004; Lapolla 1995; Zhang and Fang 1996). 
Most of them either explicitly state, or implicitly convey that the information focus of 
a MC sentence is projected in the sentence final position. Specifically, Xu‟s (2004) 
study offers some useful insights into recent developments of how Chinese 
information focus is made manifest, and his insights have been cited by much 
subsequent literature (e.g. Cheung 2009; Li 2008; Kuo and Ramsay 2008; Schwarz 
2009). According to Xu (2004, 280), a sentence final position in MC tends to be „the 
primary strategy‟ of indicating focus, and stress is a compensatory device which 
needs to work in conjunction with the use of a non-default sentence position for it to 
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function as a marker of informational focus. Now I provide evidence from Xu‟s 
(2004) account.  
Xu‟s (2004) account builds on the idea originally proposed by LaPolla (1995) that the 
focus position of Chinese is sentence final. This idea is later developed by Zhang and 
Fang (1996) who argue that whatever is in focus takes sentence final position. Xu 
(2004) argues that „compared with European languages it (i.e. MC) uses more syntax 
less phonology in focus realization‟ (2004, 277). When Xu (2004) uses the term 
„sentence final position‟, he takes into consideration the Chinese canonical order SVO 
and its relatively flexible word order, and argues that „Chinese is typologically a VO 
language, the directionality of embedding determines that this is the sentence-final 
position‟ (2004, 280). This means that constituents of informational focus often take 
the sentence final position. As Xu (2004, 298) goes on to argue: 
In Chinese the focused element should take the default focus position as far as 
possible. Once it is in this position, stress is not required. Phonological realization 
is a compensatory device where the expression intended to be focused cannot 
occur in the default position due to some structural reasons.  
To illustrate his point, Xu uses the following examples: 
[3.5] 
(a)  Lao Wang   zuotian   kai-guo   jipuche. 
(b)  Lao Wang zuotian kai-guo jipuche. 
(c)  Lao Wang zuotian kai-guo jipuche. 
(d) Lao Wang zuhotian kai-guo jipuche. 
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On the basis of the pronunciation provided by Xu (2004), I translate Xu‟s above 
examples into the following: 
 Lao Wang    zuotian      kai-guo   jipuche.  
老      王         昨天        开   过    吉普车 
Old   Wang    yesterday   drive        jeep 
Mr. Wang drove jeep yesterday. 
By using the above examples, Xu (2004, 290) argues that just like its English 
counterpart, „Chinese also uses phonological means to mark focus‟, and that each 
word of the above sentence can be uttered with more prominence, as indicated in 
boldface above. What Xu means is that (i) if Lao Wang is uttered with more 
prominence as shown in (a), the speaker gives her audience instructions that it is Lao 
Wang rather than somebody else that drove jeep yesterday. Similarly, (ii) if zuotian is 
uttered with more prominence as shown in (b), the speaker gives her audience 
instructions that it is yesterday rather than some other day that Lao Wang drove jeep; 
(iii) if kai is uttered with more prominence as shown in (c), the speaker gives her 
audience instructions that Lao Wang did have jeep driving experience yesterday; (iv) 
if jipuche is uttered with more prominence, the speaker gives her audience 
instructions that what Lao Wang drove yesterday is jeep rather than some other 
vehicles.  
In arguing that „Chinese also uses phonological means to mark focus‟, Xu (2004) also 
makes the point that the phonological manifestation of focus in Chinese is actually 
different to that of English, in that: (a) Chinese makes use of length and intensity 
rather than the rise and fall of pitch to indicate focus, and (b) phonological 
manifestation is not required in Chinese. With respect to the latter point, Xu (2004) 
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clarifies that when a sentence like [3.5] is uttered out of blue, it normally takes the 
form of (e) as shown below, in which no constituent is more prominent than others. 
(e) Lao Wang zuotian kai-guo jipuche.  
The point Xu (2004) makes here is that if no constituent in a sentence is uttered with 
more prominent than others, the focus of this sentence should be in the sentence final. 
That is, jipuche (i.e. jeep) is the focus of this utterance.  
Xu goes on to argue that a sentence like (e) may sound ambiguous in terms of focus 
interpretation; however, ambiguity can be disambiguated when context is provided. 
Based on his above examples, Xu (2004, 291) makes the following remarks: 
In fact, when it (a constituent carrying the information focus) takes the default 
focus position, stress is generally unnecessary….Stress is more likely to be used 
when the constituent intended to be in focus does not take this position. 
What Xu suggests here is that when a focused element takes the sentence final 
position, no stress is available in the whole sentence, but when a focused element does 
not occur in the sentence final position, a speaker uses stress to mark the focus of an 
utterance. This indicates that MC does use stress to mark the focus of an utterance 
even though it happens when a focused constituent takes a non-final position.  
In the light of the above evidence provided by Xu (2004), it would appear that 
prosodic stress is the linguistic resource that MC speakers draw on as markers of 
procedural meaning. As I have argued, my claim is that the occurrence of prosody in 
MC suggests that the communication style of MC speakers is indirect.  
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To sum up, I have reviewed the literature on Chinese and English prosody.  There is 
evidence that speakers of both MC and BE use prosody to encode procedural 
meaning. This would imply that the communication styles of the two sets of speakers 
are both indirect.  
In the next section, I review the literature on discourse connectives in order to provide 
evidence that discourse connectives are used in both MC and BE to encode procedural 
information.  
3.2.3.2 Discourse connectives in the two languages 
In Section 3.2.2, I have shown that within the framework of Relevance Theory, 
discourse connectives are seen as types of linguistic expressions that do not encode 
concepts, and therefore do not contribute to the truth conditional content of an 
utterance. Rather, they indicate how a speaker‟s utterance is to be processed by 
directing a hearer towards the intended context. According to Blakemore (1987, 1992, 
2002), one  way of explaining the connectives in use is to analyse them as encoding 
procedural meaning, so as to impose constraints on a hearer‟s interpretation process. 
This is because 
Their sole function is to guide the interpretation process by specifying certain 
properties of context and contextual effects. In a relevance-based framework, 
where the aim is to minimise processing cost, the use of such expressions is to be 
expected (Blakemore 1987, 77; 1989, 21).  
Although thus far, discourse connectives are widely accepted linguistic expressions 
that can be analyzed as encoding procedural meaning in larger discourse units, 
according to Blakemore (2003, 239),  
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Not all the expressions that have been classified as DMs (i.e. discourse markers, 
emphasise original) can be analysed as procedural constraints on relevance. For 
example, besides, as a result, and in contrast encode concepts and are 
constituents of propositional representations. 
This indicates that from a relevance theoretical point of view, even though some 
expressions play a role in the way discourse is understood, they do not encode 
procedural meaning. To solve the issue of identifying discourse connectives with a 
procedural function, Blakemore (2002, 95; 1992, 138-141), on the basis of the 
cognitive effects they encode, classifies discourse connectives in the following three 
ways: 
(a) It may allow the derivation of a contextual implication (e.g. so, therefore);  
(b) It may strengthen an existing assumption (by providing better evidence for it) (e.g. 
after all, moreover, furthermore);  
(c) It may contradict an existing assumption (e.g. however, but, nevertheless).  
To illustrate how a cognitive effect is achieved in one of the ways mentioned above, I 
now use two examples from Blakemore, as follows: 
[3.6] 
David isn‟t here. Barbara is in town (Blakemore 1992, 150). 
In the above example, the connection between the two segments of the utterance is 
not explicitly signalled. The second segment can either be a conclusion drawn from 
the first segment or a reason for the state of affairs described in the first segment. 
Hearers need to decide which interpretation is intended by the speaker.  
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[3.7] 
(a) David isn‟t here.  
(b) So Barbara‟s in town. 
 (Blakemore 1992, 150). 
In interpreting the utterances in [3.7] and establishing the connections indicated by 
„so‟ between the utterances (a) and (b), the hearer has to access the background 
information (c): 
(c) Whenever David isn‟t here, Barbara is in town (premise). 
Thus, the presence of discourse connective so in (b) is used to achieve relevance by 
instructing the hearer to interpret (b) as a contextual implication derived from (a). 
That is, so is used to impose constraints on contextual assumptions needed for 
interpreting (a) and (b). As a result, the interpretation process the hearer needs to go 
through becomes easier.  
Moreover, in explaining how discourse connectives are used to encode procedural 
information, Blakemore (1992, 85) claims that „even when two sentences are related 
by a cohesive tie, the hearer has to go beyond her linguistic resources to recover an 
interpretation‟. The point Blakemore (1992) makes here is that even for those 
discourse relations that are explicitly signalled by the use of a connective like the one 
in example [3.7], hearers must infer the connectivity of content. However, the 
presence of the connectives would make their inference easier, and consequently, the 
hearers‟ processing effort is decreased.  
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In my study, following Blakemore (1987, 1992, 2002), I restrict my consideration of 
discourse connectives to those that do not encode concepts, but encode procedural 
meaning, by indicating how an utterance is to be processed. In what follows, I adopt 
Blakemore‟s (1987, 1992, 2002) approach to discourse connectives to identify 
Chinese counterparts that fall into the three categories defined above.  
As indicated in Section 3.2.2, almost all languages have a range of lexical expressions 
that encode procedural constraints on utterance comprehension, Chinese is no 
exception. Although no studies have been found to systematically investigate Chinese 
discourse connectives from a relevance theoretical perspective, recent work by Feng 
(2008) provides a systematic description of Chinese pragmatic markers in general. 
Among the pragmatic markers Feng (2008) outlined, I take what Feng (2008) 
categorises as contrastive pragmatic markers (e.g. 但是  (i.e. but)), elaborative 
pragmatic markers (e.g.并且 (i.e. moreover)) and inferential pragmatic markers (e.g. 
所以 (i.e. so)) as being equivalent to the three categories of discourse connectives 
suggested by Blakemore (1992). I argue that these three types of Chinese pragmatic 
markers (in Feng‟s terms) fit well into the categories classified by Blakemore, not 
merely because they „suggest a relation between messages‟ (Feng 2008, 1707), but 
also because „they do not affect the truth conditions of a sentence that hosts them‟ 
(Feng 2008, 1688). Therefore, I take them as a class of linguistic expressions that can 
encode procedural, rather than conceptual information in MC.   
To sum up, I have reviewed the relevant literature on discourse connectives in BE and 
MC. Evidence suggests that discourse connectives are used by both speakers of MC 
and BE to encode procedural information to guide the interpretation process. The use 
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of discourse connectives in MC and BE suggests that the communication styles of the 
two sets of speakers are both indirect.  
For ease of comparison, I now list discourse connectives in BE and their MC 
counterparts in the table below, according to the categories classified by Blakemore 
(2002, 95; 1992, 138-141). 
Table 3.1 Discourse connectives in the two languages 
 
 English discourse 
connectives 
Chinese equivalents 
Introducing a contextual 
implication 
So, therefore 因此, 所以 
Strengthening an existing 
assumption 
After all, moreover,  
furthermore 
并且, 再说 
Contradicting or 
eliminating an existing 
assumption 
But, however 但,  但是, 然而 
 
3.2.3.3 Summary 
In this section, I have reviewed the relevant literature on prosody and discourse 
connectives with respect to MC and BE. Overall, evidence suggests that MC speakers 
and BE speakers have similarities in the use of linguistic devices to encode procedural 
meaning, in that they both rely on prosody and discourse connectives to guide a 
hearer‟s interpretation process.  
There is also evidence that in BE, intonation is used to mark procedural meaning, but 
the characteristic of a tone language determines that intonation is not used to encode 
procedural meaning in MC.  
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3.2.4 Summary 
In this section, drawing on Relevance Theory, I have argued that the claims made by 
existing studies of culture and communication about the use of direct and indirect 
styles in different cultures can be addressed by focusing on markers of procedural 
meaning. I have also argued that according to my literature review, the 
communication styles of MC and BE speakers are both indirect, in that they both rely 
on markers of procedural meaning to guide the interpretation process.  
In the next section, I conclude my literature review by specifying the research 
questions my current study is designed to address.  
3.3 Conclusion 
In Chapter Two, I showed that studies of culture and communication argue that 
cultures can be distinguished according to the use of direct and indirect style. 
However, such studies do not explain how one style can be categorised as being direct 
and another style can be categorised as being indirect. In Chapter Three, I have shown 
that speakers of MC and BE both rely on prosody and discourse connectives to guide 
the interpretation process. I have argued that this would suggest that both languages 
communicate indirectly.  
In Chapter Two, I also showed that studies of culture and communication claim that 
Chinese and English draw different inferences from utterances that apparently express 
the same propositional content (e.g. I‟m going to New Orleans for three days). 
However, they do not explain how culture has an impact on interpretation. In Chapter 
Three, I have shown that differences in interpretation may be explained by employing 
a relevance theoretic approach. Relevance theorists argue that for a single utterance to 
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generate the same meaning, hearers have to share a cognitive environment. If hearers 
are from different countries, they are likely to have different cognitive environments, 
and as a result, it is highly likely that they produce different interpretations of a given 
utterance. 
Given that earlier studies of culture and communication tend to draw on invented 
examples and arguments, rather than empirical study, my study is designed to ask the 
following two research questions: 
Research Question (1): 
Is there evidence from actual language use that indicates that both MC and BE 
speakers use markers of procedural meaning? 
Research Question (2): 
Is there evidence that when interpreting naturally occurring conversations, 
hearers from different cultures do actually come up with different interpretations 
because they are drawing on a different cognitive environment? 
I ask the first question because if my analysis indicates that this is the case, then both 
languages can be seen as using indirect forms of communication. This indicates that 
there is no direct connection between culture and the use of style. As a result, the 
direct and indirect distinction identified by studies of culture and communication 
needs to be rethought. 
I ask the second question because if it is established that this is the case, it is 
significant in the light of existing scholarship, because this would indicate how the 
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limitations of existing culture and communication literature can be addressed by 
focusing on what hearers actually do in the process of communication. 
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Chapter Four: Research Procedure 
Introduction 
My goal in this chapter is to explain how I addressed the two research questions by 
describing in detail my research design and the process through which I carried out 
my current empirical research.  
4.1 Research approach 
My present thesis is a line of research designed within a cross-cultural paradigm, and 
it is part of the area of cross-cultural communication, in which China is contrasted 
with Britain in terms of how cultural differences are realised in actual language use, 
from the perspective of how an utterance is produced and interpreted. It also addresses 
how cross-cultural differences affect intercultural communication.  
According to the literature on cross-cultural research methodology (e.g. van de Vijver 
and Leung 1997, Kumar 2005), a study with such an orientation means that my 
empirical data must be at least equivalent in terms of „structure‟ and „unit‟ of analysis 
(van de Vijver and Leung 1997, 8). Without these levels of equivalence, „no valid 
cross-cultural behaviour comparisons may be made‟ (Berry 1969, 122, cited by 
Vargas-Reighley 2005, 74). Since my research aims to expose cultural differences in 
the process of verbal communication by focusing on China and Britain, my data must 
represent verbal communication styles used by people from the two cultures in their 
real life situations, and therefore, they must not be „elicited‟ by a third party to „reach 
a particular goal‟ designed by a researcher (Kasper 2000, 320). This also means that 
my role is that of „a passive observer‟ (Kumar 2005, 120), in that I „do not get 
involved in the activities of the group‟, but listen to and „record the activities as they 
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are performed‟ (Kumar 2005, 120). The data I collect must reflect the effort „to 
observe how people talk when they are not being observed‟ (Labov 1972, 209).  
As I have argued in Chapter Two, there are aspects of cultural differences in 
communication which have not been discussed in the relevant literature, and yet are 
very significant in studying how cultural differences are realised in actual language 
use. My present study is designed to address these limitations, by ascertaining 
whether or not cultural differences between China and Britain can be distinguished 
according to the use of style, and investigating how culture impacts on interpretation 
of „a given utterance‟ in a specific context. In order to achieve these aims, I undertook 
data collection, data transcribing, translation, as follows.  
4.2 Collecting authentic data in radio discourse 
Researchers on cross-cultural pragmatics (e.g Wolfson 1983; Beebe and Cummings 
2006; Cohen 1996) argue that naturally occurring data are good data for cross-cultural 
research. According to Bardovi-Harlig and Hartford (1993, cited by Cohen 1996, 391-
2), the advantages of such data are that they are „not only spontaneous‟, but also 
„reflect what the speakers say rather than what they think they would say‟. 
Specifically, speakers in such data „are reacting to a natural situation rather than to a 
contrived and possibly unfamiliar situation‟.  What this indicates is that authenticity is 
an important feature of such data. It also indicates that if we use such data for cross-
cultural communication study, they can reveal the real situation of interaction between 
a speaker and a hearer. 
Kasper (2000, 317) argues that authentic discourse is motivated and structured by the 
participants‟ rather than a researcher‟s goal. By saying this, Kasper is suggesting that 
 121 
 
authentic discourse can yield data that represent what people actually say in real life. 
Also, Kasper and Rose (2002, 80), in their discussion of cross-cultural pragmatic 
research, claim that institutional settings are valuable sources to collect authentic data. 
This suggests, as Kasper and Rover (2005, 325-6) argue, that compared to 
interpersonal talk and ordinary talk, institutional settings can „provide a more stable 
environment that lends itself particularly well to examine pragmatic development in 
authentic discourse‟. In relation to my study of cultural differences in communication, 
what Kasper and Rover‟s argument indicates is that data collected in institutional 
setting is better than either interpersonal or ordinary talk to enable me to examine the 
pragmatic development in the area of cross-cultural communication. Moreover, 
according to Bardovi-Harlig and Hartford (2005, 1), what is distinctive about talk in 
institutional settings is that it „meets the field‟s (i.e. interlanguage pragmatics) 
methodological requirements of comparability, predictable occurrence of pragmatic 
features, high rates of occurrence‟. Since the aim of my data analysis is to compare 
communication patterns in two cultures, the talk in institutional setting meets the 
„methodological requirements of comparability‟ (Bardovi-Harlig and Hartford 
2005:1). Therefore, I decided to take one form of institutional talk - radio phone-in 
talk shows as the object of my study because they are useful in achieving this aim. 
4.2.1 Motivations for collecting radio data 
My decision to collect radio discourse data was motivated by the following 
considerations. Firstly, up to now, a considerable body of research on authentic 
speech has focused on a variety of institutional contexts for cross-cultural and 
interlanguage pragmatics research; the range of issues addressed includes, for 
example, academic advising sessions by Bardovi-Harlig and Hartford (1993, 1996), 
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oral proficiency interviews by Young and He (1998), classroom interactions as cross-
cultural encounters by Luk and Lin (2006), and cross-cultural interaction in medical 
setting by Cameron and Williams (1997). However, broadcast talk, as a specific type 
of institutional discourse (Hutchby 2006, 18; Tolson 2006, 25), has received little 
attention, in spite of the fact that it is a well-researched area for conversation analysis 
(e.g. Hutchby 1996, 2006; Scannell 1991; Heritage 1985; Hutchby and Wooffitt 
1998). According to Drew and Heritage (1992, 1), talk in institutional settings 
encompasses both face-to-face interaction and the interaction over the telephone. 
Radio phone-in talk, as one subcategory of broadcast talk, obviously belongs to the 
latter. Media researchers (e.g. Scannell 1991, 9; Hutchby 2006, Ch.7) argue that this 
type of radio talk lies at the interface of the public and the private, or the institutional 
and interpersonal, and it therefore displays not only “a variety of features which 
formally liken it to everyday or „mundane‟ conversation, [but also] more 
„institutional‟ forms of verbal interaction” (Hutchby 1991, 119). Given the dual 
characteristics of radio phone-in talk, I believe that it could provide richer data than 
either institutional talk or interpersonal talk alone.  
Secondly, according to conversation analysts (e.g Heritage and Maynard 2006, 14; 
Hutchby 2006, 28), institutional interaction may be structured in a more regular way, 
with components characteristically emerging in a particular order. For example, 
Hutchby (2006, 28) notes that „the most routinely structured segment of calls to a talk 
radio show is the opening sequence‟. I therefore selected that form of talk because it 
would allow me to achieve „structural equivalence‟ (van de Vijver and Leung 1997, 8) 
in cross-cultural comparisons. 
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Thirdly, in contrast to other types of talk on the radio, there was evidence to suggest 
that  radio phone-in talk can be more representative of everyday talk, in that „the style 
of phone-in argument and the enjoyment of it are more like the style and enjoyment 
one finds in a familiar dinner table rant‟ (Myers 2004, 181). The representative 
feature of radio talk is also expressed clearly by Scannell, as below:  
The voices of radio…were and are heard in the context of household activities 
and other household voices, as part of the general social arrangements of 
households and their members. It is this that powerfully drives the 
communicative style and manner of broadcasting to approximate to the norms not 
of public forms of talk, but to those of ordinary, informal conversation, for this is 
overwhelmingly the preferred communicative style of interaction between people 
in the routine contexts of day-to-day life and especially in the places in which 
they live (1991, 3-4).   
Using Scannell‟s (1991) argument as the basis for my selection of examples of „the 
preferred communicative style of interaction between people in the routine contexts of 
day-to-day life‟ in each culture (Scannell 1991: 4), I argue that this type of talk met 
my aims.  
There was also evidence that collecting authentic data from radio discourse could 
provide one of the most reliable forms of data, with the least collecting effort. 
According to Spencer-Oatey and Franklin (2009, 278):  
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 [G]aining access to data collection opportunities and finding respondents can be 
challenging for all researchers, but in cultural-comparative and cultural-
interactional research it can be even more difficult, especially when comparable 
datasets are required.  
In my view, these difficulties can be resolved if we collect authentic data from radio 
discourse. This is because, according to Hutchby (2006, 18), one of the key 
distinguishing features of broadcast talk is that “it is directed at an „overhearing‟ 
audience separated from the talk site of production by space, frequently, by time”.  
What this indicates is that if a researcher wants to collect radio data, he or she does 
not need to negotiate access to the production site, nor does the researcher need to 
acquire permission from the institution for the recording. The researcher‟s role is 
actually an ordinary overhearing audience. As long as the researcher tunes in the radio 
when the target programme is on air, recording can be done anywhere. Consequently, 
what Labov (1972, 209) calls „the observer‟s paradox‟, that is, „to observe how people 
talk when they are not being observed‟, is resolved. Seen from the perspective that the 
researcher does not exert any influence on participants, data obtained in radio 
discourse must be highly reliable.  
Given all of the substantial benefits, I argue that data collected from radio discourse 
provides a very useful data source for cross-cultural research. Thus, I decided to 
record two sets of radio talk show broadcast in China and Britain for my study. 
In the next section, I explain how I ensured the comparability of my two sets of data.  
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4.2.2 Comparability of the two sets of data 
As indicated earlier, my research is a cross-cultural comparative study in orientation, 
and therefore I took particular care to ensure that my data were sufficiently similar so 
as to allow me to make a cross-cultural comparison. In order to maximise the 
comparability of my data and ensure that the results appropriately reflected each 
cultural group‟s actual situations, before my data collection took place, I adopted the 
following three-step procedure. 
First, I restricted my focus of data to radio talk shows, in which callers phone in for 
advice with their problems, namely a radio advice talk show. In this way, I was able 
to ensure „structural equivalence‟ (van de Vijver and Leung 1997, 7). That is, the 
same construct was measured in each cultural group.  
Second, I restricted the problems about which callers phoned in for advice to issues 
related to family arguments, love relationships, personal dilemmas and everyday ups 
and downs. Such types of topic, as advertised respectively by London Biggest 
Conversation and Hong Mei Hot Line (see below), are usually regarded as suitable for 
adults only. In this way, I was able to ensure the „appropriateness of the item content‟ 
(van de Vijver and Leung 1997, 18). That is, the range of issues covered in the topic 
measured was similar in each cultural group. I will explain why such a restriction 
matters in my subsequent genre discussion. Moreover, strong attention was also given 
to „unit equivalence‟ (van de Vijver and Leung 1997, 8). That is, the „comparable 
units of analysis‟ (Patton 2002, 493) were identical in the two cultural groups. I will 
discuss this issue in more detail in Section 4.4.3. 
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Thirdly, I carefully considered the matter of the genre involved in my study. 
According to the genre literature (e.g. Bhatia 1993, 13; Swales 1990, 58), a defining 
feature of a genre is its „communicative purpose‟, and the same genre shares the same 
communicative purpose. In the light of insights gained from the genre literature, I 
regarded all of the host-caller interactions having the same „communicative purpose‟ 
of seeking advice, as the same genre. 
However, according to Hutchby (2006, 102), „genre of media talk itself comprises a 
variety of sub-types‟, and radio advice talk show is just one type among the many. 
Specifically, DeCapua and Dunham (1993, 520) argue that  
People who are seeking advice frequently turn to those who they feel might have 
insights into their problems, whether or not those individuals have credentials.  
This indicates that the stage of giving advice may exhibit a variety of features which 
can be classified into different categories. For example, it has been argued that advice 
may be provided by „the expert who sits in the studio along with the show‟s host‟ 
(Hutchby 2006, 103), or by the non-expert host (DeCapua and Dunham 1993; 
Hutchby 2006), or by the overhearing audience who are encouraged to become 
involved in giving advice after hearing callers‟ problems (Hutchby 2006, 103). 
However, as I explain later in Section 4.4.3, the issue of who is involved in giving 
advice after callers‟ problems are made explicit is not directly relevant to my study, I 
therefore decided not to distinguish whether there were any differences in the way in 
which advice was given in my data. Of note, however, is that, according to Hutchby 
(2006, 103), some radio advice talk shows involve a third party (usually an expert) 
who is sitting in the studio along with the host. The presence of an expert may lead to 
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two phenomena. One of them is that the expert actively participates in the 
conversation, and consequently, the advice talk show turns out to be a three-party 
conversation rather than involving two individuals. Another phenomenon is that the 
expert plays the role of a hearer throughout host-caller conversation, but comes in to 
talk by giving advice when callers‟ problems are made explicit. As a result, even 
though the expert sits in the studio, the advice talk show still remains a two-party 
conversation: either host-caller talk or expert-caller talk.  For the purposes of my 
study, I restricted my focus to interaction of two parties – host-caller interaction only, 
regardless of whether an expert was present in the studio or not. Because of this 
consideration, any interactions with a third party were excluded.  
In accordance with the above procedures, I collected a set of Chinese data and a set of 
English data. I chose three different shows in each data set, in order to ensure some 
degree of reliability. The Chinese data were collected from two radio phone-in shows 
broadcast in China. They were: Hong Mei Hot line and Late Night Chit-chat. The 
latter was hosted by two presenters in turn, respectively at the weekdays and at the 
weekends. Blakemore (1992, 177) argues that styles vary according to the forms 
speakers use to communicate their messages. I thus assumed that the stylistic 
preferences of the two hosts differed when they interacted with their hearers, and 
therefore I treated the show hosted by the two presenters as two distinct data sets. The 
English data were collected from three different radio phone-in shows broadcast in 
Britain. They were: Late Night Love and London‟s Biggest Conversation (LBC). 
LBC is an umbrella concept encompassing all the programmes broadcast in LBC 
97.3FM. There is no specific name for each show, and presenters are scheduled to 
host their respective programmes at a designated time slot. From LBC, I collected two 
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radio phone-in shows hosted respectively by two different presenters at different time 
slots.  All of the radio phone-in shows I collected were broadcast online.  
The entire Chinese sample consists of 45 host-caller talks and the English sample 
consists of 49 talks. Among the resulting collection of cases of host-caller talk, I 
selected a total of sixty cases that met the criteria I discussed earlier in this section, 
namely, „equivalence in structure‟, „appropriateness of the item content‟, the same 
genre, and interaction between host-caller only. The sixty cases consisted of an equal 
number (ten) of each talk show, which amounted to thirty cases included in each set 
of data. Those host-caller talks which I considered to influence the reliability of my 
study were deleted, including, for example, talks relating to different genres, wrong 
calls, and talks with a third party in conversations. In Table 4.1, I list the size of my 
data and the problem categories I assigned to the data:  
Table 4.1 Problems constructed in the two sets of data 
 Chinese talks (30 calls) English talks (30 calls) 
 
 
Problems 
Love relationship  (21) Love relationship  (19) 
Family arguments  (7) Personal dilemma  (6) 
Personal dilemma   (1) Child‟s problems   (2) 
Child‟s partnership (1) Gay relationship    (1)  
 Family problem     (2)  
 
In what follows, I explain the instrument used for data collection.  
4.2.3 Recording talk show online 
In order to collect authentic data from host-caller talks with accuracy and high quality, 
I paid particular attention to „the technical quality of recording‟ (Peräkylä 2004, 284).  
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In contrast with more conventional recording techniques such as tape recording or 
even video recording, it has been argued that online digital recording seems to be the 
best method to capture features of verbal speech for data analysis (e.g. Denscombe 
2007, 195; Peräkylä 2004, 285; Edward 2003, 341). Since all of the radio talk shows 
were broadcast online, I recorded all of my data online by means of recording 
software, and then transferred them to computer hardware. 
Apart from the advantage that online recording „achieves a naturalistic recording of 
events‟ (Flick 2002, 167; 2007a, 284), and therefore can ensure „the accuracy and 
inclusiveness of recording‟ (Peräkylä 2004, 283), this method has the unique 
characteristic by which, as long as one can get access to the internet, recording can be 
done anywhere. Because of this benefit, I recorded my Chinese data in Britain. 
4.2.4 Summary 
In this section, I have described in detail the procedure for collecting radio data. I 
have reported on the procedures I adopted to ensure the equivalence of my two sets of 
radio data, as well as the size of the data collected. I have also made clear the 
mechanical means that I used for recording. 
In the next section, I explain the second type of data I collected for my study.  
4.3 Collecting interview data 
As indicated in Section 4.1, my study is designed to explore how cultural differences 
between China and Britain are realised in actual language use. As I showed in Chapter 
two, (a) the approaches adopted by studies of culture and communication tend to 
address cultural differences according to the use of direct and indirect style, however, 
they do not actually explain how they categorise one style as direct and another style 
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as indirect by focusing on how an utterance is produced and interpreted; (b) studies of 
culture and communication argue that there are differences in interpretation between 
people with different cultural backgrounds, however, they do not actually explain how 
culture has an impact on interpretation; (c) studies of culture and communication see 
culture as pre-existing the process of interpretation, therefore, they are unable to 
explain how meaning is generated in a context.  Because of these limitations, there is 
no specific data to indicate how a hearer‟s interpretation is generated within a specific 
context, and how culture impacts on interpretation. However, the relevance theoretic 
approach I adopt in my thesis allows the process of interpretation to be explained with 
more precision. In applying Relevance Theory to my study, my goal is to explain how 
meaning is generated in a specific context, and to make explicit what contextual 
assumptions are generated by hearers with different cultural backgrounds. My 
intention was to explore how culture impacts on interpretation.  
In order to explain: (a) how actual hearers from China and Britain generate 
interpretations in the context of a radio advice talk show; (b) what contextual 
assumptions they draw on in the process of interpretation; and (c) whether or not they 
come up with different interpretations because they draw on different contextual 
assumptions, I collected interview data as follows.  
4.3.1 Respondents 
According to Rabiee (2004, 656), when exploring „personal issues the use of pre-
existing groups might be advantageous, as there is already an extent of trust among 
the members of the group, which will encourage the expression of views‟. Since the 
topics of radio programmes I focus in my study are highly personal, and issues such 
as the speakers‟ sex life, love problems and everyday ups and downs might cause 
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strangers as well as myself, as a researcher, to feel embarrassed in the conversation, I 
decided to choose two groups of acquaintances with distinct cultural backgrounds to 
carry out „a focus group interview‟ (Patton 2002, 385), the content of which was 
approved by Loughborough University‟s Ethical Advisory Sub-Committee.  
In order to recruit two groups of acquaintances, I first contacted the Language Centre 
at the University of Warwick, where I was one of the language tutors for two years. 
After I explained the purpose for my interview to the students, nine English students 
from two different levels of courses I was teaching indicated their interest in taking 
part. Consequently, I chose five of them that were taking the same course to 
participate. In a similar way, I chose three Chinese students I was familiar with from 
the Chinese Students and Scholars Associations (CSSA) of the University of 
Warwick.  
I called the first group the „English group‟, which consisted of four English male 
students and one English female student studying at the University of Warwick. They 
knew each other as a result of taking a MC course together at the Language Centre at 
the University of Warwick, and at the time of the interview, they were still on the 
same course and could regularly meet in the centre. They were at least bi-cultural 
individuals who have wide cultural knowledge, in that they were native speakers of 
BE and they were learning MC as well as Chinese culture.  
I called the second group the „Chinese group‟, because it consisted of two Chinese 
female students and one Chinese male student doing MA degrees at the University of 
Warwick. They were friends who were all living in the same accommodation and who 
cooked dinner and had dinner together at the weekend. They were also bicultural 
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individuals, in that they were native speakers of MC and had been exposed to British 
culture.  
4.3.2 A focus group interview 
My decision to work with a focus group was motivated by four reasons. Firstly, 
according to Patton (2002, 385) and Rabiee (2004, 655), a focus group interview is 
one of the best means to elicit the thoughts or cognitive processes that illuminate what 
is going on in a person‟s head during the performance of a task. Since my interview 
was designed to explore how a hearer interpreted a caller‟s utterance in the context of 
a radio advice talk show, I believed that the focus group interview could generate data 
that met my aim. 
Secondly, I felt that one-to-one interaction may appear somewhat intimidating to the 
respondents, and may adversely affect their performance. I further believed that a 
focus group interview at the place where they met the most seemed to be the best way 
to avoid this.  
Thirdly, I felt that this form of interview had the ability to generate group interaction, 
because the members of groups felt comfortable with each other, and therefore could 
fully engage in the discussion. As claimed by Krueger and Casey (2009, 4-5), rich 
data can only be generated if individuals in the group are prepared to engage fully in 
the discussion.  
I also felt that a focus group interview with acquaintances may make the discussion 
between them as natural as possible, even though the participants were aware of the 
presence of a tape recorder.  As Tannen (1984, 34) notes, „if there is a relatively large 
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number of participants who have ongoing social relationships, they soon forget the 
tape recorder‟.  
Given the above considerations, I believed that the focus group interview could draw 
out some fine points of interpretation within each group.   
4.3.3 Research settings 
The design of my interview settings for the two groups was similar, both for the 
purpose of eliciting what the respondents believed when they listened to the target 
radio programmes.  
I interviewed the two groups separately. In each case, the group met at the place 
where they met the most: at the room of one of the students for the Chinese 
participants, and at one of the lecture rooms of the Language Centre for the English 
participants. In both cases, at the beginning of the interview, I asked my interviewees 
to sign the consent form. At the interview, I provided my participants with 
background information for the study, and reminded them that the conversation 
during the interview would be recorded, but their identity would remain confidential, 
and that I intend to provide them with a copy of the transcript for confirmation after 
the interview. Throughout the interview, I played extracts from the radio talk data, 
replaying the relevant sections so that my respondents could refresh their memories 
whenever they wished.  
The recordings I played for each case consisted of six full host-caller conversations, 
three from each set of data. The reason I chose these conversations was that they met 
the criteria for cross-cultural comparison, as indicated in Section 4.2.2, and that they 
were also the materials I analysed in Chapter Six. 
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In both cases, the topics were controlled: after playing the recording of each 
programme, I asked the respondents two sets of questions. The first set focused on 
specific utterances heard from the programme. The reason for focusing on these 
utterances was that I felt that they draw on different cultural knowledge. The second 
set of questions focused on the entire conversation between the caller and the host. 
Here, I asked the respondents what problem they thought the caller wanted to solve. 
By asking this question, I aimed to investigate whether these respondents understood 
what the caller was saying in different ways. Where the target programmes were not 
broadcast in their mother tongue, I showed the respondents my transcripts and 
explained the relevant elements whenever needed.  
Due to the complexity of the topics under investigations, the number of questions, and 
the number of participants, the time I spent in each group was somewhat different: my 
interview with the Chinese group lasted for an hour, but it lasted for an hour and a 
half when I interviewed the English group. 
To ensure the quality of the interview content, in both cases, the interview was 
recorded by using a digital recorder.  
4.3.4 Summary 
In this section, I have described in detail the procedure of collecting my interview 
data. In the next section, I explain the method I used for data transcription and 
translation. 
4.4 Data transcription and translation 
My transcription process followed the approach of Conversation Analysis (CA) (e.g. 
Hutchby and Wooffitt 1998, Ch.3; Atkinson and Heritage 1984), because it was seen 
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to efficiently document the details and subtlety of the original host-caller talk as it 
occurred in the real life situation. As Hutchby (2006, 26) points out, the approach of 
CA:  
[E]nables broadcast talk researchers to draw out the unique features of broadcast 
talk, and to understand the active role played by participants themselves in 
establishing and maintaining the forms of talk (or speech exchange systems) that 
are characteristic of radio and television broadcasting. 
Following Hutchby (2006), I took the view that the CA approach to transcribing data 
would allow me to capture „the unique features of broadcast talk‟, which would 
enable me to build up an explanation of how cultural differences between China and 
Britain were realised in the context of the radio talk show. Therefore, I chose to use 
CA transcription techniques to transcribe data. 
Since my present research is a cross-cultural comparative study, it also involves the 
issue of translation. I myself was responsible for the translation, and the transcripts of 
which were checked by a team of two bilinguals (see Section 4.6). In this way, I was 
able to ensure linguistic equivalence in terms of „connotations, naturalness and 
comprehensibility‟ rather than merely semantics (van de Vijver and Leung 1997, 39). 
In the next two subsections, for the purpose of transcription, translation and analysis, I 
explain the process through which I carried out the sequential numbering of my data, 
and the format I chose for transcription and translation.  
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4.4.1 Data sequence numbers 
For ease of reference, I assigned each host-caller talk a case number. Each case 
number consists of three components, that is, it begins with an upper case letter C or 
E, followed by two numbers, and ends with two alphabetical letters in their upper 
case, such as C01LY, and E01GT. 
The upper case letters C and E stand respectively for the Chinese and the English 
radio programmes.  
The two numbers stand for the data numbering of the host-caller talk in a radio 
programme. For example, C01 in C01LY means that this is the host-caller talk 
number one of my Chinese data; E01 in E01GT indicates that this is the host-caller 
talk number one of my English data.  
The two alphabetical letters are the initials of a host of each programme.   
In light of the above, it is apparent that the examples of C01LY and E01GT suggest 
that they belong to two different sets of data. The former indicates that this is the 
Chinese host-caller talk number one, hosted by LY, while the latter refers to the 
English host-caller talk number one, hosted by GT. 
4.4.2 The format of transcription and translation 
In order to ensure consistency of the data used, I chose a „vertical format‟ where I 
arranged utterances by different speakers in the order in which they were spoken 
(Edward 2003, 326). The reason for such a choice was not merely because this 
approach gave the impression of interdependence and equal dominance of speakers 
(Edward 2003, 326), but it also enabled me to simultaneously distinguish between 
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utterances produced by different speakers. I first transcribed a total of six complete 
recorded host-caller spontaneous interactions consisting of an equal number (three) of 
each set of data, one host-caller talk from each show. I used the six transcripts for two 
different purposes. In order to verify the comparability of my two sets of data (van de 
Vijver and Lung 1997, see Section 4.2.2), I first used them to compare „how these 
constructions are similar in function and how they are different‟ (Myhill 2003, 170). 
For example, I used them to compare whether all the talks in which callers phoned in 
for help with their problems were within the scope of the issues I described in Section 
4.2.2.  If a caller was found to phone in with an issue beyond the scope of my focus, 
then this transcript was excluded. If my comparable transcripts met the criteria of 
comparability indicated in Section 4.2.2, I then used them to develop my coding 
criteria I set up to analyse data (see Sections 5.2 and 6.1). On the basis of all these, I 
transcribed my data selectively, in that I only transcribed the unit of host-caller talks 
which I regarded as my analytic focus (see Section 4.4.3).  
I also determined the way in which my translations of Chinese materials were 
presented with particular care. In Chapter Three, I saw MC and BE as two different 
language systems, in that the former is a tone language system, whereas the latter is 
an intonation language. Where the two language systems are totally different, I 
believed that the best way to present Chinese materials seemed to be that „the 
researcher has to provide both morpheme-by-morpheme glosses and a free 
translation‟ (Have 1999, 94). Therefore, I chose a three-line format to present my 
Chinese materials. That is: the materials are presented in Chinese language, but with 
first a „morpheme-by-morpheme gloss‟, and then a translation into English 
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immediately below it, line by line. I now take one case from my data as an 
illustration: 
[4.1] 
Caller: 我    有     个    事情   想   求    你. 
             I          have         a        thing    want     ask    you 
             I wish you could help me. 
Host: 啊   好  您    请   讲. 
           Ah    ok    you    please   talk  
           Ah  please go ahead.  
           (C04LY) 
In this way, I could ensure that I provide readers with „the original talk as faithfully as 
possible‟; meanwhile I produced “a translation that seems „natural‟ in the destination 
language” (Have 1999, 94).  
In the next section, I describe my transcription and translation procedure. 
4.4.3 Unit of transcription and translation 
This section brings us back to the issue of „unit equivalence‟ that I mentioned in 
Section 4.2.2. According to DeCapua and Dunham (1993, 521), in the context of a 
radio advice talk show, the reason that a caller makes a call to the show is to „state the 
problem or describe the situation which has prompted the call‟. It has been 
acknowledged in the media literature (e.g. DeCapua and Dunham 1993, 521; Hutchby 
2006, 103) that the overall process of constructing a problem includes the following 
three stages:   
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Stage A: Statement of problems; 
Stage B: Clarification and negotiation;  
Stage C: Giving advice. 
DeCapua and Dunham (1993, 512) also argue that Stage B may not be operating in all 
cases, depending on whether callers come up with clearly expressed problems 
initially. This indicates that Stage A and Stage C are obligatory for all phone-in calls 
in this particular context. Since a caller‟s constructing problems usually involves a 
process of interaction with a host, I decided to focus my analysis on the unit of host-
caller talk in the process of constructing a problem in order to ensure comparability in 
analytical focus.  
Despite my decision to choose Stage A as my focus of transcription and analysis, to 
date, there has been relatively little systematic study on its identification. The reason 
for this lack of focus is that „topical maintenance and shift [are] an extremely complex 
and subtle matter‟ (Atkinson and Heritage 1984, 165), and „there are no simple or 
straightforward routes to the examination of topical flow‟ (Atkinson and Heritage 
1984, 165). However, there is a general approach applicable to call interactions of all 
kinds, proposed by Sacks (1992, 73), cited by Have (1999, 17), as follows:  
[The reason-for-call] is, for non-intimates, an accountable action which has to be 
accounted for „by and large on the first opportunity to talk after greetings‟.      
In the context of a radio advice talk show, there is little doubt that this „accountable 
action‟ refers to the one that a caller constructs her problems, taking place 
immediately after greeting. Thus, I transcribed a caller‟s problem initiation starting 
from where the sequence of greeting ends.  
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Closely related to my focus on Stage A is the question of how we can identify the 
sequence of a caller‟s constructing her problem. Hutchby (1991, 124) argues that „the 
work of topic introduction, in each call, is done by the caller‟. This indicates that the 
fact that callers themselves automatically introduce their problems is a common 
phenomenon in the context of radio advice talk shows. However, still in the view of 
Hutchby (2006, 33): 
Questions are a powerful interactional resource for the simple reason that the 
asking of a question places constraints on the discourse options available to its 
recipient. 
What this quotation indicates is that the questions raised by a host are seen as a way 
through which a caller begins to construct her problem. In my study, I use Hutchby‟s 
arguments as a basis for identifying the beginning of a caller‟s constructing her 
problem. I take the view that topic introduction in host-caller talks involves the effort 
of two parties: a caller‟s automatic introduction to her own problems, and also a 
host‟s question as a helper. Consequently, I included a host‟s question, if its function 
is to direct a caller to address her problems and if it occurs immediately after greeting, 
in my transcribing. For example, immediately after greeting, the cases as shown in 
[4.2] and [4.3] from my research were often heard on the show: 
[4.2] 
            Caller: Hello Graham. 
            Host: I’m OK. Now, I believe you’re (.) you are seeing an older man, you’re      
twenty-four, he’s forty, yeah?  
            Caller: yeah, that’s right, yeah.  
                       (E06GT) 
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[4.3] 
          Host: Hello, there, what’s happening with you at the moment then? 
          Caller: well, we would, we were invited to my niece… for Christmas, she lives 
quite away from us. 
                     (E01JD) 
It is clear from the above examples that the questions asked by the hosts in both cases 
take place immediately after greeting. They are also used as a guide to direct callers to 
the problems the callers are going to address. The fact that the two questions are to 
guide callers to their problems is supported by the callers‟ immediate introduction to 
their problems. Therefore, I treated both questions as the beginning of Stage A in my 
transcribing.  
Having established the beginning of my transcribing, I was then faced with the 
question of how to identify the ending of Stage A.  DeCapua and Dunham (1993, 522) 
argue that „before advice givers actually give advice, there is often a long process of 
clarification and negotiation‟. What this implies is that the unit of constructing a 
problem should end at the point where the problem is made explicit. For this purpose, 
I transcribed more utterances in the context of giving advice whenever it was 
necessary, until it was sufficient for me to justify that the problem was made explicit. 
What I want to stress, finally, is that, in accordance with DeCapua and Dunham 
(1993, 521): 
Some problems can be stated simply, others are more complex and may require 
considerable negotiation between speakers in an attempt to discover what the real 
problems are and what to do about them.  
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In order to ensure comparability of data, my transcriptions were, therefore, of unequal 
length. For those callers who came up with a specific request for advice, their 
transcripts are relatively short. For those callers who came up with less clear-cut 
statements of problems initially, „there is often a long process of clarification and 
exploration‟ (DeCapua and Dunham 1993, 522). Consequently, their transcripts are 
equally long. 
In the next section, I justify my prosody transcribing procedure. 
4.4.4 Prosody 
In Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3.1, I showed that prosody is sometimes used by speakers to 
guide hearers in the process of interpretation. In order to capture those prosodic 
features that may possibly lead hearers to the identification of problems constructed 
by a caller in this particular context, I carefully considered the approach to 
transcribing prosodic features. 
In the literature on prosody (e.g. Cruttenden 1997; Milroy and Gordon 2003), there 
are two approaches to transcribing prosodic features: the instrumental acoustic 
approach and the auditory approach. According to Milroy and Gordon (2003, 145), 
„the former involves the translation of the speech signal into a visual representation‟ 
in order to measure „variations of acoustic energy contained in a speech signal‟. The 
latter refers to judgment by human ears, with the aim of distinguishing certain 
prosodic features based on what is heard and interpreted by human listeners. It is the 
latter approach that I adopted to transcribe prosodic features in my thesis. More 
specifically, my study followed the major conventions for rendering the details of the 
prosodic features discussed in the current media publications. The transcript symbols 
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that I used in my study are adapted from the descriptions provided by Hutchby (2006, 
XI-XII) and Tolson (2006, 23).  
My decision to use an auditory approach is motivated by two factors. Firstly, as I 
made clear in Section 3.2.2, one of the important functions of prosody is that it helps a 
hearer to interpret what a speaker intends to convey by altering „the salience of 
linguistically-possible interpretations‟ (Wharton and Wilson 2006, 1560). In everyday 
interaction, a hearer must rely on his own judgment, based on what is heard by ears, 
in order to identify prosodic features which may lead him to recognise the meaning 
intended by a speaker. As I showed in Chapter Three, stress in English refers to the 
„relative prominence of syllables in an utterance‟ (Pierrehumbert and Hirschberg 
1990, 272), and intonation refers to „the use of changes in voice pitch (high or low) 
(Gramley and Paetzold 2003, 87). If a hearer hears that a speaker utters a particular 
word with a strong accent (i.e. stress), or that a speaker produces a specific phrase or a 
sentence with a higher or lower pitch (i.e. intonation), then that would be a measure. 
The hearer would then be phonetically guided to choose the correct context, and 
finally led to the contextual implications intended by the speaker.  
Second, as indicated in Section 4.2.1, radio talk shows are targeted towards ordinary 
people, and it is the auditory approach, rather than the instrumental acoustic approach, 
that would allow ordinary people to make a judgment simply by ears as to what 
element is stressed, and whether the boundary tone is uttered with particular strength 
in order that they could be led to infer what a speaker intends to convey.  
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Following an auditory approach, I made all of the prosodic transcriptions of my two 
sets of data, and transcripts of which were checked by my two verifying teams (see 
Section 4.6). 
4.4.5 The transcription and translation of interview Data 
Although I recorded all my interviews with the two groups of students, I did not 
transcribe my participants‟ responses to the questions listed in the focus group 
interview in the same way as my radio data. However, I listened to the recordings and 
examined closely the content of the participants‟ discussions, in order to study 
whether or not the two groups drew on different contextual assumptions in response 
to an utterance that expresses the same propositional content, and whether or not they 
came up with different interpretations about the problems the callers were 
constructing because of different contextual assumptions they drew on. In order to 
illustrate the views of my respondents, I simply transcribed those details of their 
responses that allowed me to account for differences in contextual assumptions and 
differences in interpretation. More specifically, I used just four transcription symbols 
in what follows in order to facilitate understanding of my respondents‟ speech:  
. The utterance is uttered with a falling contour; 
… A longer than usual pause is heard; 
? The utterance is uttered with a marked rising tone; 
AA The utterance is uttered with an accent. 
Since two members in the Chinese group were also the members of the bilingual 
team, in that they were involved in checking the accuracy of my translation of their 
responses to ensure the quality of my translation, I believed that the quality of my 
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translation of their responses could be guaranteed.  Because of this, I did not present 
the translations of the responses given by the Chinese group in the same way as radio 
data, in that I merely provided the English translation for my analysis (see Chapter 
Six). 
4.4.6 Summary 
In this section, I have described my approach to transcribing radio data and interview 
data as well as my approach to translation. I have introduced the formats used in 
transcription and translation. I have reported that my respondents are all bicultural 
individuals who have been exposed to Chinese and British cultures. I have explained 
the unit of my analysis and justified the transcribing and translating procedures 
undertaken. I have also discussed my choice of auditory approach to prosodic 
transcription. In the next section, I describe the verification procedure that I adopted 
in my thesis. 
4.5 Data verification procedure 
My study adopted a data verification procedure „in order to guarantee validity‟ of my 
cross cultural research (Flick 2007a, 374). This procedure consisted of three distinct 
stages.  In what follows, I explain the stages in further details. 
First, in order to ensure that my translations were as linguistically equivalent as 
possible, I adopted a „committee approach‟ (Spencer-Oatey and Franklin 2009, 275; 
van de Vijver and Leung 1997, 41). As van de Vijver and Leung (1997, 41) point out, 
a „bilingual committee approach‟ is one of the best ways to „use judgmental evidence 
to establish linguistic equivalence‟. Following this methodology, I organized two 
teams of bilinguals. The first team consisted of two bilinguals, with MC being their 
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native language and BE being their second language. The second team was composed 
of two bilinguals, with BE being their native language and MC being their second 
language. The members of the two teams were also the participants of my interview 
study. I call the first team the „Chinese team‟ and the second team the „English team‟. 
One of the tasks of the first team was to verify my translation. Of note, however, is 
that the members in the team were „not involved in the translation but only in a check 
of the accuracy of the translation‟ (van de Vijver and Leung 1997, 40). This was 
because, according to Lincoln and Guba (1985, 314, cited by Flick 2007a, 33), 
„member checks are the most crucial technique for establishing credibility‟. When 
team members found that certain concepts or meanings had no close linguistic or 
cultural equivalents in the target language, they would adopt a decentering approach 
(Brislin 1970, 2000) to remove „words and concepts in a source language (i.e. MC in 
my case) that are difficult to translate or are specific to a culture‟ (van de Vijver and 
Leung 1997, 39). The specific procedures of such an approach, according to Eckhardt 
and Houston (2007, 101),  
[I]nclude coming up with alternate interpretations of metaphoric and idiomatic 
expressions and synonyms for phrases and deciding which most appropriately 
represent what the original speaker was trying to get across.  
I now take two examples from my data to illustrate how the decentering approach 
worked: 
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[4.4] 
 H: 他   带   你  见   他      的  朋友    吗 ? 
       He    carry  you   see     he     of    friend   ? 
   Has he introduced you as his girlfriend to his friends? 
  
 C:  见  
       see 
      Yes.   (C03HM) 
In the above exchange, the host and the caller are talking about the romantic 
relationship between the caller and her boyfriend. On the basis of my own 
understanding of Chinese culture, I assume that the host‟s question, 他带你见他的朋友
吗 (literally: does he take you to see his friends?), does not necessarily refer to the 
specific action of going to see the boyfriend‟s friend, as said literally, but refers to the 
process by which an individual introduces his or her love partner to the individual‟s 
friends. Consequently, I did not translate the question word for word, but as follows: 
Has he introduced you as his girlfriend to his friends? 
In this way, it can reflect Chinese understanding of what is said in this context. 
[4.5] 
      H: 你们 俩  是  在 恋爱 还是  你    有    家            了                       ? 
     You   two  be   in  love     or      you     have  family   (sentence final particle)? 
           Are you in a relationship with this girl or are you married? 
 
      C: 没有    家 
           No     family 
          I‟m not married.  (C08SX).      
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In [4.5], the host‟s question, 你有家了 (literally: do you have a family?), does not 
necessarily refer to the literal meaning that the caller has a family with family 
members. My own knowledge of Chinese culture assumes that by asking this question, 
the host is attempting to know whether or not the caller is already married. If the 
caller is married, then his relationship with his current girlfriend is morally wrong. 
Thus, in order to reveal Chinese understanding about what the host said in this context, 
I translated it into the following: 
Are you in a relationship with this girl or are you married? 
The second stage is to do with the verification of my transcription. In order to check 
the accuracy of my transcribing, I distributed each team a copy of transcripts, and 
asked both teams to listen to the recorded materials, make comparisons with my 
transcripts individually, and note down the errors between what was heard and what I 
transcribed. If transcription errors were noted by the teams, we discussed these 
together until we finally reached an agreement. My two teams were allocated to do 
the verification at different times, so that I could join them all the time. I decided a 
final version after a process of discussion with my two teams respectively. Moreover, 
the agreed checking and reporting procedures of my two teams also included checking 
the prosodic features in the host-caller conversations, by judging whether my 
identification of prosodic features was an accurate interpretation. For the additional 
activity, all of my verifiers were asked to write down their respective answers (yes/no) 
and reasons in terms of whether or not they agreed with my judgments.  
The third stage is to do with evaluation of „trustworthiness‟ of reported observations 
(Flick 2007b, 17). van de Vijver and Leung (1997, 40) claim that in a cross-cultural 
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study, „when a researcher does not speak the target language, he or she will need 
additional evidence to evaluate the quality of the committee‟s work‟. Since I speak 
both target languages, MC and  BE, I also joined my two teams throughout the first 
two stages and discussed with them whenever errors were noted, therefore I believed 
that the „trustworthiness‟ of those reported observations in the first two stages can be 
guaranteed. However, the additional activity of checking prosody was carried out 
independently by four verifiers. To ensure that this work was valid, I decided to 
conduct a validity study by asking the two team members follow-up questions. I 
designed a set of questions tailored to my verifiers, in order to examine whether the 
comments given in their written form would adequately reflect their opinions. The 
questions I asked included:  
(a) Do you agree or not that this phrase (or word) has been uttered with a 
stress?  
(b) Do you agree or not that this phrase (or sentence) has been uttered with a 
higher (or lower) pitch?  
During the interview, I described again the additional activity, went over my data, and 
had my verifiers (now as interview subjects) orally present their opinions on their 
judgments. The subjects then reflected on the validity of the written comments they 
provided earlier. The interviews were audio taped with my subjects‟ permission. The 
four subjects‟ interview comments were then compared with their written ones. The 
focus of the comparison was on whether the opinions mentioned in the written form 
were also mentioned in the interview. That is, during the interview, when the subjects 
provided me with their oral comments, I checked their oral comments against their 
written responses provided earlier. When I found at some points that my subjects‟ 
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ideas in written form did not appear to match their oral comments, I described the 
discrepancy and asked the subjects to confirm whether it was still valid to them. At 
the end of the interview, the results of the interview protocol were compared with the 
written comments provided by the subjects, and listed in the table 4.2 below: 
Table 4.2 Validity check: Comparing interview responses with written comments 
Interview 
Subjects 
Prosody judgement 
I W % Discrepancy (%) 
Chinese (1) 30 30 100 0 
Chinese (2) 30 28 96.67 3.33 
Chinese average 96.67 3.33 
English (1) 30 29 98.3 1.7 
English (2) 30 30 100 1.7 
English average 98.3 1.7 
 
I:  number of answers in the written materials that were also mentioned/acknowledged 
in the interview 
W: number of answers in the written responses 
%: ratio of I/W 
 
As Table 4.2 has indicated, the interview protocol shows a very high validity across 
my two teams. Comparing the interview responses with the written responses, 96.67% 
of the answers given by the Chinese subjects and 98.3% of the answers given by the 
English subjects were also mentioned or acknowledged during the interview. The high 
percentage indicates that the written responses were representative of the subjects‟ 
opinions.  
However, Table 4.2 also shows that there are few cases (3.33% for Chinese subjects, 
and 1.7% for English subjects) where discrepancies were observed. After discussing 
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with my verifiers for their confirmation, I concluded that the small discrepancy 
observed between the written form and the interview was caused by ambiguity or 
oversimplification in a few written responses. For example, Chinese (2) accidentally 
wrote one of his responses yes  in overlap with another answer no,  to the extent that 
even he himself could not judge what he had written; English (1) oversimplified his 
writing in that he only put down a „dot‟ as a response. As a result, he could not 
remember what this „dot‟ meant.  
Given the fact that the small discrepancy was caused by ambiguity and 
oversimplification in a few written responses, it therefore did not threaten the validity 
of reported observations. 
4.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have described the research procedure that I designed for my current 
empirical research. My design was carried out with reference to methodologies for 
studies in the area of cross-cultural research. I chose the qualitative approach for my 
study and used the method of online recording to collect my data. I used the technique 
of conversation analysis to transcribe the data collected from radio institutional 
settings, and adopted a decentering approach to translation. I also adopted a data 
verification procedure to guarantee the validity of my cross cultural research. 
In the next chapter, I apply Relevance Theory to analysing the communication styles 
used by MC callers and BE callers.  
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Chapter Five: Communication Styles of Speakers of MC and BE 
5.1 Introduction 
In order to address Research Question (1), my goal in this chapter is to show that the 
communication styles of MC and BE are both indirect, in that utterances produced by 
callers from China and Britain require a great deal of inferential work on the part of a 
hearer, and that both sets of callers use markers of procedural meaning to guide the 
interpretation process. 
As indicated at the beginning of Chapter Two, the aim of my study is to investigate 
how cultural differences are realised in everyday interaction from the perspective of 
how an utterance is produced and how the utterance is interpreted. In relation to how a 
caller‟s utterance is produced and interpreted in the context of a radio advice talk 
show, my study is designed to examine whether or not there are any similarities or 
differences in the use of communication styles between MC callers and BE callers. 
From a relevance theoretical point of view, as my first research question states, this 
was to look for evidence of whether or not the two sets of callers ever use markers of 
procedural meaning to guide a hearer to identify the problem a caller is constructing.  
For this purpose, as indicated in Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3, I chose to focus only on 
prosody and the discourse connectives a caller may have used in constructing her 
problem. Consequently, my study does not identify all types of markers of procedural 
meaning a caller may have used; nor does my study examine all the cases of the same 
types of procedural meaning a caller may have used.  
Specifically, following Sperber and Wilson (1995, 46), I use the term „contextual 
assumption‟ or „a set of contextual assumptions‟ to refer to the assumptions which are 
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brought to bear on the interpretation of an utterance in the context of a radio advice 
show. I use the term „contextual implication‟ (Sperber and Wilson 1995, 109) to refer 
to „the contextual effect‟ - the inferred conclusion drawn from the combination of the 
new information with some specific contextual assumptions (i.e. old information) that 
a hearer has access to that would give this new information some relevance for the 
hearer. I also follow Sperber and Wilson (1995, 37) by using a „premise‟ to refer to a 
contextual assumption at the point where I aim to distinguish between explicatures 
and implicatures. Although within Relevance Theory, the terms of „an implicated 
assumption‟ (or an implicated premise) and „an implicated conclusion‟ are also used 
to refer to a contextual assumption and a contextual implication respectively (see for 
example, Sperber and Wilson 1995, 195; Wilson and Sperber 2002, 261), what these 
relevance scholars intend to highlight by using them is that both types of assumption 
should be regarded as the implicatures of an utterance. Since the aim of my study is 
not designed to establish differences in the two types of implicature, I therefore do not 
use them in my study.  
Since within Relevance Theory, „the idea that an expression may encode procedural 
constraints on the inferential phase of comprehension was first put forward by Diane 
Blakemore‟ (Wilson and Sperber 1993, 11), I also draw on Blakemore‟s (1992, 2002) 
account of procedural information in my analysis.  
In the following section, I apply Relevance Theory to the analysis of communication 
styles in my two sets of data. 
 
 
 154 
 
5.2 Applying relevance theory to analysing communication styles 
My goal in this section is to identify whether or not callers from China and Britain use 
prosody and discourse connectives to guide the interpretation process. Before my 
analysis, however, I would like to report on the procedure my analysis is designed to 
follow. 
In order to present evidence found in my research, I analyse six extracts (see 
Appendix 2-4 and 8-10) taken from the interaction between host and caller. They 
consist of three extracts taken from each set of data, and each programme has one 
extract as a representative. In each of the six conversations, a caller constructs her 
problem until the host has acknowledged an understanding of what the problem is. In 
my study, when a caller constructs her problem, I assume that the set of propositions 
or assumptions the caller is attempting to convey to her audience in her utterance is 
the same in both cultures under study.  
I begin my analysis of each of the six extracts with a brief summary of the problem a 
caller is constructing. The point of this summary is that it is based on my own 
understanding of what the caller means by what she is saying. According to Sperber 
and Wilson, individuals vary in their perceptual and cognitive abilities, or more 
specifically, in their understanding and inference ability, I am therefore assuming that 
a caller‟s utterance can generate different interpretations for different hearers and the 
sense I make of an utterance is dependent on my own existing knowledge. I am aware 
that in the data analysis, the contextual assumptions I am providing are available to 
me as a bicultural hearer (I will explain more about my bicultural status in Chapter 
Six), they might not be available to a native speaker of MC, nor might they be 
available to a native speaker of BE. I am also aware that there may be cultural specific 
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assumptions being made. I will address the issue of the awareness of hearers‟ drawing 
on cultural specific assumptions in some detail in Chapter Six. I argue that my 
interpretation can only represent my own understanding, rather than others. For 
example, it might not be the same as that of a native speaker of BE.  
After this, I describe and explain how I arrive at a conclusion about the problem the 
caller intends to solve. In order to do this, I apply a relevance theoretic account of 
procedural meaning in my analysis. In doing so, I demonstrate that both sets of callers 
construct their problems in indirect style, to the extent that there is evidence that I 
have to carry out a lot of inferential work in order to identify the problems the callers 
intend to solve. It is the markers of procedural meaning that the callers use that make 
my interpretation process relatively easier. In my analysis, I focus only on those key 
utterances that will lead me to identify the problems a caller is constructing.  
I propose, by drawing on Relevance Theory, a hearer needs to adopt the following 
procedure to isolate markers of procedural meaning:  
(a)   A speaker (S) used X in her speech; 
(b) The contribution of X does not convey any distinct proposition in S‟s     
utterance, but indicates how the utterance that contains X is to be 
processed, or alters the strength of an utterance by increasing the salience of 
some hypotheses and eliminating others; 
(c)  When S uses X in the sense of (b), she intends to signal that the propositions 
expressed in her utterances are relevant to the ongoing discourse topic. 
In my study, I interpret X as referring to prosody and discourse connectives. Drawing 
on Relevance Theory, I propose that X would direct a hearer‟s attention to the 
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proposition expressed in the utterance that contains X. This would then lead the hearer 
to access the contextual assumptions made manifest by means of X. 
I also propose, by drawing on Relevance Theory, that in order for a hearer to identify 
problems a caller constructs in this particular context, the hearer needs to undertake 
the following inferential processes: (i) the hearer assigns a propositional form to the 
utterance by resolving ambiguities in the language used and assigning referents to 
deictic words; (ii) the hearer selects a context (a set of contextual assumptions) that 
would allow the caller‟s utterance to be perceived as relevant; and (iii) through a 
synthesis of evidence of (i) and (ii), the hearer makes an assumption as to the caller‟s 
intention.  
For ease of reference only, when I analyse my two sets of data, I name the heading of 
each of the subsections with the problem that I assume a caller is constructing.  
My analysis in the next two subsections begins with my English data, followed by its 
corresponding Chinese data.  
5.2.1 Prosody and discourse connectives used by BE callers 
In Section 3.2.3, on the basis of my literature review, I argued that there is evidence 
that BE speakers use markers of procedural meaning to guide the interpretation 
process. In the analysis that follows, I show that this is also the case for BE callers in 
my data.  
In the next three subsections, I analyse three English extracts one by one.  
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5.2.1.1 Getting money back or getting rid of ex-partner 
The following is a brief summary of my understanding of the caller‟s problem 
communicated in English extract 1 (see Appendix 2): 
The caller‟s partner was always working, and therefore already had money. However, 
her partner had been both borrowing and stealing money from her. What the caller 
wants now is not advice on how to get her money back from her partner, but advice 
on how to get rid of him. My inference is that the caller‟s problem is that her partner‟s 
behaviour of borrowing and stealing makes the caller wish her partner would leave, 
but the caller herself is unable to get rid of him. Therefore, she asks for advice on this.  
Now, I analyse the following key utterances that lead me to identify the problem the 
caller is constructing.  
[5.1] 
(1)  H: Was he working at the time to fund his // 
(2)  C: //He is al … this is it he‟s always working he‟s ALWAYS ALWAYS working. 
(3)  H: Alright so why was he borrowing cash off you then?   
           (E01GT) 
Previously, the caller had indicated that her partner was always borrowing money 
from her. 
While uttering (2), the caller stresses the second „always‟ by raising her pitch, 
followed by the repetition of the same word with a similar pitch. I argue that by 
uttering the word with extra loudness, the caller makes me (as a hearer) aware that she 
is using prosody in her utterances, this explicitly sets up my expectation of the 
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relevance of the stressed word to the problem she is constructing. This then leads me 
to select a context that would be guided by using prosody.  
To infer the problem the caller intends to solve in this case, I am engaging in the 
process of disambiguation. I assume that in the context of a discussion about money, 
the word „working‟ in (2) refers to being in paid employment. I then identify the 
resulting proposition made manifest by the utterance in (2) as something like the 
following: 
(a) The caller‟s partner is always working in paid employment.  
I identify the fact that the stress assigned to the word „always‟ leads me to access the 
proposition in (a) made manifest in the following context: 
  (b) In normal circumstances, when an individual works excessively in paid 
employment, this individual is more likely to earn more money.   
I combine the explicature in (a) with the contextual assumption in (b) and draw the 
following contextual implication: 
(c) The caller‟s partner has earned a lot of money by working excessively in 
paid employment, and therefore he does not need to borrow money.  
In the light of the inferential work I carried out above, I infer that the caller‟s problem 
is related to the partner‟s borrowing. My interpretation that the caller‟s problem is 
related to her partner‟s borrowing is supported by the host‟s question in (3), which 
indicates that he confirms my own interpretation.  
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Thus, my identification of what the caller intends to express in this case depends on 
inference, and it is the caller‟s use of prosody that makes my inference easier, in that 
it guided me to interpret the proposition expressed in (a) in the context of (b) and 
finally led me to draw the conclusion that the caller‟s problem is related to her 
partner‟s borrowing. 
Since the procedure, a hearer needs to follow to isolate markers of procedural 
meaning, is applicable to all the analysis in this chapter. Therefore, in the analysis that 
follows, I omit my detailed explanation of how I, as both an analyst and a hearer, 
follow the procedure to isolate markers of procedural meaning, but focus only on how 
I am led by prosody and discourse connectives to identify the problem a caller is 
constructing.  
[5.2] 
(1)  H: But there was always an excuse for him borrowing cash off you then? 
(2)  C: Yeah money wasn‟t BORROWED from me which (.) he was doing such a lot 
… there is another (.) my back was turned. If I was making a couple of tea or 
something he‟s taking money anyway … as well. 
            (E01GT) 
I assume in the context in which the caller either lost sight of her money because she 
was making a cup of tea, or she did not give any permission to take her money, that 
the possible meaning of „taking money‟ is that it refers to stealing money. I then 
identify the resulting propositions made manifest by the caller‟s utterances as 
something like the following: 
(d) The caller‟s partner was doing more than borrowing; 
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          (e) When the caller was not watching him, he was stealing money from the    
caller.  
Having been directed to the word „borrowed‟ by the caller‟s raised pitch, I identify 
that the contribution of prosodic stress assigned to this word makes the propositions in 
(d) and (e) immediately manifest in the following context: 
(f) If one is stealing money from somebody else, then this one has no excuse for 
his behaviour.  
I combine the propositions in (d-e) with the contextual assumption in (f), and generate 
the following contextual implication:  
          (g) No excuse, because the partner wasn‟t borrowing at all but stealing.  
In this exchange, the caller does not directly answer „no‟, but provides a longer and 
more complex utterance as in (2). I assume, by doing so, the caller must have intended 
to achieve some additional effects not achievable simply by saying „no‟: the caller 
might have intended to communicate not just the fact that the partner‟s behaviour was 
not borrowing, but that his behaviour was stealing. Even though the effort required for 
me to process this response is larger than that needed to interpret the direct answer 
„no‟, the caller‟s use of prosody makes the assumption in (f) easily accessible. 
Therefore the difference in processing effort is not so significant. Moreover, the 
contextual effects achieved by the indirect answer are obviously greater. As a result, 
the indirect answer is optimally relevant, since the extra processing effort is offset by 
the extra contextual effect.  
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The assumption in (g) indicates that the propositions in (d-e) are relevant to the on-
going discourse topic, in that they provide evidence that leads me to assume that the 
caller‟s problem is related to the partner‟s behaviour of both stealing and borrowing 
although it is not yet made explicit at this stage. 
Thus, in this example, understanding the caller‟s utterances involves some degree of 
inference, and it is the caller‟s use of prosody that guides the interpretation process.  
I also found the caller sometimes uses discourse connectives to guide the 
interpretation process, as illustrated below. 
[5.3] 
(1)  H: And if someone‟s been nicking money off us, we want it back and what you 
intend to do… what do you intend to do Lisa about all these. 
(2)   C: I don‟t know I just (.) the only thing I … the only thing I could think of was to 
put a quite big notice on the front door where I‟m living now pinned it on … 
saying I don‟t want to see you anymore.  
(3)   H: And you think that will work? 
(4)   C: Well he came back three times, about half past two in the morning ringing and   
ringing my front door bell. 
            (E01GT) 
[5.4] 
(5)  H: Are you trying to finish with him // 
(6)  C: //Yeah. 
(7)  H:  Or are you just trying to get money off him?  What‟re you going to do. 
(8)  C: Well  it‟s … it‟s going to be waste of time get … trying to get money off him. I 
just hh I want him out of my life. 
(9)  H: So the question, the question tonight is how do you get rid of the man that you 
don‟t want any longer, yeah? 
(10) C: Yeah (E01GT).   
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The host‟s utterance in (1) contains the phrase „nicking money‟, and this indicates that 
the host confirms my interpretation in [5.2] that the caller‟s problem is related to her 
partner‟s behaviour of both borrowing and stealing. 
In both [5.3] and [5.4], the caller respectively uses a discourse initial „well‟ as in (4) 
and (8). I assume that the caller‟s use of this „utterance-initial use of discourse 
connective‟ (Blakemore 2002, 133) is intended to achieve relevance by indicating that 
the information that „well‟ prefaces „diverges from the expectations set up by the 
preceding discourse‟ (Blakemore 2002, 133). I assume the „preceding discourse‟ in 
both cases refers to the host‟s respective questions in (3) and (5). This is not merely 
because the host‟s questions and „well‟ segment are adjacent utterances, but also 
because the host‟s questions „would provide easy access to a chunk of contextual 
information required for the comprehension of latter utterances‟ (Wilson 1998, 69).  
To see how the utterances in [5.3] are constructed as a problem for the caller, I am 
engaging in a process of reference assignment. I assume, in the context of talking 
about the caller‟s relationship with her partner, that „he‟ and its various forms refer to 
the caller‟s partner. I then identify the resulting proposition made manifest by the 
caller‟s utterances in [5.3] as something like the following: 
(h) The caller‟s partner persistently came back to her after she put a notice on 
the door telling him not to turn up again. 
I identify that the presence of „well‟ makes the proposition in (h) immediately 
manifest in the following context: 
 163 
 
          (i) If the method of putting a notice on the door would work, then the partner   
would stop attempting to see her. 
I combine the explicature in (h) with the contextual assumption in (i) and draw the 
following contextual implication: 
(j) The proposed solution is unlikely to work. 
Based on my above inferential work, I assume that the caller‟s problem is related to 
her effort to get rid of her partner. 
In [5.4], I identify that the resulting propositions made manifest by the caller‟s 
utterances as something like the following: 
(k) Trying to get back her money that her partner has both borrowed and stolen 
is a waste of time; 
(l)  The caller wants her partner to leave her alone. 
I identify that the presence of the connective „well‟ makes the proposition in (k) more 
accessible in the following context: 
(m) In normal situation, if people realize that doing something is a waste of 
time, then they simply won‟t do it.  
I combine the explicature in (k) with the contextual assumption in (m) and draw the 
following contextual implication: 
           (n) The caller won‟t waste her time trying to get her money back from her    
partner. 
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On the basis of the assumption in (n), I infer that trying to get her money back from 
her partner does not appear to be the problem the caller is constructing.  
I then identify that the recovery of the proposition in (l) makes the following 
contextual assumption immediately accessible:  
(o) If a person desires (by using the word „want‟) to do something, then the very 
thing this person wants to do is beyond the reach of this person at the 
moment. 
I combine the assumptions in (l) and (o) and draw the contextual implication that:  
(p) The caller is unable to get rid of her partner.  
On the basis of the inferential work I have carried out so far, I assume that the caller‟s 
problem is that she is unable to get rid of her partner.   
My interpretation that the caller‟s problem is that she is unable to get rid of her 
partner is supported by the host‟s summing up of the problem in (9), which indicates 
that the host acknowledges that the caller‟s problem has been made explicit. 
In summary, I found that understanding the caller‟s utterances in this case depends on 
inference. I found that the relevance of the information about stealing and borrowing 
appears to provide the context for why it is important that the caller gets rid of her 
partner. However, the relevance of this information only becomes evident at the end, 
and therefore it shows that I have carried out much inferential work, in order to work 
out the problem the caller was constructing. I also found that it is the caller‟s use of 
prosody, as in the cases of [5.1] and [5.2], and discourse connectives, as in the cases 
of [5.3] and [5.4], that guided my whole process of interpretation.  
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In the next two sections, I look at two more English extracts in order to show that the 
phenomenon I have observed in this extract are also available in the other extracts. 
5.2.1.2 Spending Christmas in the absence of children 
The following is a brief summary of my understanding of the problem constructed by 
the caller in English extract 2 (see Appendix 3): 
The caller‟s niece has invited the caller‟s family for a Christmas get-together at the 
niece‟s home. However, the niece has recently moved away, and she is now living 
somewhere else. Going to the niece‟s new home involves travelling. Moreover, the 
caller‟s children have gone to their respective girlfriends‟ homes, therefore they 
would be unable to go to the niece‟s home. This very fact results in a problem that the 
caller‟s husband refuses to go to the niece‟s home for Christmas. This is a problem for 
the caller, because she does not have the transport and is not able to get to her niece‟s 
home. Now the husband wants their children to come back home for Christmas, 
whereas the caller wants to spend Christmas as she usually does. My inference is that 
the caller‟s problem is that she and her husband have different views on how they 
should spend Christmas, and therefore she wants advice on this. 
In what follows, I analyse the key utterances that lead me to identify the problem the 
caller is constructing. 
[5.5] 
(1)   C: Yeah we‟ve ALWAYS spent family (.)  family Christmas together ALWAYS. 
(2)   H: Um-hum 
(3)   C: Erm but  as I say they‟ve just recently moved away.  
           (E01JD) 
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To infer the problem the caller was intending to solve, I resolve ambiguities in the 
language used and assign referents to deictic words. I then identify the resulting 
proposition made manifest by the caller‟s utterances as something like the following: 
(a) The caller‟s family and the caller‟s niece‟s family have always spent 
Christmas together in the niece‟s home; 
(b) The caller‟s niece has moved away and she is now living somewhere else. 
Having been directed to the word „always‟ by the caller‟s raised pitch, I am led to 
access the proposition in (a) made manifest in the following context: 
(c) If a sort of celebration is repeated for a number of years, then it has become 
a tradition. 
I combine the assumptions in (a) and (c) and draw the contextual implication that: 
(d) The caller has the expectation that what happened in the past will happen in 
the future, that is, the caller‟s family and the niece‟s family will celebrate 
Christmas together in the niece‟s home as what they did in the past. 
However, the caller‟s use of „but‟ in (3) indicates that the „but‟ segment is intended to 
achieve relevance by virtue of contradicting and eliminating a (possibly mistaken) 
assumption deducible from the first segment of the caller‟s utterances (Blakemore 
1992, 102),  which in this case appears to be the assumption in (d). This connective 
leads me to process the proposition in (b) in the following context: 
(e) If the niece had not been moved away, then the caller‟s family and the 
niece‟s family would have been able to spend Christmas as they normally 
do.  
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I combine the explicature in (b) with the contextual assumption in (e) and draw the 
following contextual implication:  
(f) There is some impediment to the caller‟s being able to celebrate Christmas as 
she normally does.  
On the basis of evidence in (f), I infer that the caller‟s problem is related to the factors 
that impede her normal Christmas celebration, although it is not yet made explicit at 
this stage. 
Thus, in this example, in order to identify the problem the caller was expressing, I 
carried out some degree of inferential work. It is the caller‟s use of prosody and the 
connective that made my inference relatively easier.  
[5.6] 
(1)    C: He is refusing to go. 
(2)    H: Right. 
(3)   C: Which now causes the problem we just … because I can‟t get to my niece 
otherwise I would have GONE. 
              (E01JD) 
The context of the above conversation is that the caller‟s husband is refusing to go to 
the caller‟s niece‟s home for Christmas, because the caller‟s children are unable to go. 
This has brought a problem to the caller, in that she is not able to get to the niece‟s 
home, as the niece no longer lives locally.  
After resolving the ambiguities in the language used and assigning referents to deictic 
words, I identify the resulting proposition, made manifest by the caller‟s utterances, as 
something like the following: 
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(g) The caller‟s husband refuses to go to the niece‟s home for Christmas; 
(h) This is the problem for the caller, because she is not able to get to the niece‟s   
home; 
(i)  If it were not for this problem, the caller would have gone to the niece‟s 
home. 
The caller‟s accented falling tone when she uttered the word „gone‟ directs me 
specifically to this word. I assume that by uttering „gone‟ in such a way, the caller is 
indicating that the preceding phrase (i.e. I can’t get to my niece) is to be interpreted 
„as part of a larger piece of structure, thereby…indicating a wider context‟ (House, 
2006, 1554).  This leads me to access the propositions in (g – i) at least in the 
following context:  
(j)  Going to the caller‟s niece‟s home may involve travelling; 
         (k)  If an individual travels to somewhere, necessary transport is needed; 
         (l)   The caller‟s husband usually drives wherever the caller travels; 
         (m) If the caller‟s husband does not drive, then the caller cannot travel. 
I combine the assumptions in (g-i) and (j-m) and draw the contextual implication that: 
(n) There are some factors that impede the caller‟s being able to spend 
Christmas in the way she wants.   
In the light of the assumption in (n), I infer that the caller‟s problem is related to her 
being unable to spend Christmas in a way she wants.  
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Thus, in this example, in order to identify the problem the caller was constructing, I 
have carried out a number of inferences. It is the caller‟s use of prosody that has 
helped me to identify the problem indicated in (n).  
[5.7] 
(1) H: Before I get to Mo, and Mo takes on your situation Lindsey how are you 
feeling about this and what what would you really like to do. 
(2)  C:  I would like the sort of being together like we normally do erm as I said both 
… you know my children have left home. HE really wanted the children to co 
… to come here to make our other arrangement. 
            (The stage of clarification is omitted) 
(3)  H: Ok - all right Mo – this is the situation you probably come across in in various 
different permutations over the year …what do you make it to Lindsey‟s 
story?   
            (E01JD) 
To infer the problem the caller intends to solve in this case, I am engaging in the 
process of reference assignment and enrichment. In the context of discussing the 
caller‟s argument with her husband surrounding the issue of family get-together, I 
assume that the pronoun „he‟, which the caller uttered with a raised pitch, refers to the 
caller‟s husband. Moreover, where the caller states „he really wanted children to come 
here‟ in (2), the word „here‟ refers to the caller‟s own home. This is based on my 
understanding that going to the niece‟s home may lead to some problems. I then 
identify the propositions made manifest by the caller‟s utterances in [5.7] as 
something like the following: 
(o) The caller prefers to celebrate Christmas as she normally does; 
(p) The caller‟s husband wanted their own children to come back home for   
Christmas. 
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I combine the explicatures in (o - p) with the contextual assumption in (q) and draw 
the following contextual implication:  
(q) The caller and her husband have different views on how to celebrate 
Christmas.  
In the light of above inferential work, I assume that the assumption in (q) is the 
problem the caller intends to solve. My interpretation that the caller‟s problem is that 
she and her husband have different views on how to celebrate Christmas is supported 
by the host‟s asking Mo (the expert sitting alongside the host in the studio) to give 
advice, which indicates that the host believes that the problem has been expressed. 
Thus, in this case, my interpretation of the caller‟s problem involves a large amount of 
inference. It is the caller‟s use of prosody that gives me a clear indication of how her 
utterances are to be processed, so that I can see, with the least inferential effort, the 
assumption in (q) as the problem the caller intended to solve.  
In summary, I found that the caller‟s utterances include a lot of seemingly irrelevant 
details such as the information about the niece‟s moving away, the children‟s having 
been away from home, the husband‟s refusing to go to the niece‟s home as well as the 
caller‟s preference for spending Christmas as she normally does. However, all the 
information appears to provide a context for why the caller and her husband have 
different views on celebrating Christmas. The relevance of this information only 
becomes evident at the end of my interpretation, so it shows that I have carried out a 
great deal of inference in order to make explicit what problem the caller intends to 
solve. It is under the guidance of prosody and discourse connective together as in 
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[5.5], or prosody as in [5.6] and [5.7] that I could successfully identify the caller‟s 
problem with the least inferential effort.  
5.2.1.3 Physical change affects love relationship 
The following is a brief summary of my understanding of the caller‟s problem 
communicated in English extract 3 (see Appendix 4): 
The caller and her partner Mark have just had a baby. Although the caller loves her 
partner very much, her partner is not happy with all the stretch marks the caller has 
and therefore they have not made love together for a while, despite the fact that Mark 
is very good to the baby. My inference is that the caller‟s problem is that the caller is 
not happy because her partner Mark is no longer having a sexual relationship with 
her. Therefore she asks advice on this.  
In my analysis, I focus on the following key utterances from this extract that lead me 
to identify the problem the caller is constructing. 
[5.8] 
(1)  C: My partner Mark (.) he is ok. I love him to pieces and all that but he is just … 
he‟s not very happy with like all the stretch marks and all that. 
(2)  H: Right so he < > he thinks that you‟ve kind of changed physically. 
(3)  C: Yeah he is not happy with the figure and everything, he thinks I‟ve put on a lot 
of weight during pregnancy. 
(4)  H: Have you spoken to him about it… have you actually talked to him about it? 
            (E07AD) 
The context of the above exchange is that the caller has just had a baby.  
On the basis of my existing knowledge about British culture, I assume that the term 
„partner‟ refers to someone with whom the caller is in a long-term stable sexual 
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relationship although I also assume (based on my knowledge about Chinese culture) 
that this relationship is not applicable to people from China. I then identify the 
resulting proposition, made manifest by the caller‟s utterances in (1), as something 
like the following: 
(a) The caller loves her partner Mark very much; 
(b) Mark is not happy with the stretch marks the caller now has. 
I identify that the proposition in (a) made manifest in the following context:  
(c) In UK, if two people are love partners, then they will have a sexual 
relationship. 
I combine the assumptions in (a) and (c) and draw out the contextual implication that: 
(d) The caller and Mark must have had a sexual relationship. 
However, the caller‟s use of „but‟ makes the proposition in (b) immediately manifest 
in the following context: 
(e) The sexual relationship between the caller and Mark has suffered because 
she has stretch marks, Mark does not find her sexually attractive.  
By combining the explicature in (b) with the contextual assumption in (e), I draw the 
contextual implication that: 
(f) It is the caller‟s physical change that has impeded Mark from having a sexual 
relationship with her.  
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On the basis of evidence in (f), I assume that the caller‟s problem is that her physical 
change makes her sexual relationship with her partner suffer, and therefore she asks 
advice on this. My interpretation that the caller‟s problem is about her sexual 
relationship with her partner is supported by the host‟s question in (4), which 
indicates that he believes that the caller‟s problem has been expressed, and now 
comes to the stage of offering advice to the caller on how to solve her problem by 
talking to her partner.  
Thus, in inferring the caller‟s problem, it is the caller‟s use of the connective „but‟ that 
has guided my interpretation process.  
In summary, I found the caller‟s utterances include a lot of seemingly irrelevant 
details such as information about Mark‟s unhappiness with the caller‟s stretch marks. 
I found that the relevance of such information appears to provide a context for why 
Mark no longer has a sexual relationship with the caller. However, it is only at the end 
of the conversation that the relevance of this information becomes evident, and 
therefore, it shows that I have undertaken a lot of inferential work to identify what 
problem the caller intends to solve. I found that it is the caller‟s use of the connective 
„but‟ in her utterance that led me to draw the conclusion in (f). I also found that while 
interpreting the term „partner‟ used by the caller, I was activating an assumption about 
relationships that is cultural specific, in that it would not be available to Chinese 
hearers. I will address the issue of the awareness of hearers (who are bi-cultural) who 
have a choice of contexts to call on in Chapter Six and discuss further in Section 
7.2.2.4. 
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5.2.1.4 Summary 
In this section, drawing on Relevance theory, I have analysed in detail the key 
utterances in three extracts that led me to identify the problems the callers were 
constructing. 
I found that the problems of BE callers are all indirectly communicated, in that the 
callers‟ utterances include a lot of apparently irrelevant details. A consequence of this 
indirect communication is that the host and the hearers have to carry out a great deal 
of inferential work in order to find out what makes the details relevant.  
I found that it is the callers‟ use of prosody and discourse connectives that guides the 
interpretation process, so that hearers can identify problems expressed by these callers 
in a less costly way. 
I found that all of the callers under study use either prosody, as in the cases of  [5.1], 
[5.2], [5.7] and [5.9],or discourse connectives, as in the cases of [5.3], [5.4],[5.6],[5.8]  
or both, as in the case of [5.5],  to guide the interpretation process.  
I found that there are cases where I activated contextual assumptions, as in [5.8], that 
were available to hearers from Britain but I assume were not available to hearers from 
China. 
5.2.2 Prosody and discourse connectives used by MC callers 
In this section, I analyse Chinese data in order to show that, as with what I have found 
in the English data, callers in Chinese radio programmes also use discourse 
connectives, or prosody, or both, to guide the interpretation process.  
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As with my analysis of English data, in the next three subsections, I analyse three 
Chinese extracts, one by one. 
5.2.2.1 Getting rid of a married man 
The following is a brief summary of my understanding of the caller‟s problem in 
Chinese extract 1 (see Appendix 8): 
The caller is a divorced lady and she is now in a romantic relationship with a man.   
However, the caller now cannot allow her romantic relationship with the man to 
continue, because she discovered that the man she considers as her potential husband 
is married. Although the caller is trying to end the relationship with the man, the fact 
that she is living together with him in the same room makes her feel that it is difficult 
to get rid of him. My inference is that the caller‟s problem is that she does not know 
how to get rid of the man living in the same room with her, and therefore she asks 
advice on this. 
In what follows, I analyse the following key utterances from this extract. 
[5.10] 
(1)    C: 我 发现  他  有  家    我 就   退出         来          了. 
              I     find   he has family  I    so  withdrew  come (sentence final   particle) 
              I found he‟s married, so I withdrew. 
(2)    H: 嗯. 
             Em 
             Em 
           (C03SX) 
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The context of the above example is that the caller found that her boyfriend is 
married. 
To infer the problem the caller intends to solve in this case, I am engaging in the 
process of disambiguation. I assume, in the context of discussing the caller‟s romantic 
relationship with her boyfriend (i.e. he), that the possible meaning of the term 
„withdraw‟ is that it refers to not allowing her relationship with her boyfriend to 
continue.  I then identify the resulting propositions, made manifest by the caller‟s 
utterances, as something like the following: 
(a)  The caller‟s boyfriend who would potentially be her husband is married; 
(b) The caller would not allow her romantic relationship with the man to 
continue.  
I am aware that the caller uses a connective „so‟ to introduce her second segment of 
her utterances. The presence of „so‟ implies that a causal relationship holds between 
(a) and (b). It leads me to assume that the caller is indicating that the „so‟ segment is 
relevant by virtue of being a contextual implication derived from the segment that 
precedes „so‟ (Blakemore 2002, 95; 1992, 139), which in this case appears to be the 
assumption in (a). Based on my own understanding of Chinese culture in relation to 
the issue raised by the caller, I assume that the presence of „so‟ makes the following 
contextual assumption immediately accessible: 
(c) In Chinese society, if one knows that the person one is going to marry is 
already married, then the individual would not allow the romantic 
relationship between them to continue.  
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I also assume, on the basis of my knowledge of Chinese culture, that the assumption 
in (c) may be available to hearers from China, but may not be available to hearers 
from Western countries like Britain. Again, I will address the issue of the awareness 
of hearers having possessed two cultural meaning systems who have a choice of 
contexts to draw on in Chapter Six and discuss further in Section 7.2.2.4. 
I then combine the explicature in (a) with the contextual assumption in (c) and draw 
the contextual implication that: 
(d) The caller would not allow her romantic relationship with the man to 
continue. 
In the light of evidence in (d), I infer that the caller‟s problem is related to the caller‟s 
action of not allowing her romantic relationship with the man to continue, although it 
is still not clear what problem the caller intends to solve.   
Thus, in this example, understanding what problem the caller intends to solve 
involves a lot of inference. It is the caller‟s use of the connective „so‟ that has led me 
to reach the conclusion that the caller‟s problem is that her discovery about his 
marriage has caused her decision of not allowing her relationship with her man to 
continue. As my analysis indicates, in response to the caller‟s utterance, I activated 
the assumptions that I assume were available to hearers from China, but not available 
to hearers from Britain. I will address the issue of the awareness of hearers (who are 
bicultural) who have a choice of context to draw on in Chapter Six and discuss further 
in Section 7.2.2.4.  
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[5.11] 
(1)   C:   我  不理   他   可  他   现在   总   赖着    我. 
               I       ignore   him   but    he    now   always  cling to    me 
               I ignore him but he now always clings to me. 
(2)   H: 那 不行 你 必须得 告诉 他  你    有      家       你  本身  就是  欺骗了我. 
             That no  you  must     tell     he  you have  home  you itself be    cheat    me 
             Oh, no, you must tell him. Since he‟s married, he‟s cheated on you. 
            (C03XS) 
Where the caller states in (1) 我不理他 (i.e. I ignore him), the phrase 不理 (i.e. 
ignore) may have a number of possibilities. It could refer to taking no notice to 
whatever happens to somebody; and it could also imply that one person does not talk 
to another. In the situation where the caller has decided not to allow her relationship 
with the man to continue, I assume that the latter function is more appropriate for this 
context. Moreover, where the caller states in (1) 他现在总赖着我 (i.e.  he now 
always clings to me), the phrase 赖着 (i.e. cling to) in this context refers to harassing 
the caller. I then identify the resulting propositions, made manifest by the caller‟s 
utterances, as something like the following: 
(e) The caller does not talk with her boyfriend; 
(f)  The caller‟s boyfriend keeps harassing her.  
I recognise that the recovery of the explicature in (e) makes the following contextual 
assumption immediately accessible: 
(g) If one does not talk with the other, then one treats the other as a stranger.  
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 I combine the assumptions in (e) and (g) and draw the contextual implication that: 
(h) The caller treats her boyfriend as a stranger.  
However, the caller‟s use of „but‟, when she introduces her second segment of 
utterances in (1), makes the proposition in (f) immediately manifest in the following 
context: 
          (i) The caller cannot treat her boyfriend as a stranger because he persistently  
harasses her. 
I combine the explicature in (f) with the contextual assumption in (i) and draw the 
following contextual implication: 
(j) The caller feels that it is difficult to end the relationship with the man. 
In the light of above analysis, I infer that the caller‟s problem is related to her feeling 
that it is difficult to end her relationship with the man.  
My interpretation that the caller‟s problem is related to her feeing that it is difficult to 
end the relationship with the man is supported by the host‟s utterances in (2), which 
indicates that the host believes that the caller‟s problem has been expressed, and is 
trying to offer advice on how to stop the man‟s harassing. 
Thus, in this example, the caller‟s utterances require a lot of inferential work on the 
part of the hearer, and it is the caller‟s use of the connective „but‟ that has led me as a 
hearer to draw the conclusion that her problem is related to her feeling that it is 
difficult to end her relationship with the man.  
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[5.12] 
(1)    H: 如果  你  要  再来  纠缠  我   那  我   就   可以    [报警了. 
              If      you  want   again   cling to  I    then    I     then    will      call police 
              If he keeps harassing you, then you can call the police. 
(2)   C: [可是 他 现在   跟   我  在  一个 屋里  住       呀! 
            But       he    now    and       I      in     one    room   live    (exclamation) 
            But now, he is living in the same room with me. 
 (3) H: 那  不行 你   应该  让   他  出去. 
            That  no    you    should   let   him  out 
            Oh, no, you should let him move out. 
           (C03SX) 
The caller here uses a „but‟ in (2). I assume the „but‟ segment is intended to achieve 
relevance by contradicting and eliminating an assumption which has been made 
manifest in her preceding utterance. However,  
In many cases the assumption which the speaker intends the hearer to eliminate is 
not derived from the interpretation of the first segment of the but utterance at all, 
but is simply an assumption which the speaker has reason to believe is manifest 
to the hearer (Blakemore 2002, 109, emphasis original). 
The point Blakemore makes here appears to be true in this case. I identify that when 
the caller utters „but‟, it is in overlap with the utterance 报警 (i.e. call the police) 
made by the host in (1). In my view, such an overlap seems to indicate that this may 
well be what the caller was intending at this point. I then assume that the eliminated 
assumption manifest to the hearer (i.e. host) is „provided by an utterance made by the 
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hearer herself‟ (Blakemore 2002, 109). Given the overlap function, I accept that the 
given assumption made manifest by the host refers to the second segment of her 
utterance in (1), where the host was giving advice to the caller on how to persuade her 
boyfriend to leave the caller alone in a way that the caller can 报警  (i.e. call the 
police).  
Where the host states in (1) 你就可以报警了 (i.e. you can call the police), the 
phrase 报警  (i.e call the police), based on my own understanding of Chinese culture, 
has a number of functions: it could refer to the assumption that in an emergency, 
people can call the police to report a crime; it could also refer to the assumption that 
people can call the police to help them deal with something urgent that they are 
unable to cope with. In this particular context, my understanding of this extract 
assumes the latter: to call the police to stop the caller‟s boyfriend‟s harassing. I also 
assume that this assumption may not be available to hearers from Britain, because 
what is described is Chinese cultural specific phenomenon.  
I then identify the resulting proposition, made manifest by the host‟s utterance in (1), 
as something like the following: 
(k) The caller can call the police to help her get rid of her boyfriend if he keeps 
harassing her. 
I also identify the proposition, made manifest by the caller‟s utterance in (2), as 
something like the following: 
(l) The caller is living together with the man in the same room.  
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I am then directed to the phrase 在一个屋里住 (i.e. live in the same room) by the 
caller‟s lengthened duration. I identify that the fact that the stress assigned to this 
phrase makes the following contextual assumptions immediately accessible: 
(m) When two people in a romantic relationship live in one room, they normally 
live together consensually;  
(n) If they live together consensually, it would be difficult for one of them to get 
rid of the other;  
(o)  As long as they do not break the law, even the police have no right to set 
them apart.  
I combine the explicatures in (k-l) with the contextual assumptions in (m-o), and draw 
the following contextual implication: 
(p) The caller feels unable to get rid of her boyfriend. 
In the light of the inferential work I have carried out so far, I assume the caller‟s 
problem is that she feels unable to get rid of her man. If we compare the implicature 
in (j) with the implicature in (p), we can find that the implicature in (p) remains 
unaltered. However, with the evidence provided in (l), the contextual implication in 
(j) is obviously strengthened. This indicates that the man‟s living in the same room 
with the caller makes her feel that it is even more difficult to get rid of him and it 
further confirms that how to get rid of her boyfriend is the problem the caller is 
intending to solve. My interpretation that the caller‟s utterances are designed to 
communicate a problem about how to get rid of her boyfriend is supported by the 
host‟s utterances in (3), which indicates that the host confirms that the caller‟s 
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problem has been made explicit, and which also indicates that she is coming to the 
stage of offering advice by telling the caller to let her man out of her room.  
Thus, understanding the caller‟s problem involves inference. It is the caller‟s use of 
discourse connective and prosody that led me to identify the problem the caller was 
constructing with the least inferential effort.  
In summary, I found that the caller‟s utterances consist of information about the 
man‟s harassing the caller and living in the same room with the caller. These pieces of 
seemingly irrelevant information appear to provide a context for why it is difficult for 
the caller to get rid of the man. However, the relevance of this information only 
becomes evident at the end of the conversation. This shows that the hearer has carried 
out a great deal of inferential work in order to understand what the caller intends to 
solve. I found that the caller‟s use of discourse connective as in [5.1], or both 
discourse connectives and prosody as in [5.11] makes the inferential process relatively 
easier. I also found that there are cases where I activated contextual assumptions 
available to hearers from China that I assume may not be available to hearers from 
Britain.  
5.2.2.2 A romantic relationship with an older and married lady 
The following is a brief summary of my understanding of the caller‟s problem 
communicated in Chinese extract 2 (see Appendix 9): 
The caller is in a romantic relationship with a lady 12 years older than the caller 
himself. Moreover, the lady is married and has children.  Despite her age and marital 
status, the caller has been in a relationship with this lady for two years. My inference 
is that the caller‟s problem is that his relationship with the woman is morally 
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impermissible, and therefore he asks advice on whether or not he should maintain his 
relationship with the woman.  
In what follows, I analyse the following key utterances from this extract. 
[5.13] 
(1) C: 我    喜欢 上     了        一个   比   我    大    一  轮       的   一个    女的. 
           I       like      (particle)     a      than   I     big   a  round   of      a        lady 
           I‟m in a relationship with a lady who is A ROUND OLDER than me. 
 
(2) H: 啊 (hahaha). 
          Ah  (hahaha) 
          Ah  (hahaha) 
        (C02LY) 
To infer the problem the caller intends to solve, I am engaging in a process of 
disambiguation. The caller uses a term 一轮 (i.e. one round) in (1). On the basis of 
my knowledge about Chinese culture in relation to the issue raised by the caller, I 
assume that 一轮 refers to Chinese traditional twelve year lunar circle which in this 
case means 12 years. I then identify the resulting proposition, made manifest by the 
caller‟s utterances, as something like the following: 
(a) The caller is in a romantic relationship with a lady twelve years older than 
the caller himself.  
I am then directed to the phrase 大一轮 (i.e. twelve years older) because the caller 
assigned stress to it by uttering it in a lengthened duration. I identify the fact that the 
stress assigned to this phrase makes the proposition in (a) immediately manifest in the 
following context: 
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(b) If there is a large age difference between two lovers, then their romantic      
relationship is not seen as appropriate in Chinese society because it appears 
to be unnatural; 
(c) If a woman is a lot older (say, 5 years or more) than a man in a romantic 
relationship, then this relationship is even more inappropriate. 
I combine the explicature in (a) with the contextual assumptions in (b-c), and draw the 
following contextual implication: 
(d) The romantic relationship between the caller and his lady is seen as 
inappropriate in Chinese society. 
My interpretation that the relationship between the caller and his lady is seen as 
inappropriate in Chinese society is supported by the host‟s surprising tone when she 
uttered 啊 (i.e. ah) in (2), followed by her laughter, and I take this to indicate that she 
confirms my interpretation.  
Thus, in inferring the problem the caller was constructing, it is the caller‟s use of 
prosody that guides the interpretation process. 
[5.14] 
(1)  C: 我们    时间    长了      我们   就  喜欢上     对  方         了. 
           We      time     long        we      so    like       opposite    (sentence final particle) 
              We meet each other frequently due to our geographical proximity, so we‟ve         
gradually fallen in love with each other. 
 
  (2)  C:  你   说     这     件事儿   我  应该     怎么     处理         呢? 
          You  say   this     issue        I   should  how    deal with     ? 
     Do you think I should maintain the relationship and become closer to her? 
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(3) H:  你   必须得    退出来        这   是     错    爱. 
           You   must      withdraw     this  be wrong love 
     You must end the relationship and this is wrong love.  
            (C02LY) 
Previously, the caller had indicated that the lady that the caller is in a romantic 
relationship with has a shop next door to the caller‟s workplace, which gives them 
opportunities to frequently meet each other.  
To make sense of the utterance, I am engaging in a process of disambiguation. On the 
basis of my existing knowledge about Chinese culture, I assume that it is morally 
impermissible if one has a romantic relationship with someone who is married, and 
also it is not seen as appropriate for an older woman to have a romantic relationship 
with a younger man. Therefore, the expression 这件事儿 (i.e. this issue) in (2) refers 
to the fact that the man has a morally impermissible romantic relationship with an 
older woman.  
I then identify the resulting propositions, made manifest by the caller‟s utterances, as 
something like the following: 
(e) The caller and his lady have met each other frequently due to close 
geographical proximity; 
(f)  The caller and his lady have developed a romantic relationship;  
(g) The caller is asking whether he should maintain his morally impermissible 
relationship with the older lady. 
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I am aware that the caller uses a connective „so‟ to introduce the second segment of 
utterances. I assume the presence of „so‟ implies that there is a causal relationship that 
holds between (e) and (f). It indicates that the proposition introduced by „so‟ is 
relevant, by virtue of being a contextual implication of the assumption which has been 
made accessible by the interpretation of the preceding utterance (Blakemore 2002, 95; 
1992, 139), which in this case appears to be the assumption in (e). I recognise the 
presence of „so‟ makes the following contextual assumption immediately accessible: 
(h) If one is geographically closer to the other, then it is relatively easier for this 
one to develop a romantic relationship with the other.  
I combine the assumptions in (e-f) and (h) and draw the contextual implication: 
(i) The caller and his lady are geographically closer to each other. As a 
consequence, they have developed a romantic relationship.  
On the basis of the assumption in (i), I infer that the caller‟s problem is related to the 
geographical proximity between the caller and his lady. 
I then identify the proposition in (c) made manifest in the following context: 
(j) The caller is trying to find out whether he should maintain his morally 
impermissible relationship with the older lady. 
I combine the explicature in (c) with the contextual assumption in (j) and draw the 
contextual implication: 
(k) The caller wants advice on whether he should maintain his morally 
impermissible relationship with the older lady. 
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In the light of above inference, I assume the caller‟s problem is that he does not know 
whether he should maintain his morally impermissible relationship with the older 
lady. My interpretation that the caller‟s problem is that he does not know whether he 
should maintain his morally impermissible relationship with the older lady is 
supported by the host‟s response in (3), which indicates that she believes that the 
caller‟s problem has been made explicit and comes to the stage of giving advice to the 
caller, in that she is telling the caller to end the relationship straightaway.  
Thus, in this example, it is the caller‟s use of discourse connective that guides my 
inferential process.   
In summary, I found that while constructing his problem, the caller provided some 
seemingly irrelevant information such as the information about the caller‟s morally 
impermissible relationship with a married older woman. However, I found that the 
relevance of this information appears to provide a context for why it is important for 
the caller to know whether he should maintain his relationship with this lady. 
Specifically, it is only at the end of the conversation that the relevance of this 
information becomes evident. Therefore, it shows that understanding the caller‟s 
utterances involves a lot of inferential work on the part of a hearer. I also found that 
the caller‟s use of prosody as in the case of [5.13] and discourse connectives as in 
[5.14] in his utterances guided the interpretation process. Moreover, I found that in 
order to understand what the caller means by what he said, I activated many 
assumptions, which in this case appear to be based on my existing knowledge about 
Chinese culture. This implies that these assumptions may not be available to hearers 
whose native language is BE. As indicated earlier in this chapter, I will address the 
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issue of the awareness of a choice of context that hearers having processed knowledge 
of two cultures may have in Chapter Six, and discuss further in Section 7.2.2.4. 
5.2.2.3 The relationship with a bad tempered husband 
The following is a brief summary of my understanding of the caller‟s problem, 
communicated in Chinese extract 3 (see Appendix 10): 
The caller herself has a good temper, but her husband‟s temper is terrible. Despite his 
bad temper, this husband does care about the family he and the caller have together. 
Therefore, the caller is generally satisfied with her husband. What makes the caller 
upset is that her husband often argues with her. My inference is that the caller‟s 
problem is that she and her husband often argue, therefore she wants advice on this. 
In what follows, I analyse the key utterances that lead me to identify the problem the 
caller is constructing. 
[5.15] 
(1)  C: 我   爱人吧       性格     挺    暴噪   的.  
            My  husband   temper  very  bad     of 
 
            My husband‟s temper is very bad.   
   
(2) C: 但是     他   是  一个    顾   家        的  男人. 
           but       he    be     a     care home   of   man 
           but he does care about the family. 
 
(3)  C: 所以   不能     说       他     不   好. 
            So       cannot   say     he     not   good 
            So  I am satisfied with him in general. 
            (C03HM) 
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As always, to infer the problem the caller is constructing, I resolve ambiguities in the 
language used and assign referents to deictic words, and identify the resulting 
propositions, made manifest by the caller‟s utterances, as something like the 
following: 
(a) The caller‟s husband has a bad temper; 
(b) The husband cares about the family he and the caller have together; 
(c) The caller is generally satisfied with her husband. 
I then identify the recovery of the explicature in (a) make the following contextual 
assumption immediately accessible: 
(d) If a husband has a bad temper, then he may often argue with his family 
members, of course, including his wife.  
I combine the explicature in (a) with the contextual assumption in (d) and draw the 
contextual implication that: 
(e) The caller‟s husband often argues with the caller. 
On the basis of the assumption in (e), I assume that the caller‟s problem may be 
related to her argument with her husband.  
However, the caller‟s use of „but‟ in (2) makes me assume that the „but‟ segment is 
intended to achieve relevance by virtue of contradicting and eliminating a (possibly 
mistaken) assumption which is deducible from the first segment of the caller‟s 
utterances (Blakemore 1992, 102), which in this case appears to be the assumption in 
(e). The presence of „but‟ makes the proposition in (b) immediately manifest in the 
following context:  
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(f) The caller‟s husband does care about the family if he does not lose temper. 
I combine the explicature in (b) with the contextual assumption in (f) and draw the 
contextual implication that: 
(g) If it were not for his bad temper, the husband would care about the family 
more.  
On the basis of evidence in (g), I infer that the caller‟s problem may be related to her 
husband‟s bad temper.  
The caller‟s use of „so‟ in (3) leads me to assume that it implies that there is a causal 
relationship that holds between (b) and (c). It indicates that the „so‟ segment is 
relevant by virtue of being a contextual implication derived from the segment that 
precedes „so‟ (Blakemore 2002, 95; 1992, 139), which in this case refers to (b). The 
presence of „so‟ makes the proposition in (c) immediately manifest in the following 
context: 
(h) If a married man takes care of the family, then the man‟s wife is satisfied 
with him.  
I combine the assumptions in (c) and (h) and draw the following contextual 
implication: 
(i) Despite the bad temper, the caller‟s husband does care about the family. As a 
consequence, the caller is satisfied with him.  
The assumption in (i) leads me to infer that the caller‟s problem is related to her 
husband‟s bad temper although it is still not made explicit at this stage. 
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Thus, in this example, it is the caller‟s use of connectives „but‟ and „so‟ that guided 
the interpretation process.  
[5.16]  
(1)  C: 昨天           又        打   起来了     吵    起来     了. 
           Yesterday   again   fight     up         argue     up   (sentence final particle) 
           We argued again yesterday.  
 
 (2)  H: 你   应该        和      他     谈    谈. 
            You should    and    him   talk talk 
            You should have a talk with him.  
           (C03HM).            
The caller used an expression „yesterday‟ in (1). My understanding of this extract 
assumes that this refers to the day before the caller phoned up to the show. I then 
identify the resulting proposition, made manifest by the caller‟s utterance, as 
something like the following: 
(j) The caller and her husband argued again the day before she phoned up to the 
show. 
Having identified the propositional form, I am directed to the word 又 (i.e. again) by 
the caller‟s lengthened duration. I find the stress assigned to this word makes the 
proposition (j) immediately manifest in the following context: 
(k) It is not the first time that the husband had an argument with the caller. 
(l) In Chinese society, family harmony is highly valued. As a result, it is seen as 
a big problem (e.g. bigger than other countries like UK) if husbands and 
wives argue. 
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I combine the explicature in (j) with the contextual assumptions in (k) and (l) and 
draw the contextual implication: 
(m) The caller and her husband often argue, and this is a serious problem for the 
couple.  
In the light of the above inferential work, I assume that the caller‟s problem is that she 
and her husband often argue. My interpretation that the caller‟s problem is the 
assumption in (m) is supported by the host‟s turn in (2), which indicates that the host 
acknowledges that the caller‟s problem has been expressed and comes to the stage of 
offering advice to the caller in a way that the caller should have a talk with her 
husband.  
Thus, again, I have undertaken a great deal of inferential work in order to understand 
the problem the caller was expressing. It is the caller‟s use of prosody that guided the 
interpretation process. 
In summary, I found that I have to rely on inference to identify what problem the 
caller intended to solve. However, I also found that in the process of inferring the 
problem the caller was constructing, it is with the help of the caller‟s use of prosody 
and discourse connectives that I arrived at the interpretation that the caller intended to 
solve the problem that she and her husband often argue.  
5.2.2.4 Summary 
In this section, drawing on Relevance Theory, I have analysed in detail the key 
utterances in three Chinese extracts that have led me to identify the problems the 
callers were constructing. 
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I found that the problems of these MC callers are all indirectly communicated, in that 
the callers‟ utterances include a lot of seemingly irrelevant details. A consequence of 
this indirect communication is that the host and the hearers are required to carry out a 
great deal of inferential work to work out what makes the details relevant.  
I found that all the callers in question use either discourse connectives, as in the cases 
of [5.10], [5.11], [5.14] and [5.15], or prosody, as in the cases of [5.13] and [5.16], or 
both, as in the case of [5.12], to guide the interpretation process. 
I also found that in order to interpret the relevance of what a caller is attempting to 
convey in her utterances, I sometimes activated contextual assumptions based on my 
knowledge about Chinese culture, as in the cases of [5.12], [5.13] and [5.16] that were 
not available to hearers from Britain. 
5.3. Conclusion 
In this chapter, by drawing on Relevance Theory, I have analysed six extracts from 
my two set of data, in order to examine whether or not markers of procedural meaning 
are used respectively by callers from China and Britain.  
My analysis has revealed that:  
(1) There are similarities within the two sets of data, in that the problems of all the 
callers in the two sets of data are all indirectly communicated.  
(2)  Understanding utterances produced by the two sets of callers involves a great deal 
of inferential work.  
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(3) Callers from both China and Britain use prosody and discourse connectives to 
guide the interpretation process so that a hearer is able to identify what makes 
details relevant to the problems the callers were constructing.   
(4) In the process of inferring the problem a caller was constructing, I (as a hearer) 
sometimes activated contextual assumptions that were only available to hearers 
from one culture, but not available to hearers from the other culture under study, 
as in the cases of [5.8], [5.12], [5.13] and [5.16]. 
My analysis in this chapter was premised on the assumption that a caller‟s utterance 
can generate different interpretations for different hearers. Therefore, my 
interpretations can only represent my own understanding rather than others. In the 
next chapter, I show that when interpreting problems constructed by the callers, 
hearers from China and Britain do actually come up with different interpretations, 
because they are drawing on a different cognitive environment.  
My above analysis forms the basis of my discussion in Chapter Seven. 
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Chapter Six: Differences in Interpretation 
6.1 Introduction 
In Chapter Five, I showed that in my own interpretation of problems that callers were 
constructing, there are cases where I was activating contextual assumptions that I 
assume were not shared by hearers from Britain and China. I argued that a caller‟s 
utterance can generate different interpretations for different hearers and my own 
interpretation can only represent my own understanding rather than others. My goal in 
this chapter is to show that when interpreting the problems expressed by the callers, 
hearers from China and Britain do actually come up with different interpretations, 
because they are drawing on a different cognitive environment. I also show that 
hearers who are bicultural have a choice of context to draw on when they interpret an 
utterance produced by a caller. However, before I proceed to my analysis, I explain 
the procedure my analysis is designed to follow.  
As my second research question states (see Section 3.3), I was looking for evidence 
that when interpreting naturally occurring conversations, hearers from different 
cultures do, indeed, come up with different interpretations, because they are drawing 
on a different cognitive environment. From a relevance theoretical point of view, this 
was to identify the contextual assumptions that hearers from different cultures were 
accessing. In order to determine whether or not hearers with distinct cultural 
backgrounds draw different inferences from utterances that apparently express the 
same propositional content, as proposed by earlier studies of culture and 
communication (e.g. (e.g. Cohen 2004; Gao and Ting-Toomey 1998; Ting-Toomey 
1999; Scollon and Scollon 1995), I examined the contextual assumptions activated in 
the process of interpretation in my two sets of data, as follows. In cases where hearers 
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from China activated a contextual assumption (or a set of contextual assumptions) in 
response to an utterance produced by a caller, I looked to see if the same contextual 
assumption (or a set of contextual assumptions) was also available to hearers from 
Britain. If the answer was positive, I indicated that hearers from China and Britain 
generated similar interpretations. If the answer was negative, I indicated that the two 
set of hearers generated different interpretations. In the latter situation, I indicated that 
Chinese culture has an impact on interpretations generated by Chinese hearers. 
Likewise, in cases where hearers from Britain activated a contextual assumption (or a 
set of contextual assumptions) in response to an utterance produced by a caller, I 
looked to see if the same contextual assumption (or a set of contextual assumptions) 
was available to hearers from China. If the answer was positive, I then indicated that 
hearers from Britain and China generated similar interpretations. If the answer was 
negative, I would then indicate that the two sets of hearers generated different 
interpretations. In the latter situation, I also indicated that British culture has an 
impact on interpretations generated by hearers from Britain.  
I adopted two steps in collecting data relating to contextual assumptions, in order to 
show how interpretations were generated. The first step was my own interpretation of 
the radio talk, and the second step was the focus group interview, which referred to 
the opinions of actual hearers of the two cultures in consideration. The reason that I 
adopted two steps was that I believed that an analysis drawing on my own 
understanding of what a caller intended to communicate in her utterance could only 
represent my own interpretation. Therefore, whether it was actually an interpretation 
that anyone other than myself would come up with was not self-evident. Only an 
interview asking actual hearers themselves would generate evidence to support this 
 198 
 
claim. As Patton (2002, 466) points out, „[w]ho is in a better position to judge whether 
the categories appropriately reflect their issues and concerns than the people 
themselves?‟ These two approaches were supplementary to each other, in that they 
both provided evidence to support or challenge my claim.  
In my study, I adopted an integrated approach, by using the dynamic constructivist 
approach to analysing contextual assumptions within the framework of Relevance 
Theory. According to the dynamic constructivist approach proposed by Hong and her 
colleagues, individuals have culturally specific meaning systems that are shared by 
individuals within the culture. These cultural meaning systems, as I discussed in 
Section 2.1.1, are interpretative frames that influence individuals‟ affect, cognition 
and behaviour (Hong et al. 1997). Individuals can internalize two separate cultural 
frames (e.g Hong 2009; Hong et al. 2000). The biculturals - those „individuals who 
have been exposed extensively to two cultural meaning systems‟ (Hong and Mallorie 
2004, 64) can shift between these frames in response to cultural clues such as an 
utterance through the frame-switching mechanism. Since I am a native speaker of 
Mandarin Chinese from mainland China and I have also been exposed to British 
culture for a number of years, I assume that I have had access to at least some 
knowledge constructs from both cultural meaning systems. I therefore consider 
myself as a Chinese-English bicultural individual for the purposes of my study. 
In the data consisting of my own interpretation of the radio talk, I first articulate the 
contextual implications that I came up with when I heard a caller‟s talk, then the 
contextual assumptions I activated in response to the caller‟s utterances, and finally 
the synthesis of the contextual assumptions and the explicature that led me to draw 
that contextual implication. Specifically, when I hear the utterances produced by a 
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British caller, I am not going to access Chinese contextual assumptions, but assume 
that the contextual assumptions informed by British culture are relevant ones. Because 
I am not a native speaker of BE, I predict that the contextual assumptions I activated 
might not overlap with those supplied by a native speaker of BE. In order to infer 
what a caller means by what she says, I make as explicit as possible the processes that 
I went through in interpreting that call. I then demonstrate how the responses of the 
British group and Chinese group in my interview study overlap with or are different 
from my own interpretations. While analysing the inferences drawn by my 
respondents in discussing a call, I provide only those details of their responses that 
allow me to indicate or account for differences in interpretation.  
In order to provide evidence that people who have access to different cognitive 
environments are likely to generate different contextual assumptions when 
interpreting the problems expressed by the callers, I provide six extracts taken from 
my two sets of data (see Appendix 5-7 and 11-13). In order to contextualise the 
contextual assumptions I set out to elicit, I begin my analysis with a brief summary of 
the problem a caller is constructing. The summary I give is based on my own 
understanding of the problem the caller was expressing and it is therefore not 
necessarily the interpretation shared by other hearers. 
Since my aim here is to investigate whether or not people who have access to 
different cognitive environments interpret a caller‟s problem in different ways, I focus 
primarily on those key utterances that I assume, based on my own understanding of 
the overall extract, to have the possibility that activates the assumptions that are 
available to hearers of either culture or both cultures under study. Consequently, those 
utterances that are not relevant to my concern are excluded.  
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I propose, by drawing on Relevance Theory, in inferring the problem a caller intends 
to solve, I as a hearer have to resolve ambiguities in the utterances produced by a 
caller and assign referents to deictic words. I believe it is the presence of these 
ambiguities that give the utterances the potential for different interpretations. I claim 
the way in which I resolve the ambiguities in a caller‟s utterances is significantly 
related to the way I interpret the overall extract. The particular assumptions which 
lead to the process of disambiguation I describe above are the problem a caller intends 
to solve. 
In the section that follows, I present evidence found in my study, and then in Section 
6.3, I conclude my analysis by summarising what I have found in this chapter.  
6.2 Evidence on differences in interpretation 
My goal in this section is to show that there are different interpretations available if 
different contextual assumptions are activated. I begin my analysis with English data, 
followed by its corresponding Chinese data. For ease of reference, in my analysis, I 
name the heading of each of the subsections with the problem I assume a caller is 
constructing.  
6.2.1 Contextual assumptions activated in English talk shows 
In the next three subsections, I present evidence found in three English extracts, one 
by one.  
6.2.1 1 A pierced tongue and sex life 
The following is my brief summary of the caller‟s problem constructed in English 
extract 4 (see Appendix 5): 
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The caller‟s girlfriend is getting her tongue pierced, which makes the caller worried 
that the pierced tongue would adversely affect his physical expressions of love. 
However, the caller is not sure whether he needs to worry about this. My inference is 
that the caller does not know whether or not his girlfriend‟s pierced tongue will 
adversely affect his physical expression of love, and therefore he asks advice on this.  
I focus on the following key utterances from this extract in my analysis. 
[6.1] 
(1)  H: What is it. 
(2)  C: Basically the < > she‟s getting her tongue pierced, and I‟m just thinking it‟s 
going to ruin my SEX LIFE, you know well the. 
(3)  H: Well sorry ba ba ba ba. 
(4)  C: (heh) yeah (heh) I know. 
(5)  H: ba ba ba ba, let‟s just rewind < > rewind, excuse me, both of listeners, let‟s just 
rewind for a moment if we can. 
(6)  C: I know it‟s silly //isn‟t it? 
(7)  H: //No no zip it. she‟s getting her tongue pierced, 
(8)  C: Yeah. 
(9)  H: This is all this is about she‟s goanna to have her tongue pierced and you‟re  
            worried this is goanna to ruin your sex life, 
(10) C: Yeah but wouldn‟t it? Am I worried too much? 
           (E08AD) 
The context of the above conversation is that the caller was hoping to go to Paris with 
his girlfriend on St. Valentine‟s Day, but now he is feeling depressed and will have to 
stay at home alone. 
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Upon hearing the above conversation, the initial interpretation that I came across is 
that the caller did not know if his girlfriend‟s pierced tongue would adversely affect 
his physical expression of love.  
The reason that I generated this interpretation is that I assumed, in the context of 
discussing something that happened to the caller and his girlfriend, that „she‟ refers to 
the caller‟s girlfriend. Moreover, where the caller states in (2) „and I‟m just thinking 
it‟s going to ruin my sex life‟ the conjunction „and‟ implies a causal relationship 
between these two states which could be alternatively stated as „and therefore‟. I then 
identified the resulting proposition made manifest by (2) as something like the 
following: 
(a)  The caller‟s girlfriend has a metal thing put into the tongue of her mouth; 
(b)  He is worried that this will have an adverse effect on his sex life. 
I was then led by the caller‟s stress assigned to the phrase „sex life‟ to access (a-b) 
made manifest in the following context: 
         (c) Sex life is a physical expression of love between couples; 
         (d) If one‟s tongue in the mouth has a metal thing fixed, then one may make   
one‟s partner feel uncomfortable when they physically express their love; 
(e) The caller is not sure whether his girlfriend will make him uncomfortable 
after having that metal thing fixed. 
I combined the assumptions in (a-b) and (c-e) and finally drew the contextual 
implication I described earlier, namely that: 
 203 
 
(f) The caller does not know if his girlfriend‟s pierced tongue will adversely 
affect his physical expression of love. 
Because the assumption in (f) is the first line of interpretation that occurred to me, I 
accepted it as the intended interpretation of the caller without looking any further for 
alternative interpretations that might also be relevant. Therefore, I regard the caller‟s 
problem to be that he does not know if his girlfriend‟s pierced tongue would adversely 
affect his physical expression of love.  
When discussing this call, I first asked each group in my interview study what they 
thought was meant by a pierced tongue ruining my sex life. 
The English group responded: 
T: I was thinking he was thinking she can‟t perform oral sex on him any more (laugh). 
J:  I‟m glad you said that this is also what I was thinking. 
A: My idea is exactly the same. 
S: Yeah I thought the same as well. 
E: Yeah. anyway he says ruin MY sex life. he‟s only thinking about himself…he‟s    
not talking about HER…it seems he cares about himself. 
 
The Chinese group answered: 
C: Actually you know sex life has different kinds…there is a popular French style 
called what? anyway he may be thinking he won‟t be feeling comfortable when 
they have sex life together.  
L: You know in our country we don‟t do that sort of thing with the tongue. but I‟m 
just guessing he was thinking they couldn‟t have sex life together. 
G: Probably he was just thinking the pierced tongue would have a bad effect on their 
sexual relationship or maybe their romantic relationship. 
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For the English group, the referent of the term „sex life‟ is distinct from that of the 
Chinese group. For the English group, „sex life‟ in this context is „oral sex‟. For the 
Chinese group, „sex life‟ implies all kinds of physical expression of love. Specifically, 
I am aware that in my interpretation of their responses, I sometimes enriched and 
disambiguated the utterances my respondents came up with. In this case, for example, 
it is because I take C‟s emphasis given to „a popular French style‟ to be just one kind 
of „sex life‟ that I then go on to infer that what C meant by saying this may probably 
refer to what the English group said „oral sex‟ although C herself did not acknowledge 
this.  
Later in the interview, I asked the groups what problem they thought the caller wanted 
to solve. 
The English group responded: 
A: I don‟t think he does WANT to solve. he‟s just kind of wanted to tell someone 
about it. 
J:  He‟s obviously nervous. 
T: He‟s probably just wanted his opinion confirmed. 
S: He‟s like calling up looking for help from a friend? looking for a second 
opinion…trying to get someone to agree with him. 
E: Like he wants to know if he‟s been too worried about it. 
 
The Chinese group answered: 
G: He does not know if a pierced tongue would indeed have a bad effect on his sex 
life. so this is his problem. 
C: Yeah…but he sounds like he is lack of common sense. 
L: Agree. 
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Their responses indicated that members of both groups understood the caller‟s 
utterances as implying that he was thinking about the relationship between a pierced 
tongue and sex life. The groups varied, however, in terms of their assessment of the 
problem the caller intended to solve. I argue that the variations in their interpretations 
are the consequence of differences in the evidence each group used in their inference. 
For example, in inferring what problem the caller intended to solve, the two groups 
used distinct sets of assumptions as evidence. The evidence potentially available to 
the respondents was made explicit in their responses to my questions, which focused 
on the groups‟ understanding of the term „sex life‟. Their responses to my first 
question show that not all members of the Chinese group had, as part of their 
knowledge, the assumption articulated in varying ways by members of the English 
group, that „sex life‟ in this context is a form of „oral sex‟. Because of this, the two 
groups activated different sets of assumptions when later asked to explain the problem 
the caller was expressing. For example, T, in the English group, drew on his previous 
articulated assumption about „oral sex‟ to infer that the caller did not want to solve 
any problem but just „wanted his opinion confirmed‟. In contrast, G in the Chinese 
group drew on her previously articulated assumption about a pierced tongue having a 
bad effect on their sexual relationship to infer that the caller‟s problem was that he 
wanted to know „if a pierced tongue would indeed have a bad effect on the sexual 
relationship‟. In general both groups understood the relevance of what the caller was 
saying in different ways: the English group saw the caller‟s utterances as designed not 
to solve any problem but to look for a second opinion to agree with him; the Chinese 
group saw the caller‟s utterances as designed to communicate a problem whereby he 
wanted to know if a pierced tongue would affect his physical expression of love. 
However, their responses also indicated that although members within a group bear a 
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close resemblance in their cognitive environment, because they are brought up in the 
same country, they sometimes generated quite different interpretations. For example, 
members in the English group appear to activate similar contextual assumptions about 
„oral sex‟, however, their understanding of the problem the caller intended to solve 
vary: A saw the caller‟s utterances as designed not to solve any problems but to tell 
someone about what would happen to his sex life. In contrast, T and S saw the caller‟s 
utterances as designed to communicate that he wanted to have his opinion confirmed, 
but E saw the caller‟s speech as communicating a problem whereby he wanted to 
know whether he was too worried about the effect the pierced tongue would have on 
his „oral sex‟. The English group produced interpretations that were not the same as 
my own, but which did indicate that there was a similarity in our interpretations, in 
that we all inferred that the caller was thinking about the relationship between a 
pierced tongue and his sex life. The Chinese group appeared to indicate that they were 
interpreting the caller‟s problem in the same way as I had, but the difference between 
us is that they also talked of a „French style‟ and a „lack of common sense‟, something 
as if they are instantiated in their everyday life.  
Specifically, in response to my first question, L, in the Chinese group, appeared to 
shift her English cultural knowledge to her Chinese one, and inferred that „in our 
country we don‟t do that sort of thing with the tongue‟, but she quickly switched back 
and inferred that the caller was more concerned with whether he could still have sex 
life with his girlfriend. This indicated that L had a choice of context to draw on, in 
that L used her bicultural knowledge to make a comparison about the issue of the 
„pierced tongue‟, but depended on her English cultural knowledge to interpret the 
English caller‟s remarks.  
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To summarise, there are differences both between and within the groups in 
understanding the caller‟s problem. In general, for the English group, the caller‟s 
speech was designed not to communicate a problem but to look for a second opinion. 
For the Chinese group, the caller‟s speech was to solve the problem of a pierced 
tongue indeed affecting his physical expression of love. Although the cognitive 
environments of members within the English group overlap with each other, and 
consequently, they did have access to the similar contextual assumptions about „oral 
sex‟, their understanding of the problem the caller wanted to solve was distinct. More 
specifically, there is evidence that the Chinese group shifted their Chinese cultural 
frame to their English one, so as to infer the issue raised by the English caller.  
6.2.1.2 Sex outside a relationship 
Below is my summary of English extract 5 (see Appendix 6): 
The caller‟s girlfriend told the caller that she had a sexual relationship with somebody 
else. Although the girlfriend has had a sexual relationship with somebody else rather 
than the caller himself, the caller still loves her. Because of this, the caller does not 
know how to accept the fact that his girlfriend has a sexual relationship with 
somebody else. My inference is that the caller‟s problem is that he does not know how 
to accept the fact that his girlfriend has a sexual relationship with somebody else, and 
therefore, he asks advice on this.  
I focus on the following key utterances from this extract in my analysis. 
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[6.2] 
(1)   C: She told me yesterday morning that she‟s been seeing and < > having um 
sexual relationship…with ANOTHER MAN. 
(2)    H: Ok not er the sort of information you want to hear from your girlfriend is it? 
(3)  C: No. I was very hurt and I feel very troubled by it, I‟m you know just 
wondering, I mean she is behaving like she‟s a complete cow. 
(4)    H:  Em.   
(5)    C: And I‟m just you know I  I I love her, and I‟m not sure how to take this. 
              (E08GT) 
Upon hearing the above conversation, the initial interpretation that I came up with is 
that the caller did not know how to accept the fact that his girlfriend had had a sexual 
relationship with somebody else. 
The reason that I generated this interpretation is that I assumed, in the context of 
discussing the relationship between the caller and his girlfriend, that „she‟ (as well as 
its object form her) referred to the caller‟s girlfriend. Moreover, where the caller 
states in (5) „I love her and I‟m not sure how to take this‟ the connective „and‟ implies 
a causal relationship between the two states in (5) which could be alternatively stated 
as „and therefore‟. I then identified the propositions, made manifest by the caller‟s 
utterances, as something like the following:  
(a) The caller‟s girlfriend has a sexual relationship with somebody else. 
I was then led by the caller‟s stress assigned to the phrase „another man’ to access the 
proposition in (a) made manifest in the following context: 
(b) In English society, sex life is a physical expression of love between couples; 
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(c) If a woman is in a romantic relationship with someone, then the woman 
should be loyal to the relationship. 
(d) If a woman in a romantic relationship with someone has sex with somebody 
else, then she is not faithful in her current romantic relationship.  
I combined the assumptions in (a) and (b-d) and drew the following contextual 
implication: 
(e) The caller‟s girlfriend is not faithful in her relationship with the caller.  
The assumption in (e) shows that the pronoun „this‟ in (5) refers to the assumption 
that the caller‟s girlfriend is not faithful to her relationship with the caller. Because of 
this, I identified the fact that the proposition made manifest by (5) turns out to be: 
(f) The caller is not sure how to accept the fact that his girlfriend is not faithful 
in her relationship with the caller. 
I was then led by the caller‟s use of the connective „and‟ and process (f) in the 
following context:  
(g) If a man still loves his girlfriend, the man may not know how to accept the 
fact that his girlfriend has had a sexual relationship with somebody else. 
I combined the assumptions in (f) and (g) and drew the contextual implication I 
described earlier, namely that: 
(h) The caller does not know how to accept the fact that his girlfriend has had a 
a sexual relationship with somebody else. 
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The assumption in (h) is the first line of interpretation that I came up with when I 
heard the caller‟s above speeches, I accepted it as the intended interpretation of the 
caller, and stopped looking any further for any alternative interpretations that might 
also be relevant. Therefore, I consider the problem the caller intended to solve in this 
case to be that he does not know how to accept the fact that his girlfriend has had a 
sexual relationship with somebody else. 
When discussing this call with my two groups, I first asked each group a question 
about what they thought it might mean if one told one‟s partner that one had a sexual 
relationship with somebody else. 
The English group responded: 
G: Just tell the fact. 
S:  Just mean what they say. 
A: That‟s the fact. If they decide that‟s a problem then that‟s a problem, if they decide 
that it‟s not then it‟s not. 
T: Yeah. 
J: I guess what he‟s trying to say depends on the situation. it can mean anything that 
means that she‟s bored, it could mean she‟s not having enough sex as it is, or 
maybe she‟s found somebody better than the one she has had before, so it‟s really 
hard to say just from saying that she‟s had sex with someone else. 
 
The Chinese group answered: 
L: She had sexual relationships with someone else and even told her partner. 
obviously she doesn‟t take the issue of sexual relationship seriously… a good 
name for this kind of women is open but probably I am deeply influenced by my 
parents. I call her a morally bad woman. 
C: A slut. I think a case like this is rare in China. she even TOLD him she had a 
sexual relationship with somebody else when she is IN a relationship. I assume if 
someone in a relationship has a sexual relationship with somebody else. they try to 
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hide it and not to tell anyone and it would be silly if this person tells her partner 
what has been done.  
G: Yeah. maybe it‟s common in Western countries like England that they don‟t really 
care whether you are a virgin or not. but in China a large majority of us still think 
those people who have sexual relationship before getting married are not good at 
least morally.  
For the English group, the referents of the expression „having a sexual relationship 
with somebody else‟ are quite distinct from that of the Chinese group. The English 
group as a whole came to an agreement that this expression is just „the fact‟ although 
J inferred that this fact „can mean anything‟. Their remark that „if they decide that‟s a 
problem then that‟s a problem, if they decide it‟s not then it‟s not‟ indicates that the 
English group did not think having a sexual relationship with somebody else was a 
particularly important issue in a romantic relationship. For the Chinese group, in 
contrast, this expression has a much wider field of reference, potentially covering 
their referent for „the fact‟ in the sense of Chinese morals. They thought that having a 
sexual relationship with somebody before getting married was an important issue, and 
assumed that a woman with such a behaviour was „a morally bad woman‟.  Although 
G in the Chinese group compared how England and China treated the issue of 
virginity differently, she quickly switched from her knowledge of English culture to 
her knowledge of Chinese culture, and inferred that sleeping around before getting 
married in China was a morally wrong behaviour. This indicated that G had a choice 
of context to call on, and finally depended on her Chinese cultural specific knowledge 
to interpret the issue raised by the English caller. 
Later in the interview, I asked the groups what problem they thought the caller wanted 
to solve in this case. 
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The English group responded: 
T: He is trying to say whether he would be with her or not. 
A: I think it‟s also a problem with his own self-image. he‟s a kind of confused about 
how he should react to that situation. 
G: Like he said…I don‟t know how I‟ve got her in the first place. like he‟s lucky to 
have a girlfriend like this. so he doesn‟t want to break up. 
J: I think he‟s really confused as well. so he‟s calling to get some clarification as to 
what he should do.  
S: I think he wants to know if it‟s wrong for her to cheat on him because he wants to 
get radio host‟s opinions.  
 
The Chinese group answered:  
G: I think if in China a man in this situation knows exactly how to react to this. they 
will end the relationship straightaway. I think he‟s just feeling hurt that someone 
he wants to marry turns out to be like this and he‟s trying to find someone to 
express his anger. probably he thinks radio programme is the best place to tell 
because he is in the dark and nobody knows him. 
L: I don‟t think he needs advice on this issue. he just wants to tell someone otherwise 
he may feel mad. 
C: I agree it‟s hard for him to accept the fact that his girl is a bad woman. 
On the basis of evidence such as the above, it became clear that although both groups 
understood what the caller was saying in similar ways, in that they both inferred that 
the caller‟s speeches were about his relationship with his girlfriend who had a sexual 
relationship with somebody else, they varied in terms of their assessment of the  
problem the caller was constructing. Again, I argue that the differences in their 
interpretations arise from the differences in contextual assumptions each group 
activated. For example, in inferring what problem the caller intended to solve, the two 
groups used distinct sets of assumptions as evidence. Their responses to my first 
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question show that the English group did not have, as part of their knowledge, the 
assumption articulated in varying ways by members of the Chinese group that „having 
sex with somebody before getting married is a morally bad woman‟. Because of this, 
the two groups activated a distinct set of assumptions when later asked to explain 
what problem they thought the caller intended to solve. A, in the English group, drew 
on his previous articulated assumption about „the fact‟ to infer that the caller was just 
„kind of confused about how he should react to that situation‟. In contrast, G, in the 
Chinese group, drew on her previous articulated assumption about „a morally bad 
woman‟ to infer that the caller‟s (if he were a Chinese) phone in to the show was not 
to solve any problem because „he knows exactly what to do‟, but to express how 
angry he was at his girlfriend‟s morally impermissible behaviour. In general, there are 
some broad differences in each group‟s understanding of the problem the caller 
intended to solve: the English group saw the caller‟s utterances as designed to 
communicate the fact that he wanted to know what he should do in this situation. The 
Chinese group saw the caller‟s speech as designed not to solve any problem, but to 
express how angry he was with his girlfriend‟s morally impermissible behaviour.   
I am also aware of the differences within the groups of my respondents. For example, 
although members of the English group activated similar contextual assumptions 
about „the fact‟, their understanding of the problem the caller intended to solve varies: 
T inferred that the caller wanted to know whether he should be with his girlfriend or 
not.  In contrast, both A and J inferred that the caller was confused about how he 
should react to that situation; F, however, inferred that the caller wanted to know if it 
is wrong for his girlfriend to cheat on him. The English group as a whole did not 
indicate that they were interpreting the caller‟s issue in exactly the same way as I had, 
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but which did indicate that they inferred that the caller was confused as to what he 
should do in this situation. The Chinese group produced interpretations that were 
different to my own, but which did indicate that we all understood the caller‟s speech 
as implying that he was concerned with his relationship with his girlfriend after she 
had a sexual relationship with somebody else.  
More specifically, I am aware that the bicultural participants have a choice of context 
to call on when they interpret the problem constructed by the caller. Their responses 
to my second question show that G, in the Chinese group, made an immediate 
connection between the caller‟s issue and how a Chinese man in the same situation 
would actually act, and inferred that the caller (if he were a Chinese) „was trying to 
find someone to express his anger‟. What this indicated is that G depended on her 
Chinese cultural specific knowledge to infer the issue raised by the English caller.  
To summarise, there are differences both between and within the groups in 
understanding the problem the caller was expressing. For the English group, the 
caller‟s speech was designed to solve the problem of how he should react to that 
situation. For the Chinese group, the caller‟s speech was designed not to solve any 
problem, but to express how angry he was at his girlfriend‟s morally impermissible 
behaviour. Moreover, although members within the English group resemble each 
other in their cognitive environment, and consequently they activated similar 
contextual assumptions about „the fact‟, there are variations in their understanding of 
the problem the caller wanted to solve. Specifically, there is evidence that the Chinese 
group depended on their Chinese cultural specific knowledge to infer the issue raised 
by the English caller.  
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6.2.1.3 Maintaining a friendship rather than a romantic relationship 
Below is my brief summary of the caller‟s problem expressed in English extract 6 (see 
Appendix 7): 
The man the caller was dating indicated his interest in maintaining a friendship with 
the caller when he ended his dating relationship with her. Because the caller did not 
give the man an answer as to whether she wanted to his friend, the caller now tries to 
give the man a call and tell him that she wants to be his friend. My inference is that 
the caller‟s problem is that she does not know whether or not telling him to accept his 
friendship would help to re-establish their dating relationship, and therefore she wants 
advice on this. 
In my analysis, I focus on the following key utterances from this extract. 
[6.3] 
(1)    H:  Hi there what‟s happening in your life at the moment then? 
(2)   C: Well basically (.) I‟ve been on a … I‟ve seen this guy eight times over two      
months. 
(3)    H: Um-hum. 
(4)    C: And he‟s kind of like DUMPED me. 
(5)    H: Right. 
(6)   C: And basically he (.) he‟s currently like kind of saying < > the connection  
doesn‟t feel right. But he … while we were dating … he did make a big thing 
about how would be great to be friends of somebody first and … and even 
when he dumped me (.) said we can still be friends but I didn‟t say anything 
cos I was upset. 
(7)    H:  Ok. 
(8)   C: Basically… I‟m just wondering I‟m thinking about … maybe calling him 
when he < > comes back and saying < > well (.) be nice and clearly I want to 
be friends. but I‟m thinking is that too needy or is that a good way to try to 
win somebody back.    
              (E03JD) 
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Upon hearing the above conversation, the initial interpretation that came to my mind 
was that the caller wanted to know whether or not building a friendship with the man 
was a good way to win him back to the dating relationship with the caller. 
The reason that I generated this interpretation was that I assumed, in the context of 
discussing a dating relationship, that the caller‟s use of „dumped‟ means that the man 
she was dating has left her, and also where the caller states „is that a good way to try 
to win somebody back’ in (8), the pronoun „that‟ refers to building a friendship with 
the man. I then identify the resulting propositions, made manifest by the caller‟s 
utterances, as something like the following: 
(a) The man the caller was dating has left her;  
(b) He wanted to build a friendship with the caller first; 
(c) Building a friendship with the man is a good way to win him back to the 
dating relationship with the caller.  
I was led by the caller‟s use of „but‟ in (6) to access the propositions in (a-b), made 
manifest in the following context:  
(d) The man‟s wishes to start out by being friends with the caller are the 
obstacles hindering the progress of their relationship. 
I combined the assumptions in (a-b) and (d) and drew the contextual implication:  
(e) The caller has difficulty in developing a romantic relationship with the man 
because he wishes to be friend with the caller first. 
I then identified that the proposition in (c) was not intended to communicate the fact 
that building a friendship with the man was a good way to win him back to the 
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romantic relationship with the caller, but to find out whether it is. Therefore I assumed 
it activated the following contextual assumption: 
(f) The caller is asking if it is true that building a friendship is a good way to 
win the man back. 
I combined the assumptions in (c) and (f) and drew the contextual implication I 
described earlier, namely that  
(g) The caller wants to know whether or not building a friendship with the man 
is a good way to win him back to the romantic relationship with the caller. 
The assumption in (g) is the first line of interpretation to satisfy my expectation of 
relevance raised by the caller‟s utterances, and therefore I accepted it as the intended 
interpretation of the caller, without looking any further for alternative interpretations 
that might also be relevant, because extra processing effort would be required to 
retrieve them. Hence, I consider the caller‟s problem to be that she wanted to know 
whether or not building a friendship with the man was a good way to win him back to 
the relationship. 
When discussing this call with my two groups, I first asked each group what they 
thought it might mean if someone has dumped her. 
The English group responded: 
S: He‟s finished the relationship. 
G: Yeah. 
A: He‟s ended the relationship. 
T: He doesn‟t want to continue seeing her. 
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J: It‟s a kind of like dumped. I think it‟s only about eight times they‟ve seen, probably 
it‟s not a proper relationship yet. 
A: I agree. it doesn‟t sound like they‟ve been in a real serious relationship. 
 
The Chinese group responded:  
L: He‟s ended the relationship. 
G: He doesn‟t want to date her any more. 
C: Yeah. 
On the basis of evidence such as this, it became evident that the referent of the term 
„dumped‟ was similar to both groups, referring to the man‟s ending the relationship 
with the caller.  
Later in the interview, I asked them to sum up in their own words what problem they 
thought the caller wanted to solve. 
The English group responded:  
T: She wants to find out if she is ok to call that guy back and to see if she may fix the 
relationship with him or if it‟s too desperate. 
A: Yeah I think basically right. 
J: Yeah she wants to know if it‟s worth pursuing the relationship or not. 
S: I think she‟s trying to decide if she has a chance to have a relationship with him 
again.  
G: She‟s just trying to have a relationship with him again. 
 
The Chinese group answered:  
C: She still wants to have a relationship with him. 
L: She‟s trying to find out if she can keep the relationship going. 
G: I agree she‟s just asking whether he will be back to her again if she tries. 
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Responses such as these indicate that the two groups did appear to share the 
assumptions I took to be manifest to the caller when she was constructing her 
problems. Because of the shared contextual assumptions about „dumped‟ activated by 
the two groups, as well as myself, our understanding of the problem the caller was 
expressing was similar.  
To summarise, the two groups‟ understanding of the caller‟s problem overlapped with 
my own interpretations, in that we all inferred that the caller‟s problem in this case to 
be that the caller wanted to know whether or not building a friendship with the man 
could win him back to the relationship. I believe the similarity in our interpretations is 
the consequence of the similar contextual assumptions activated by the caller‟s 
account in the process of interpretation.  
6.2.1.4 Summary 
In this section, I found that when hearers of one culture activated assumptions that 
were not available to hearers of the other culture, their understanding of the relevance 
of what a caller was saying was in radically different ways, as in the cases of [6.1] and 
[6.2].  
I found that when hearers in one culture activated contextual assumptions that hearers 
of the other culture also had access to, their understanding of the relevance of what a 
caller was saying was similar, as in the case of [6.3].  
I found that my respondents were flexible in using their bicultural knowledge, in that 
they sometimes depended on their knowledge about a culture foreign to their own, as 
in the case of [6.1], but sometimes they depended on their cultural specific 
knowledge, as in the case of [6.2], to draw the inference.   
 220 
 
6.2.2 Contextual assumptions activated in Chinese talk shows 
In the next three subsections, I present evidence found in three Chinese extracts. 
6.2.2.1 Parents’ decision in a romantic relationship 
Below is my summary of the caller‟s problem expressed in Chinese extract 4 (see 
Appendix 11): 
The caller is trying to have a romantic relationship with a man five years younger than 
the caller herself. Because it is not seen as appropriate in China that an older woman 
has a romantic relationship with a younger man, their relationship is objected to by 
the man‟s parents. My inference is that the caller‟s problem is that she does not know 
how to persuade the man‟s parents to accept her romantic relationship with their son, 
and therefore she asks advice on this. 
In my analysis, I focus on the following key utterances. 
[6.4] 
(1) C: 我 认识一个 比 我 小  五  岁  的 男人 我 想  和 他  在一起       
          I    know   a   than   I   small five year of   man   I  want  and  he   together 
          I know a man five years younger than me, and I want to be with him 
 
(2)  C: 可    他  的   家里   不   愿意     
           but        he   of        family   not      agree 
           but his family do not agree 
 
 (3)  C: 我     该      怎么    办?          
             I         should           how      do 
            What should I do?      
            (C01LY) 
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Upon hearing the above conversation, the initial interpretation that I came up with is 
that the caller did not know how to persuade the man‟s parents to accept her 
inappropriate romantic relationship with their son.
 
The reason that I generated this interpretation is that I assumed, on the basis of my 
own understanding of parents‟ influence on one‟s romantic relationship in Chinese 
society, that the phrase „his family‟ in (2) referred to „the caller‟s man‟s parents‟. I 
then identified that the resulting propositions, made manifest by the caller‟s 
utterances, as something like the following: 
(a) The caller wants to have a romantic relationship with a man five years 
younger than the caller herself; 
(b) This is objected by the man‟s parents; 
(c) The caller is asking what she should do in order to persuade the man‟s 
parents‟ to accept her relationship with their son. 
I identified that the recovery of the proposition in (a) made the following contextual 
assumption immediately accessible: 
(d) In Chinese society, it is not seen as appropriate for an older woman (say, 5 
years older) to have a romantic relationship with a younger man because it is 
not seen as natural.  
I combined the assumptions in (a) and (d) and drew the following contextual 
implication: 
(e) The caller‟s romantic relationship with the younger man is not seen as 
appropriate in China. 
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I was then led by the caller‟s use of 可 (i.e but) in (2) to access the propositions in (b-
c), made manifest in the following context: 
(f)  Normally, one‟s romantic relationship is affected by one‟s parents‟ 
opinions; 
(g) If parents disagree with their child‟s romantic relationship, then the child 
may try to persuade the parents to accept the relationship.  
(h) The man‟s parents disagree with their son‟s relationship with the caller 
because it is not appropriate; 
(i) The caller does not know how to persuade the man‟s parents to accept her 
relationship with the man. 
I combined the assumptions in (b-c) and (f-i) and drew the contextual implication I 
described earlier, namely that: 
(j) The caller wants advice on what she should do to persuade the man‟s parents 
to accept her inappropriate relationship with their son. 
The assumption in (j) is the first line of interpretation to satisfy my expectation of 
relevance raised by the caller‟s utterances, and therefore I accepted it as the intended 
interpretation of the caller, without looking any further alternative interpretations that 
might also be relevant. Hence, I consider the caller‟s problem in this case to be that 
she does not know how to persuade her man‟s parents to accept her inappropriate 
relationship with her younger man.  
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When discussing this call with the two groups, I first asked each group why the caller 
was telling us that she wanted to be in a relationship with a man five years younger 
than the caller herself. 
The English group responded:  
G: She wants to get someone else‟s opinion to see if they think that him being five 
years younger is ok. like someone else‟ perspective on the situation. 
T: I guess it maybe like… not as common in China… like if in this country… five 
years age difference wouldn't usually matter. unless one of the people was like…a 
teenager… say that one person is fifteen the other one is twenty. that will be a 
problem. but one is twenty the other is twenty five. that‟s not. 
S: That‟s indicating that that‟s a problem. she's not actually said that that‟s the 
problem. 
G: She probably thinks she‟s too old. she wants to know if the age gap is a problem. 
A:Yeah that‟s a good point actually. maybe she wants to attribute to that. maybe she‟s 
also a bit weird. 
J: I think in China it‟s a bit strange for her to have an older woman than a man in a 
relationship like five-year difference is quite significant. I think specifically like 
older family wouldn‟t agree with it, so I think she seeks justification whether five 
year is too much even though it wouldn‟t be that strange in this country. 
 
The Chinese group responded:  
C: There is a big gap between them and also she is a lot older than the man…5 year 
gap not 1 year. so not appropriate. 
G: Yeah not like this country…they don‟t really care about this and a bachelor in this 
country can marry a lady with two or even three children which is unbelievable in 
China. 
L: She is worried about that age gap and she is older than the man…and that‟s not 
common in China and hard to accept. 
 224 
 
The responses indicated that for the English group, the referent of the expression „the 
man is five years younger than the caller‟ is somewhat distinct from that of the 
Chinese group. For the English group, this expression has been assigned different 
interpretations: G sees the issue of being 5-year older than her man as providing 
background information to the assumption the caller made about herself that „she is 
too old‟; T and J made an immediate connection which links the caller‟s case to their 
knowledge about Chinese culture. For example, J inferred that the issue of 5-year age 
gap „may not be common in China‟ and made a point that in China it‟s a bit strange 
„to have an older woman than a man in a relationship‟. For the Chinese group, the 
expression „the man is five year younger than the caller‟ refers to the assumption 
articulated in varying ways by members of this group that it is not an appropriate 
relationship if „a woman is a lot older than the man‟. Although this assumption sounds 
similar to the point made by J in the English group, the Chinese group did not talk of 
it being about an issue with „older families‟. Moreover, G, in the Chinese group, 
linked the issue of age gap to her knowledge of British culture, and inferred that 
British „don‟t really care about this‟. These responses indicate that both groups 
depended on their bicultural knowledge to make a comparison about the issue of age 
gap, to infer what the caller was trying to communicate.  
I then asked each group the question of why they thought that it mattered if the man‟s 
family did not agree with the relationship. 
The English group responded:  
T: It depends on like how serious the relationship is. like if this one has been going for 
a few years and you‟re thinking of getting married. that will be because she‟s going 
to join your family. 
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G: Clearly it implies that family is important and the family‟s opinions about their 
relationship are obviously important.  
A: It sounds like if the family doesn‟t agree, it will be difficult for them to be 
together. whereas I think if in this country if the guy left home…he wouldn‟t really 
care what the family think so much. 
S: Presumably if his family is involved then this is a very serious relationship.  
J: I think it‟s the bonus. at the end of the day you‟re an adult. you make the decision 
and you know yourself better than anyone else…so if you can get your family to 
like her  then that‟s good. but if they don‟t then it doesn‟t matter. 
 
The Chinese group responded:  
G: Parents‟ idea is important and if the man‟s parents don‟t agree and she has to think 
it over and see whether that man is indeed ok for her. 
C: It DOES matter. if it‟s me…I‟d like to listen to my parents‟ idea before having a 
relationship with a man …but a lot of people don‟t.  
L: It is important. it determines whether she can be together with the man. 
The responses indicated that members of both groups understood the caller‟s 
statements as implying that she does care about the man‟s family‟s opinions about her 
relationship with the man. The two groups, however, differed in their assessment of 
the caller‟s point about the man‟s family‟s opinions as to whether the parents‟ 
acceptance is important. All the members of the Chinese group inferred that parents‟ 
opinions were very important to one‟s relationship. In contrast, the English group 
generated varying interpretations: G inferred that „approval is important‟; A in the 
English group admitted that the approval sounded important for the caller, however, A 
made a direct connection between the caller‟s issue and what he could experience in 
his own country, and inferred that if it were in UK, a guy „would not really care about 
the family‟s opinions so much‟. This indicated that A depended on his bicultural 
knowledge to infer the issue raised by the caller. The responses by J that „if you can 
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get your family to like her then that‟s good, if they don‟t it doesn‟t matter‟ implied 
that he did not take family‟s opinions as significant in a relationship. More 
specifically, T and S extended the issue of parents‟ opinion which they expressed as 
having to do with „how serious the relationship is‟, and inferred that „if his family is 
involved then this is a serious relationship‟.  
Later in the interview, I asked them to sum up in their own words what problem they 
thought the caller wanted to solve. 
The English group’s response was:  
J: It looks like she actually wants practical advice rather than the other ones. she just 
seems to want some kind of affirmation or someone to tell them it‟s ok. 
S: Well „what should I do‟ is quite an open ending. like…should she try and get 
approval from his family or should she just give the whole thing up.  
G: I think you‟re absolutely right. 
T: Yeah she doesn‟t know whether she still needs to try to get approval or to give up. 
A: Yeah. 
 
The Chinese group’s response was:  
L: It sounds like she still wants to be together with that man although his family do 
not agree. so probably she is asking how she can be together with that young man. 
G: I think her question implies many different issues. being older than a man is 
difficult to accept and this is a face issue. and it‟s difficult to convince the man‟s 
parents. also she herself may not be certain about her relationship with the man and 
after all the man is 5 years younger. so she may need someone to say OK you two 
can be together. 
C: Not sure really … but it doesn‟t sound like she wants to give up. 
The responses to my first and second questions show that the English group did not 
make the assumptions articulated in varying ways by members of the Chinese group 
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that (a) it is not an appropriate relationship if a woman is 5 year older than a man, and 
that (b) parents‟ opinions „determine whether she can be together with that man‟. 
Because of these, the two groups vary in terms of their assessment of the problem the 
caller wanted to solve: the Chinese group saw the caller‟s utterances as designed to 
communicate a problem of how the two can be together. For the English group, the 
differences in the contextual assumptions they drew on to infer the issues about age 
gap and family‟s opinions on the man‟s relationship, led to variations in their 
understanding of the caller‟s problems: one of them inferred that the caller wanted 
someone to tell her that the two were ok, implying that the age gap was not too much; 
all the other four inferred that the caller wanted to know whether she needed to try to 
get approval or to give up the relationship. Neither of the groups produced 
interpretations that overlapped with my own, but they did indicate that we all inferred 
that the caller did care about the man‟s parents‟ opinions about her relationship with 
the man and she did think about the issue of age gap.  
To summarise, there are differences both between and within each group‟s 
understanding of the caller‟s problem: the Chinese group as a whole saw the caller‟s 
utterances as designed to communicate the problem of how she can be together with 
her younger man, rather than of how she can get approval from her young man‟s 
parents, which was the interpretation I formulated. The English group generated two 
different interpretations: all but one of them saw the caller‟s speech as designed to 
solve the problem of whether she needed to get approval or to give up her relationship 
with her younger man. One of them inferred that the caller merely wanted to have 
someone‟s opinion to confirm that her relationship with her younger man was 
acceptable. As my analysis shows, it was the differences in the contextual 
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assumptions each group drew on that led to the differences in their interpretations. 
Moreover, there is evidence that both groups depended on their bi-cultural knowledge 
and drew a comparison between the two cultures about the issue of age gap raised by 
the caller. 
6.2.2.2 Pregnancy before marriage 
Below is my brief summary of the caller‟s problem communicated in Chinese extract 
5 (see Appendix 12): 
The caller and his girlfriend have a sex life together, and now the girl is pregnant. 
Although they have agreed that the girlfriend should have an abortion, the caller 
cannot find her on the day when the abortion is to take place. The caller fears that his 
girlfriend intends to give birth to the baby, and then take it to the man‟s parents‟ home 
in order to force him to marry her. My inference is that the caller does not know 
whether or not he should marry the girlfriend for the sake of the baby, therefore he 
asks advice on this. 
In my analysis, I focus on the following key utterances from this extract. 
[6.5] 
(1) C:   定好       了        今天    去     打胎     可     她     现在     躲避   我 
            Agreed (particle) today   to   abortion   but   she    now      hide   me 
      We have agreed that she should have an abortion today, but she is hiding from me. 
 
     
 她 现在 准备 把  孩子   生 下来 然后  把  孩子 给 我  家  送去       
  She now prepare hold  child   bear out   then   hold  child give  I   home   send 
  She is now planning to give birth to the baby and then take it to my home. 
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(2)   C: 如果 她 把  孩子  生   下来 那  我  该   怎么  办  呢 
             If    she   hold   child  bear    out   then   I    should    how   do    ?   
             If she gives birth to the baby, what should I do? 
 
 (3)  H:  那  就  是 一个 法律的 问题了 你 可以  不  娶   她 
      That then  be    a       law        issue     you  may    no  marry  her 
            That‟s the issue of law. You can decide not to marry her. 
       
 但 你   是  孩子 的 父亲  你  必须得  承担 法律的    责任了.  
   But you are child  of   father   you   must   undertake  law     responsibility 
   But you are the father, and you must take legal responsibility for the child. 
    (C08SX) 
Upon hearing the above conversation, the initial interpretation that occurred to me is 
that the caller did not know whether or not he should marry his girlfriend for the sake 
of the baby.  
The reason that I generated this interpretation is that I assumed, based on my own 
existing knowledge about Chinese culture, that in the context of discussing a home for 
an unmarried person, the caller‟s use of 我家 (i.e. my home) in (1) referred to the 
caller‟s parents‟ home, because in China, an unmarried person usually lives with his 
or her parents. I then identified the resulting propositions, made manifest by the 
caller‟s utterances, as something like the following: 
(a) The caller and his girlfriend have made a joint decision that she should have 
an abortion; 
 (b) She is hiding from the caller on the day when the abortion is to take place; 
 (c) She is planning to give birth to the baby; 
 (d) After the baby is born, she will take the baby to the caller‟s parents‟ home; 
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 (e) The caller is asking what he should do.  
I identified that the recovery of the proposition in (a) made the following contextual 
assumption immediately manifest: 
(f) If a pregnant woman wants to have the abortion, then the woman does not 
want the baby. 
I combined the assumptions in (a) and (f) and drew the following contextual 
implication:  
(g) Neither the caller nor his girlfriend wants the baby. 
However, the presence of 可 (i.e. but) in (1) led me to access the proposition in (b) in 
the following context: 
(h) If a woman is hiding on the agreed abortion day, then she wants to keep the 
baby. 
I combined the assumptions in (b) and (h) and drew the contextual implication: 
(i) It is the caller himself that does not want the baby.  
The caller‟s stress assigned to 生 (i.e. give birth to) by his lengthened duration drew 
my attention and I was led to access the proposition in (c), made manifest in the 
following context: 
(j) In Chinese society, if an unmarried couple have a baby, it will cause many 
problems to the baby and also to the couple themselves. 
I combined the assumptions in (c) and (j) and drew the contextual implication: 
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(k) There will be many problems if the girlfriend gives birth to the baby. 
I then identified that the recovery of the proposition in (d) made the following 
contextual assumptions immediately manifest: 
(l) In the situation where one does not want the baby, the mother‟s taking the 
baby to the father‟s parents‟ home is to show it to the father‟s parents in 
order to let the parents pressurise the father to marry the baby‟s mother for 
the sake of the baby.   
I combined the assumptions in (d) and (l) and drew the contextual implication:  
(m) The caller‟s girlfriend intends to force the caller to marry her. 
The evidence in (m) indicates that the verb 办 (i.e. do) in (2) refers to the caller‟s 
choice of whether he should marry his girlfriend or not. On this basis, I identified that 
the proposition in (e) made manifest in the following context: 
(n) The caller is not sure whether he should marry his girlfriend or not for the 
sake of the baby. 
I combined the assumptions in (e) and (n) and drew the contextual implication I 
described earlier, namely that: 
(o) The caller does not know whether or not he should marry his girlfriend. 
The assumption in (o) is the first line of my interpretation to satisfy my expectation of 
relevance raised by the caller‟s utterances, and therefore, I accepted it as the intended 
interpretation of the caller. Hence, I consider the caller‟s problem to be that he does 
not know whether he should marry his girlfriend or not.  
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While discussing this call with my two groups, I first asked each group what they 
thought „my home‟ referred to and why the caller was telling us that his girlfriend 
would take the baby to his home. 
The English group responded: 
S: Presumably his parents‟ home or something like that. 
T: Doesn‟t really know where he lives…his house. 
A: I assume his own house. 
G: If she‟s taken the baby to his parents‟ home LOOK WHAT HAS HE DONE 
(laughter). maybe trying to shame him into doing something.  like she wants to try 
in that particular way in front of his parents. that‟s why I assume it could be his 
parent‟s home  
A: I thought just taken to his house like. he should get support from this house for 18 
years. 
J: Maybe my home refers to his family as a whole. as you said, presented it to his 
family rather than an actual physical house. 
 
The Chinese group answered:  
G: Obviously his parents‟ home because they are not married. if she takes the baby to 
his parents‟ home. the parents will obviously pressurise him to marry her for the 
sake of the baby.  
C: Parents‟ home. I assume the girl herself does not want to bring it up but she wants 
to keep it. anyway that‟s her own baby. and I think this is probably our culture ... a 
man‟s parents usually love grandchild dearly and they are the best candidates who 
can bring it up ...and also I assume she doesn‟t necessarily want to marry him. but 
she wants him to take the responsibility. 
L: I agree parents‟ home but I think her aim is to force him to marry her. 
The responses indicated that the two groups varied in terms of the referents assigned 
to the term „my home‟. The Chinese group as a whole appeared to take it to be the 
caller‟s parents‟ home, and inferred that taking the baby to the parent‟s home was to 
 233 
 
force the caller to marry the girlfriend. For the English group, the term „my home‟ in 
this context referred to the caller‟s home. Their statement that „presumably his 
parents‟ home‟ indicated that „parents‟ home‟ is also the referent which this group 
provided for what this term referred to. Although G, in the English group, appeared to 
overlap with the point made by the Chinese group, in that G did infer that this 
expression refereed to the caller‟s parents‟ home, he talked of it as assuming that 
taking the baby to the parents‟ home was a way to shame the caller into doing 
something, without being specific about what that „something‟ might be. More 
specifically, in response to my second question, C, in the Chinese group, related the 
issue raised by the caller to her own „culture‟, and inferred that taking the baby to the 
caller‟s parents‟ home was a way of wanting „him to take the responsibility‟. This 
indicates that she depended on her Chinese cultural specific knowledge to infer the 
issue raised by the caller.  
Later in the interview, I asked each group to summarise in their own words what 
problem they thought the caller wanted to solve.  
The English group responded: 
T:  The baby. 
S:  He doesn‟t want the baby. 
A: Illegitimate child on the way. he doesn‟t want it. he doesn‟t know how to deal with 
it. 
G: The child‟s mother is a bit crazy. it‟s quite a big problem actually. I did know a girl 
in high school who said her life plan was basically to find a rich man …sleep with 
him and she had his kid and he would be forced to look after both of them for 18 
years and then find another man to do the same thing   
J: I still stick to what I just said he doesn‟t understand what he is required to do 
according to law. that‟s his problem. 
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The Chinese group responded:  
L: To marry or not to marry her.  
C: A big problem (laughter). yeah I agree that‟s his problem and also I think he wants 
to know whether he should take responsibility for the baby. 
G: He wants to listen to the host‟s opinion about whether he should marry or not. 
Their responses to my first question show that the members of the English group did 
not have, as part of their knowledge, the assumption articulated in varying ways by 
members of the Chinese group that taking the baby to the caller‟s parents‟ home was 
„to force the caller to marry his girlfriend‟. Because of this, the two groups drew on 
different assumptions when later asked to explain what problem the caller intended to 
solve. For example, L, in the Chinese group, drew on her previously articulated 
assumptions that taking the baby to the parents‟ home was a way to force the caller to 
marry his girlfriend, and inferred that the caller‟s problem was that he did not know 
whether he should „marry her‟. In contrast, A, in the English group, drew on his 
previously articulated assumption that taking the baby to the caller‟s own home was a 
way to show that the baby should get support from this house for 18 years, and to 
infer that the caller‟s problem was that he did not know how to deal with a child he 
did not want. The Chinese group did indicate that their interpretations were similar to 
my own, but they also talked of the responsibility the caller needed to take for the 
baby. Members of the English group differed in their views as to what the caller‟s 
problem was about: one of them inferred the caller‟s problem to be that „he does not 
understand what is required according to law‟. The other four inferred that the caller‟s 
problem was about the baby. Neither line of their interpretations was the same as my 
own, but it did imply that the caller‟s remarks were about the baby. 
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To summarise, there are differences both between and within the groups in 
understanding the caller‟s problem. As regards the Chinese group, the caller‟s 
problem was that he did not know whether or not he should marry his girlfriend. The 
English group itself generated two different interpretations: (a) the caller was 
uncertain as to what was required of him, according to law, and (b) the caller did not 
know how to deal with a baby he did not want. There was also evidence that both 
groups depended on their own culture specific knowledge to infer what the caller was 
saying.  
6.2.2.3 Children’s New Year greeting 
The following is my brief summary of the caller‟s problem communicated in Chinese 
extract 6 (see Appendix 13): 
The caller is very upset that the daughter that she had with her ex-husband didn‟t give 
her a New Year greeting call. The caller wants to know whether she should ring her 
daughter. My inference is that the caller‟s problem is that she does not know whether 
she should break the Chinese tradition to phone her daughter first during the New 
Year, and therefore she asks advice on this. 
My analysis focuses on the following key utterances. 
[6.6] 
(1)  C: 这   孩子   到  现在    过了    春    节         这么      长       时间了  
           The child  till  now    gone    spring  holiday    such     long     time  
       Even such a long time after the New Year 
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   一直  不  给  我  来 个 电话 就是 等  我 给 她   挂  电话. 
     Always  no  give  I  come   a   call     just wait     I  give her   hang   phone 
     She hasn‟t phoned me yet, she just waits for me to call her.  
 
(2)  C: 我 心里 不    平衡     红梅       我 现在  给   不    给   她  挂    这个  电话. 
            I   heart no balance  HongMei  I   now   give  no  give  her hang  this   call 
           I‟m very upset. HongMei, do you think I need to call her? 
 
(3)  H: 你     现在    给    她    发       短    信    吗？ 
    You    now    give  her  send   short   letter         ? 
    Have you sent her a message? 
(C02HM)  
The initial interpretation that occurred to me when I heard the above exchange was 
that the caller did not know whether she should phone her daughter during the 
Chinese New Year. 
The reason that I generated this interpretation is that I assumed, in the context of 
discussing the caller‟s daughter‟s not having phoned the caller during the New Year, 
that both the phrase 这孩子 (i.e. the child) and the pronoun 她 (i.e. she or her) 
referred to the caller‟s daughter. I then identified the resulting propositions, made 
manifest by the caller‟s utterances, as something like the following:  
(a) The caller‟s daughter has not phoned the caller a long time after the New 
Year; 
(b) The child just expects a call from the caller; 
(c) The caller is asking whether she should phone her daughter.  
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I was led by the caller‟s stress in the form of the lengthened duration assigned to the 
phrase 过了春节这么长时间了 (i.e. such a long time after the New Year) to access 
the proposition in (a), made manifest in the following context: 
(d) Chinese New Year is a significant festival for Chinese people and at that 
time they expect to be together with or hear from their children.  
I combined the assumptions in (a) and (d) and drew the following contextual 
implication: 
(e) The caller had a strong expectation that her child would call her, but the 
expectation has not been fulfilled. 
I was then led by the caller‟s stress assigned to the pronouns 我 (i.e. me) and 她 (i.e. 
her) and access the proposition (b), made manifest in the following context: 
(f) Children are expected to call parents and not the other way round. 
I combined the assumptions in (b) and (f) and drew the contextual implication: 
(g) The daughter is not acting according to the expectations.  
I then identified the proposition in (c) made manifest in the following context:  
(h) The caller is trying to find out whether she needs to phone the child.  
I combined the assumptions in (c) and (h) and drew the contextual implication I 
described earlier, namely that: 
(i) The caller does not know whether she needs to phone her child.  
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The assumption in (i) is the first line of my interpretation to satisfy my expectation of 
relevance raised by the caller‟s utterances, and I accepted it as the intended 
interpretation of the caller. Therefore, I consider the caller‟s problem in this case to be 
that she does not know whether or not she needs to phone her child.  
When discussing this call with my respondents, I first asked each group the question 
of whether they thought that it mattered to the caller that she did not receive her 
daughter‟s call during the New Year. 
 The English group responded: 
J: A call from her child would indicate her child cares about her.  
A: she‟s kind of expected the child would call her, the child kind of fails to do what 
she meant to do.  
  S: I think it matters to the caller because she wants to have a kind of like 
communication from her daughter. 
G: She is just thinking her child doesn‟t care about her. 
T: Yeah. 
 
The Chinese group responded: 
L: Of course it‟s important. to call parents to say Happy New Year no matter where 
you are and that‟s our tradition but if I didn‟t call them for some reasons they 
would call me and ask me if I am ok. 
G: No doubt to say Happy New Year. actually I call them almost on all the holidays 
not just for New Year. if I don‟t…my parents would be worried and they might 
also think I‟m too busy and they would call me. 
 C: So do my parents. so before they call me I call them.  
The responses indicated that members of both groups took the call from the child as 
significant to the caller. The groups varied, however, in terms of their perception of 
the relevance of the child‟s call: why it was important to the caller. The English saw 
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the call as indicating that the child cared about the parents. For the Chinese group, 
however, the issue of calling parents was specifically related to the Chinese tradition 
of exchanging a New Year greeting, assuming that without this greeting call, parents 
would be worried about their child.   
Later in the interview, I asked them to sum up what problem they thought the caller 
wanted to solve. 
The English group responded: 
T: I think because she expects the child to call her she thinks it's the right thing to do. 
clearly she wants to talk to her daughter but she doesn‟t think she should call her 
first. so that‟s why she‟s called up to the radio station to ask whether it‟s ok for the 
mum to call her daughter first.  that's what she's asking. 
J: It‟s strange it's such a private matter. I mean who calls who first it‟s only between 
the person who is on the phone. no one else would even know. it seems so strange 
to be something to swallow your pride about. 
S: That‟s not respectable. she‟s like even in Chinese New Year she doesn‟t call the 
mum to say like „Good Luck‟ and Congratulations.  
G: Clearly the mums don‟t call the daughter in Chinese New Year, so why would she 
expect her daughter to. 
A: Does she really think she can solve the problem …on the phone. 
 
The Chinese group responded: 
L: She wants to know whether she should call her daughter first ...actually I feel like 
the caller and her daughter must have some other problems …otherwise she would 
call her child directly like all the other mums do. 
C: Yeah I‟ve got the same feeling too. 
G: Agree. 
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On the basis of evidence such as this, it became apparent that although both groups 
understood what the caller was saying in similar ways, in that they both inferred that 
the caller wanted to know whether she should phone her daughter, they differed in 
their concern to ask for advice. That is: why the caller should ask about it at all. The 
Chinese group appeared to indicate that they were interpreting the caller‟s account in 
the same way as I had, but they extended the issue raised by the caller to „some other 
problems‟ between the caller and her child, and inferred that „the caller would call her 
child directly‟ otherwise. The English group produced interpretations that were not 
the same as my own, in that the group specifically related the issue raised by the caller 
about her child‟s calling first to the caller‟s „pride‟, and inferred that the caller‟s 
concern was with how her calling her child first would „swallow her pride‟.  
I am also aware of the differences between members within the English group in their 
understanding of the caller‟s concern about her child‟s call. For example, J‟s repeated 
use of the word „strange‟ indicated that he felt that the mum‟s strong expectation 
about her child‟s initiating a call was unacceptable. Similarly, G‟s point that if „mums 
don‟t call the daughter in Chinese New Year, so why would she expect her daughter 
to call her‟ indicated that he regarded the mum‟s expecting her child‟s call as unfair, 
but S, on the contrary, inferred that a child should call their parents in the New Year 
to show respect for the parents. Nevertheless, these responses indicated that even 
members with the same cultural backgrounds sometimes interpreted what was heard 
in different ways. 
6.2.2.4 Summary 
In this section, I found that (1) when hearers of one culture activated assumptions that 
were not available to hearers of the other culture under study, their understanding of 
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the relevance of what a caller was saying differed as in the case of [6.4], [6.5] and 
[6.6]; (2) when hearers within the same culture activated assumptions that were not 
available to the other hearers in the same group, their understanding of the relevance 
of what a caller said differed; (3) when these bicultural individuals interpreted a 
caller‟s remarks, they were flexible in using their bicultural knowledge, by making a 
comparison, to interpret the meaning of a caller. 
6.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have sought to analyse the contextual assumptions hearers from 
China and Britain drew on when they interpreted the problems expressed by callers. 
My analysis brought out variations in interpretation, both between and within the 
groups, but there was also a consistent pattern that indicated that members of each 
group were drawing on a set of assumptions about what a caller was saying that were 
not available to the other group. More specifically, what this indicated was that the 
two groups interpreted what a caller said in radically different ways. Moreover, there 
were patterns that indicated that members within the same group were drawing on a 
set of assumptions about what a caller said that were not available to the other 
members. This indicated that members within the same speech community sometimes 
interpreted the meaning of a caller in different ways. There were also patterns that 
indicated that the bicultural individuals were very flexible in their use of bicultural 
knowledge: sometimes, they depended on their own cultural specific knowledge, and 
sometimes they used their knowledge of a culture foreign to their own, but sometimes 
they relied on their bicultural knowledge by making a comparison, to infer what a 
caller meant by what she said.  
All the above findings form the basis for my discussion in Chapter Seven. 
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Chapter Seven: Discussion 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, my goals are: (a) to summarise and evaluate the findings reported in 
this thesis, and (b) to demonstrate the significance of my findings in the context of 
existing scholarship by showing that the approaches adopted in existing studies of 
culture and communication are not appropriate as a means of characterising cultural 
differences. 
I begin my discussion, in Section 7.2, with a summary of my findings on differences 
in communication between MC and BE in the context of radio advice talk shows. 
Then in Sections 7.2.1, 7.2.2 and 7.2.3, I show how the relevance-theoretic approach I 
adopted in my thesis enables me to reveal and explain cultural differences in 
communication in a more effective way than previous studies of culture and 
communication. Subsequent to this, I discuss, in Section 7.3, how my findings 
contribute to our understanding of cultural differences in communication between 
individualistic and collectivistic cultures, by focusing on Britain and China. I 
conclude this chapter with Section 7.4, in which I argue that on the basis of my 
previous discussions, it is the differences in contextual assumptions that are the cause 
of variations in interpretation, and it is the cause of cultural differences in 
communication; here, I also argue that there is no simple direct connection between 
culture and communication style, and that the use of direct and indirect style is not 
appropriate for characterising cultures.   
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7.2 Findings on differences in communication between MC and BE 
In this section, I summarise and evaluate what my empirical research has found about 
cultural differences in communication between MC and BE. I show how Relevance 
Theory provides a descriptive vocabulary and an explanatory framework that enable 
me to describe in greater detail the socio-cultural phenomenon that previous studies of 
culture and communication are unable to do.  
My data analysis shows that in the context of radio advice talk shows, (a) utterances 
produced by callers from China and Britain both require some degree of inferential 
work on the part of a hearer; (b) both sets of callers rely on markers of procedural 
meaning to guide the interpretation process being carried out by the hearer; (c) there is 
no correlation between culture and communication style, and (d) different 
interpretations are available if different contextual assumptions are activated in 
response to the utterances that make up my data. In the following three subsections, I 
show how the relevance-theoretic approach that I adopted in my thesis enables me to 
explain the observed phenomenon in a way that approaches adopted in previous 
studies of culture and communication preclude. 
7.2.1 All communication is indirect 
In this section, I show why the relevance theoretic approach I adopted in my thesis 
enables me to explain the issue of context better than the approaches adopted in 
existing studies of culture and communication. I further show how the relevance-
theoretic approach in this thesis enables me to explain the process of inference in a 
more effective way than previous studies of culture and communication. I also show 
what the relevance-theoretic approach in my thesis adds to studies of culture and 
communication in the analysis of communication style. 
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7.2.1.1 All utterances need a context 
I begin my discussion of cultural differences in communication with the direct and 
indirect distinction made by previous studies of culture and communication. I then 
show how and why this distinction is seen as problematic from the perspective of 
Relevance Theory. 
As I reviewed in Section 2.2.1.2, when arguing that one style counts as direct and 
another style counts as indirect, culture and communication researchers tend to 
attribute the differences between the two types of styles to the way in which the 
meaning of an utterance is expressed. For example, Adair and Brett (2004, 161) argue 
that when a speaker is using a direct style in a given utterance, the meaning of that 
utterance „is embedded in words or acts‟, whereas when a speaker is using an indirect 
style in a given utterance, the meaning of that utterance „is conveyed not just by a 
person‟s words or acts, but also by the contexts in which those words or acts are 
communicated‟. This implies that for Adair and Brett, some utterances may be 
understood without needing to draw on context. 
However, from the perspective of Relevance Theory, what this distinction indicates is 
that these scholars do not engage with the pragmatics of utterance interpretation. As I 
indicated in Section 3.2.1, what a speaker communicates is merely a piece of evidence 
of her „thought‟ or assumption, and „no assumption is simply decoded, and that the 
recovery of any assumption requires an element of inference‟ (Sperber and Wilson 
1995, 182). The required inferential process is governed by the principle of relevance, 
in that the meaning of an utterance may only be inferred with reference to the context 
in which it occurs by following the principle of relevance. This understanding leads us 
to assume that, as I have already shown in my literature review and my data analysis, 
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context is essential in interpreting any utterance. This means that all forms of 
utterance produced by speakers from any culture can only be meaningful if they are 
interpreted within a context. 
To illustrate how context is involved in interpreting any utterance, I now take one of 
Adair and Brett‟s (2004) cases, as I cited in Section 2.2.1.2 as an example.  
[7.1] 
[A] negotiator from a LC culture might suggest that his company is financially 
weak that without a good price, his company will not be able to buy the product 
at all (Adair and Brett 2004, 162). 
Adair and Brett categorise this case as being direct on the premise that „the 
negotiator‟s message is explicit‟ (2004, 162). As indicated in Section 2.2.1.2, the 
above example is a report from an utterance produced by a negotiator, it is unclear 
what actual utterance could be. For the purpose of my analysis, I therefore paraphrase 
the report on the basis of my understanding of the meaning of the message, as 
follows: 
My company is financially weak, and without a good price, my company will 
not be able to buy the product at all.  
Since the meaning of the expressions like „financially weak‟ and „a good price‟ is not 
made explicit, according to Recanati (2003, 7), these expressions are in need of 
„saturation‟ (i.e. a pragmatic process of contextual value-assignment that is triggered 
(and made obligatory) by something in the sentence itself). I assume, in the context of 
„buying products‟, that the expression „financially weak‟ may well refer to „not 
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having much money to buy products at a higher price‟, and that the term „a good 
price‟ may well refer to „a cheaper price‟. Consequently, the assumption derived from 
the paraphrase would be something like the following: 
My company does not have much money to buy products at a higher price, and 
without a cheaper price my company will not be able to buy the product at all.  
Although Adair and Brett (2004, 162) argue that the meaning of the negotiator from a 
LC culture is explicit, and they also attribute their own interpretation, namely that „if 
you do not give us a good price, we will not be able to buy from you‟ to the message, 
since they claim that context is not required for communication in LC cultures, they 
are therefore unable to explain how that meaning is arrived at.  
Drawing on Relevance Theory, it is relatively easy to see the contextual assumptions 
that hearers call on and yet are ignored by Adair and Brett as follows: 
To infer the relevance of what the negotiator was saying, the interlocutors would first 
assume that the negotiator‟s utterance is relevant to them, and they then resolve the 
ambiguities in the utterance by assuming that „my company‟ refers to the business 
company the negotiator belongs to, and „the product‟ refers to the product being 
offered, and also the one the negotiator wants to buy. All of this requires the 
interlocutors to draw on context, so the foreground is: even working out what is 
literally said (i.e explicatures) is context dependent. Only after contextually 
disambiguating the vague expressions can negotiators identify the resulting 
propositions, made manifest by the negotiator‟s utterance, as something like the 
following:  
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(a) The negotiator‟s company does not have much money to buy products at a 
higher price; 
(b) The negotiator‟s company will not be able to buy the product offered.  
The recovery of the propositions in (a) and (b) makes the following contextual 
assumption immediately accessible: 
(c) If a company does not have much money to buy products at a higher price, 
then the company is only able to buy a product at a lower price; 
(d) If the product price is higher, then the company is not able to buy it.  
A synthesis of the assumptions in (a-b) and (c-d) would lead the interlocutors to draw 
the contextual implication that: 
(e) The negotiator wants a lower price. 
It is evident, contrary to Adair and Brett‟s (2004) claim that context is not necessary 
for communication in LC cultures, my analysis shows that utterances produced by the 
negotiator from a LC culture do, indeed, need a context. As I have shown, assumption 
(e) could be derived only in the context of the assumptions (c) and (d) together. The 
implication is that without drawing on context, the assumption (e) is not self-evident 
to a hearer or an analyst. Although Adair and Brett (2004, 161) acknowledge that 
people in HC (collectivistic) cultures need to draw on context in order to understand 
what a speaker is saying, what they do not acknowledge is that this is actually the case 
for all forms of utterance produced by people from both HC and LC cultures. This 
indicates that Adair and Brett‟s (2004) claim ignores a fundamental aspect of the 
communication process.  
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My data is full of instances that indicate that context is integral to the interpretation of 
all forms of utterance. I now take only two as an illustration, one from each set: 
[7.2] 
C: my partner Mark erm he is ok. I love him to pieces and all that but he is just 
… he‟s not very happy with like all the stretch marks and all that.  
               (E07AD, see Section 5.2.1.2 of this thesis) 
[7.3] 
         C: 他   现在  跟   我  在  一个 屋  里  住       呀! 
              he      now    and      I      in       a    room   in   live     (exclamation) 
             He is living in the same room with me. 
            (C03XS, see Section 5.2.2.1 of this thesis) 
In [7.2], I inferred that the caller‟s utterances were designed to communicate the 
problem that the caller‟s stretch marks are having a negative effect on her sexual 
relationship with her partner Mark. To derive this interpretation, I initially had access 
to the contextual assumptions about British culture, made manifest by the caller‟s 
utterance, that (i) if two people are love partners, then they have a long-term stable 
sexual relationship. By combining what the caller explicitly said with the assumption 
in (i), I drew the contextual implication (ii) that the caller must have a stable sexual 
relationship with Mark. Because the caller used „but‟ to introduce her subsequent 
utterance, I was led to activate another set of contextual assumptions (iii) that if a man 
is not happy with the stretch marks his partner has, then the man would find his 
partner sexually unattractive, and (iv) If a man finds his partner sexually unattractive, 
then the man would no longer have a sexual relationship with the partner. Only when 
I combined the assumptions in (ii) and (iii) and (iv) would I finally draw the 
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contextual implication (v), namely that it is the caller‟s stretch marks that are having a 
negative effect on her sexual relationship with Mark. If we compare the assumption in 
(v) with the new information in the form of the caller‟s utterance, we can see that 
there is nothing in the linguistically encoded content of the caller‟s utterances that 
expresses the assumption in (v), and this meaning is actually derived through my 
assumptions about love partnership in Britain, together with the information conveyed 
in the caller‟s utterances. This means that assumption (v) is a context-dependent 
interpretation.  
In [7.3], I inferred that the caller‟s utterances are designed to communicate a problem 
that it is difficult for her to end her romantic relationship with her boyfriend who is 
already married. To arrive at this interpretation, I initially had access to contextual 
assumptions, made manifest by the caller‟s utterances, that (i) when two people in a 
romantic relationship live in one room, they normally live together consensually, and 
that (ii) if they live together consensually, it would be difficult for one of them to get 
rid of the other. Only when I combined the newly presented information (i.e. the 
caller‟s utterance) with the contextual assumptions in (i) and (ii) could I draw the 
contextual implication (iii) that it is difficult for the caller to end her relationship with 
her man. The assumption in (iii) is not self-evident to me, but a result of the 
interaction between the information conveyed in the caller‟s utterance and the 
contextual assumptions (i) and (ii) that I drew on in response to the utterance. 
Therefore, it is only with reference to context that I can generate the assumption in 
(iii).  
In the light of the above analysis, it is clear that unlike the study by Adair and Brett, 
who argue that context is required for communication in HC cultures only, evidence 
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from my data indicates that context is involved in interpreting utterances made by 
speakers from British culture, which as Hall (1976) argued, is a LC culture, as well as 
an individualistic culture argued by Hofstede (1980). Therefore, I argue that the 
distinction that Adair and Brett make between the use of direct and indirect style in 
different cultures, which emphasises that context is the key for understanding 
communication in HC cultures only, is problematic.  
To sum up, I have shown that my study, which draws on Relevance Theory, provides 
evidence to indicate that context is an essential part of the utterance interpretation 
process. In the next section, I show that the interpretation of an utterance in a context 
determines that inference is required for understanding utterances made by speakers 
from cultures that have been categorised as HC and those from cultures that have been 
categorised as LC. 
7.2.1.2 Inference required for communication in cultures that have 
been categorised as HC and LC 
This section aims to demonstrate that utterances produced by speakers of cultures that 
have been categorised as HC and LC both require the hearer to make inferences. I 
show that although existing studies of culture and communication claim that 
understanding communication in HC cultures involves a process of inference, because 
they neither acknowledge that this process is also required for communication in LC 
cultures, nor do they make explicit how hearers in HC cultures carry out the process 
of inference, they are therefore unable to explain how one style is direct and another 
style is indirect. I show that the relevance theoretic approach that I adopted in this 
thesis not only acknowledges that a process of inference is required for 
communication in cultures that have been categorised as HC and LC, but also makes 
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explicit how the process of inference works, I am therefore able to explain that the 
distinction between the use of direct and indirect style in different cultures is 
misleading. 
As I reviewed in Sections 2.2.2.3, while addressing cultural differences according to 
style, studies of culture and communication suggest that the difference between direct 
and indirect communication is that the former requires a hearer to decode the meaning 
of a speaker, whereas the latter requires a hearer to make some inference, as in the 
following quotation:  
[LC] refers to communication patterns of direct verbal mode…, the speaker is 
expected to be responsible for constructing a clear, persuasive message that the 
listener can decode easily. [HC] refers to communication patterns of indirect 
verbal mode …the receiver or interpreter of the message assumes the 
responsibility to infer the hidden or contextual meaning of the message (Ting-
Toomey 1999, 100-101).  
However, as I discussed in the previous section, an utterance produced by a speaker of 
any culture „is only a piece of evidence about the communicator‟s intentions, and has 
to be used inferentially and in a context‟ (Sperber and Wilson 1995, 170). This 
intention can only emerge if a hearer or an analyst processes the evidence in a specific 
context, by carrying out a process of inference. When a hearer or an analyst has 
recognised the intention, it is the result of inference made by a hearer or an analyst. In 
the case of direct and indirect communication, this means that utterances produced by 
speakers from high and low context cultures all require inference. This is in direct 
opposition to the view held by Ting-Toomey (1999).  
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From the perspective of Relevance Theory, the reason that different forms of 
utterances all require inference is that, when the utterances are processed within the 
context in which they are produced (via interaction between old and new 
information), they all lead a hearer to undertake the following three basic stages of 
inferential processes: 
(i) The hearer assigns a propositional form to the utterance by resolving 
ambiguities in the language used and assigning referents to deictic words; 
(ii) The hearer selects a context (a set of contextual assumptions) that would 
allow the speaker‟s utterance to be perceived as relevant; 
 (iii) By a synthesis of evidence of (i) and (ii), the hearer makes an assumption 
of the speaker‟s intention.  
(Sperber and Wilson 1995, 108, also see Section 3.1.2 of this thesis).  
By way of illustration that inference is essential to understanding all utterances, I now 
use Ting-Toomey‟s own data (see Section 2.2.1.2 for the details) as an example. 
[7.4]  
(A dispute between two European American neighbours) 
Jane (knocks on her neighbour’s open window): Excuse me, it is 11 o‟clock already, 
and your high-pitched opera singing is really disturbing my sleep. Please stop 
your gargling noises immediately! I have an important job interview tomorrow 
morning, and I want to get a good night sleep. I really need this job to pay my 
rent. 
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Diane (resentfully): Well, this is the only time I can rehearse my opera! I‟ve an 
important audition coming up tomorrow. You‟re not the only one that is 
starving, you know. I also need to pay my rent. Stop being so self-centred! 
Ting-Toomey categorises the talk involving two Japanese women as indirect (see 
Section 2.2.1.2), but categorises the talk between the two Americans in the above 
dispute as direct, on the premise that „their interaction exchange is direct, to the 
point‟, and Jane and Diane „use the strengths of low-context, explicit talk in dealing 
with the conflict issue openly and nonevaluatively‟. This implies that, for Ting-
Toomey, when hearing the above utterances made by the two Americans, hearers do 
not need to undertake a process of inference to identify the intention of the 
communicator. Drawing upon Relevance Theory, it is relatively easy to see the 
inferential work that hearers need to undertake, and yet which is ignored by Ting-
Toomey, as follows: 
From the relevance theoretic point of view, upon hearing Jane‟s utterance „please stop 
your gargling noises immediately‟, Diane would first assume that the information 
carried in the utterance is relevant to her, and she then resolves the ambiguities by 
assuming that „your‟ refers to Diane‟s, „gargling noises‟ refers to the noise made by 
her own singing, and „immediately‟ refers to the moment after the utterance is made. 
Diane would then identify the following resulting proposition: 
(a) Jane is telling Diane to stop singing right now. 
On the basis of previous information that „your high-pitched opera singing is really 
disturbing my sleep‟, Diane may identify that the recovery of the proposition in (a) 
makes the following contextual assumption immediately accessible:  
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(b)  In normal circumstances, if one tells the other to stop singing because of 
disturbing one‟s sleep, then this one is making a compliant.   
The two assumptions in (a) and (b) together would lead Diane to draw the contextual 
implication that: 
(c) Jane is making a complaint about her (i.e. Diane‟s) singing.  
In the light of above analysis, it is clear that in the culture that Ting-Toomey 
characterises as using a direct style, it is necessary to employ an inferential process to 
interpret an utterance. Although Ting-Toomey (1998, 104) acknowledges that an 
utterance produced by a communicator in a HC culture like Japan and China requires 
a process of inference, what she ignores is that „every act of interpretation involves 
inference‟ (Clark 2009b, 6), and that the process of inference contributes to 
understanding all forms of utterance produced by speakers from cultures that have 
been categorised as HC and LC. Moreover, although Ting-Toomey does, indeed, 
acknowledge that a process of inference is required for communication in HC 
cultures, she does not explain how that inference is made (see Section 2.2.2.3). 
Because of this, Ting-Toomey is unable to explain how one style can be categorised 
as direct and another style can be categorised as indirect. As I showed above, even the 
initial stage, where Diane works out what proposition the utterance produced by Jane 
is likely to be expressing (by assigning referents, resolving lexical ambiguities and 
enrichment) is an inferential process. As I showed, without Diane‟s (as a hearer) 
inferential work, by going through the above three stages, the assumption in (c) 
cannot emerge. This indicates that within the framework of Relevance Theory, direct 
and indirect forms of style categorised by Ting-Toomey (1998) both fall into the 
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category of indirect style, in that they both require some inferential work on the part 
of a hearer. 
There is a great deal of evidence in my data that indicates that in most cases, neither 
set of callers indicates their meaning unequivocally, but they both produce utterances 
that require a substantial amount of inference (see Chapter Five). I now take two 
examples from my data as an illustration, one from each set. 
[7.5] 
(1) H: Was he working at the time to fund his // 
(2) C: //He is al … this is it he‟s always working he‟s ALWAYS ALWAYS working. 
(3) H: Alright so why was he borrowing cash off you then?  
          (E01GT) 
[7.6] 
(1) C: 我  喜欢上    了       一个 比  我 大  一  轮 的 一个  女的. 
           I      like    (post-verb particle)  a   than  I    big   a  round  of      a      lady 
           I‟m in a relationship with a lady who is A ROUND OLDER than me. 
 (2)  H: 啊 (hahaha). 
             Ah  (hahaha) 
             Ah  (hahaha). 
             (C02LY) 
In [7.5], although the caller ostensively communicated the assumption (i) that „her 
partner had enough money, and therefore did not have to borrow money from the 
caller‟ by her utterance of „he‟s always always working‟, she did this, in Sperber and 
Wilson‟s (1995, 178) terms, „not by saying so, but by providing direct evidence‟ in 
the form of her utterance that he had. By contrast, there is nothing in the encoded 
content of the caller‟s utterance in (2) that expresses the assumption in (i). I derive 
 256 
 
that assumption purely inferentially, on the basis that working excessively (along with 
my existing knowledge of working in paid employment) means that the partner had 
enough money. Therefore, the utterances produced by the English caller require 
inference. 
Likewise, in [7.6], the caller‟s statement communicates the information (ii) that „his 
romantic relationship with his lady is seen as inappropriate in Chinese society‟ by his 
utterance in [7.6 (1)]. Again, the caller did this by providing direct evidence that it is. 
Notice that the assumption in (ii) does not follow just from the information carried in 
the utterance in [7.6 (1)]. It is actually the result of inference that I make by 
combining the new information with other immediately accessible contextual 
assumptions, which in this case appear to be my knowledge of Chinese culture that it 
is not an appropriate romantic relationship in Chinese society if a woman is a lot older 
than a man. Therefore, the utterances produced by the Chinese caller also involve 
some inferential work being carried out on the part of a hearer. 
As the above analysis has shown, inference is an integral part of interpreting all forms 
of utterance produced by speakers from both HC and LC cultures. This, again, 
indicates that the direct and indirect communication that Ting-Toomey (1999) 
identifies both fall into the category of indirect communication, in that they both 
require inference. On this basis, I take the stance that the distinction between the use 
of direct and indirect style that Ting-Toomey employs to categorise cultures is 
misleading.  
To sum up, the evidence that my study has brought to light in my own data analysis 
adds a layer of description and explanation to the study by Ting-Toomey, namely that 
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utterances produced by speakers from cultures that have been categorised as HC and 
LC all require a process of inference. As I show later in Section 7.2.3, the 
acknowledgement that inference is involved in interpreting any utterance produced by 
speakers from the two types of cultures has further implications for our understanding 
of differences in interpretation, which is important for our understanding the 
relationship between culture and communication. 
In the next section, I discuss how Relevance Theory provides an account that enables 
me to add a new level of explanation of the issue of communication style to studies of 
culture and communication, which such studies currently do not have.  
7.2.1.3 Markers of procedural meaning occur in cultures that have 
been categorised as HC and LC 
In this section, I show how my data analysis provides evidence to indicate that the 
issue of communication style can be addressed by focusing on markers of procedural 
meaning. I also show how evidence from my empirical analysis indicates that 
communication style of cultures that have been categorised as HC and LC  is indirect, 
and that speakers from cultures that have been categorised as HC and LC use markers 
of procedural meaning to guide a hearer‟s interpretation process.  
In Section 2.2.1.2, I showed that the previous studies of culture and communication 
have characterized individualistic (LC) and collectivistic (HC) cultures as using direct 
and indirect styles respectively. However, as my discussion in the previous two 
sections shows, utterances produced by speakers belonging to both types of culture, 
i.e. speakers of MC and BE, use communication that is indirect. In the light of the 
application of Relevance Theory in my data analysis, I argue that the notion of direct 
and indirect communication as a way of addressing cultural differences should be 
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abandoned. In what follows, by drawing on Relevance Theory, my study offers an 
alternative perspective from which the issue of communication style can be studied. 
In Section 3.2.2, I showed that within the framework of Relevance Theory, „there is 
no guarantee that the interpretation that satisfies the hearer‟s expectation of relevance 
will be the correct, i.e. the intended, one‟ (Wilson 1994, 47). As a result, a speaker 
who wants to be understood engages in the communication by using markers of 
procedural meaning which enable a hearer to recognize her intentions. On that basis, I 
argued that the styles of speakers of any culture are indirect, including those that 
relevant literature has defined as using „direct style‟.  Drawing on Relevance Theory, 
I show that this is exactly what happens in my data as well as the data provided by 
previous studies of culture and communication. I now take one case from Adair and 
Brett‟s data (2004), as I cited in Section 2.2.2.2, as an example. According to Adair 
and Brett, in response to a question of whether a product can be sold at the price 
offered, a seller from a HC culture tends to say something like (a) to imply that the 
price offered for the product is too low to be accepted. A buyer from a LC culture 
tends to say something like (b) to make a direct refusal to offer a higher price. 
[7.7] 
 Indirect style 
(a) We are an award-winning film studio and therefore get higher prices for our 
production.  
 Direct style 
(b)  Even though your studio has won awards for its film series, you‟ve moved this 
series into syndication a year early, so you cannot expect a high price under those 
market conditions (adapted from Adair and Brett 2004, 165). 
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As I reviewed in Section 2.2.2.2, Adair and Brett categorise (a) as indirect, but 
categorise (b) as direct. However, drawing on Relevance Theory, we can see that both 
set of utterances themselves do not explicitly indicate the intended meaning. For 
example, although the negotiator in (a) has ostensively communicated the assumption 
(i) that the negotiator wants higher price for the production the negotiator’s film 
studio has produced by her utterance, this assumption, in Sperber and Wilson‟s (1995, 
178) terms, bears no relation to the semantic content of the utterance. Interlocutors 
need to undertake a process of inference to derive that assumption. To help hearers 
identify this assumption, the negotiator uses a marker „therefore’ in her utterance. The 
contribution of the connective does not impact on the propositional meaning of the 
utterance that contains it, but it is there to indicate that the segment before the 
connective is a premise, and segment introduced by „therefore‟ is a conclusion. 
The process of inference is also required for understanding (b). What the negotiator in 
(b) is communicating but not explicitly saying is that (ii) we cannot offer you a higher 
price because your studio has not moved the series into syndication for long. Since 
the negotiator does not explicitly state the relationship between the price of the series 
and the length of the series‟ being moved into syndication, I do not really understand 
what the negotiator meant by saying „you‟ve moved this series into syndication a year 
early’ and its relationship with „price‟. However, I simplistically assume, based on my 
understanding of the connective „so‟ that it may imply that the price of the series is 
devalued, because of the short period of being moved into syndication. This indicates 
that the proposition that precedes „so‟ is not self-evidently meaningful. It is the 
negotiator‟s use of „so‟ that gives the interlocutors a clue that there is a casual 
relationship between the propositions expressed in the two states divided by „so‟. As a 
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result, the interlocutors derive the assumption in (ii) with the least inferential effort. It 
is plausible to claim that in both cases, without the help of these connectives, it may 
not be easy for the interlocutors to interpret the utterances in accordance with the way 
they are intended. 
As seen in the above two cases, both cultures rely on inferential work being carried 
out on the part of the hearer, and to that extent, both are „indirect‟. As my analysis of 
Adair and Brett‟s data shows, it is the presence of markers of procedural meaning that 
makes the inference easier. What this indicates is that, within the framework of 
Relevance Theory, markers of procedural meaning are used in cultures that Adair and 
Brett have categorised as using „direct‟ and „indirect‟ style.  
The use of markers of procedural meaning is not limited to the data provided by Adair 
and Brett. As my data analysis in Chapter Five shows, the inferential processes are 
involved in interpreting utterances produced by callers from both China and Britain. 
In order to help hearers to work out with the least processing effort the problems they 
were attempting to articulate, both sets of callers help the hearers by using markers of 
procedural meaning in their utterances. To illustrate, I now take two examples from 
my data, one from each set.   
[7.8] 
 (1) C: Yeah we‟ve ALWAYS spent family er family Christmas together                                
ALWAYS. 
 (2)  H: Um-hum. 
 (3)  C: Erm but  as I say they‟ve just recently moved away. 
           (E01JD) 
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[7.9] 
 (4)  C:  我  发现  他  有   家 .     
              I     found     he   has   family     
              I found he is married. 
 
  (5)  C: 后来吧  我 就  退出来      了. 
              later         I    so   withdrew  (postverbal   particle) 
              So I withdrew. 
             (C03SX) 
In each case, the caller‟s utterance may generate different interpretations according to 
different contexts. However, in both cases, the callers use markers of procedural 
meaning to limit my possible interpretations. When I interpret these utterances, I am 
aware that the contribution of markers of procedural meaning does not add anything 
new to the proposition expressed in the utterances that contain them, but they provide 
a clue as to how to select the contextual assumptions. As a result of this process, I am 
able to draw the contextual implications. For example, in [7.8], I was led by prosody 
assigned to the word „always‟ to activate the contextual assumption (i) that it has 
become a tradition that  the caller‟s family and her niece‟s family spend Christmas 
together at her niece‟s home. It is only when I perceived the word „always‟ that I 
would be encouraged to derive the contextual implication (ii) that the caller would 
spend Christmas as she normally does. Thus, as I showed, my interpretation of the 
caller‟s utterances involved a great deal of inferential work, and it is under the 
guidance of prosody that I succeeded in selecting the contextual assumption in (i) and 
finally drew the contextual implication in (ii).  
Moreover, the propositions expressed in (1) and (3) are not self-evident. If „but‟ were 
not there, it would have been hard for me to identify the logical connections between 
 262 
 
them, and thus it would be difficult for me to infer the caller‟s intention. I may 
possibly see (1) as a premise leading to the conclusion in (3), or I may see (3) as a 
premise and (1) as a conclusion. However, 
[F]or an utterance to be understood, it must have one and only one interpretation 
consistent with the principle of relevance – one and only one interpretation, that 
is, on which a rational speaker might have thought it would have enough effects 
to be worth the hearer‟s attention, and put the hearer to no gratuitous effort in 
obtaining the intended effect (Wilson and Sperber 1992, 69). 
It is the presence of „but‟ that gives me a clue that the „but‟ segment is intended to 
achieve relevance by contradicting or eliminating the assumption (ii), which finally 
leads me to successfully draw the contextual implication (iii) that there is some 
impediment to the caller‟s being able to celebrate Christmas as she normally does. It 
can be argued that, without the guidance of „but‟, the assumption in (iii) would not be 
made so strongly manifest.  
Similar to [7.8], the caller in [7.9] formulates her utterances by means of markers of 
procedural meaning in the way that certain contextual assumptions are triggered 
before others. For example, the caller adds „so‟ in (5). The presence of „so‟ gives me a 
clue that the relationship between (4) and (5) the caller is envisaging is that the former 
is a premise for the deduction of the proposition expressed by the latter. Under the 
guidance of „so‟, I successfully reached the contextual implication (iv) that the caller 
discovers that the man (i.e. 他) the caller in the relationship with is married, and as a 
consequence, the caller decides to end the relationship with the man. Again, there is 
nothing in the linguistically encoded information that expresses the assumption 
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indicated in (iv). It could be derived only by drawing the inference, guided by the 
connective „so‟.  
Hence, Relevance Theory provides me with a theoretical framework that has a 
descriptive vocabulary which allows me to account for the processes involved in 
meaning generation. As such, it allows me to explain what makes an utterance more 
or less direct in a way that other approaches do not.  
What I want to suggest here is that, as I showed in examples [7.7 – 7.9], if a speaker 
intends to explicitly direct a hearer‟s attention to a specific set of contextual 
assumptions, and thus points the hearer to the intended interpretation, the actual form 
of markers of procedural meaning a caller uses can vary, but this will not affect the 
fact that the contribution of these markers does not convey any distinct propositions in 
the caller‟s utterance, but simply alters the strength of that utterance by making the 
contextual assumption and cognitive effects immediately available.  
7.2.1.4 Summary 
My argument in this section has been that my present research, which draws on 
Relevance Theory, provides a way that allows me to demonstrate that the styles of HC 
and LC cultures are both indirect, in that the inferential processes are involved in 
interpreting utterances produced by callers from both China and Britain. Both sets of 
caller use markers of procedural meaning to help hearers identify the problems they 
were trying to articulate.  
7.2.2 The relationship between culture and communication style 
My goal in this section is to show how the relevance-theoretic approach that I adopted 
in this thesis enables me to demonstrate that culture is not related to communication 
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style in the way that studies of culture and communication have argued. On this basis, 
I argue that the relationship between culture and communication can be more 
effectively addressed if we focus on what hearers actually do. 
7.2.2.1 Communication style in cultures that have been categorised as 
HC and LC is indirect 
Strictly speaking, this section reiterates many of the issues that I have discussed in the 
previous section. However, since it is widely accepted in studies of culture and 
communication that cultures can be distinguished in terms of the use of direct and 
indirect style, I regard it important to make explicit how communication style is used 
in cultures that have been categorised as HC and LC by earlier studies of culture and 
communication. My goal in this section is to argue that communication style of the 
two types of culture is indirect. 
In Sections 2.2.1.2 and 2.2.2.2, I showed that, while addressing cultural differences in 
communication, earlier studies of culture and communication argue that the 
relationship between culture and communication can be addressed according to the 
use of direct and indirect style. For example, Fujishin (2007) argues that in the context 
of business negotiation, there are differences in the use of communication style 
between different cultures, as follows: 
In a low-context style, verbal communication is very direct, precise, explicit and 
literal….[In HC cultures] verbal communication is indirect, subtle, implicit and 
figurative….you are expected to read between the lines and understand what the 
speaker is intending to communicate without being told or instructed with explicit 
details (Fujishin 2007, 69). 
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This claim assumes that communication style in LC cultures is direct, whereas 
communication style in HC cultures is indirect. 
However, as I discussed in the previous section (see Section 7.2.1.3), since from the 
perspective of Relevance Theory, „there is no guarantee that the interpretation that 
satisfies the hearer‟s expectation of relevance will be the correct, i.e. the intended, 
one‟ (Wilson 1994, 47). Consequently, a speaker tends to use markers of procedural 
meaning to enable a hearer to recognise what the speaker is intending to 
communicate. In Section 7.2.1.3, I argued that evidence from Adair and Brett‟s 
(2004) data as well as my own data has shown that markers of procedural meaning are 
used by speakers from cultures that have been categorised as LC and those that have 
been categorised as HC. I would argue that the presence of markers of procedural 
meaning in both types of cultures indicates that communication style of the two types 
of cultures is indirect. This view stands in strong contrast to that of Fujishin (2007). 
On the basis of evidence as well as what I have discussed above, I argue that 
Fujishin‟s claim that the relationship between culture and communication can be 
addressed in terms of direct and indirect style is problematic.  
To sum up, unlike the argument made by Fujishin (2007) that cultures can be 
characterised by the use of direct and indirect style, the evidence that has emerged 
from my current empirical study is that communication styles of cultures that have 
been categorised as LC and those that have been categorised as HC are all indirect, in 
that speakers belonging to both types of cultures employ markers of procedural 
meaning to guide the interpretation process.  
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In the next section, I show that the fact that communication style of the two types of 
cultures is indirect determines that there is no correlation between culture and 
communication.  
7.2.2.2 No correlation between culture and communication style 
In Section 2.2.2.2, I showed that previous studies of culture and communication argue 
that there is a strong correlation between culture and communication style (e.g. Adair 
and Brett 2004; Fujishin 2007; Neuliep, 2006; Pekerti and Thomas 2003). For 
example, Pekerti and Thomas argue that 
Overall, the results of our analysis provide support … [that] cultural differences 
in communication styles…were evident across cultures. An idiocentric 
communication style was dominant for Pakeha….In contrast, a sociocentric style 
was dominant for Asians (2003, 145).  
There, I also argued that Pekerti and Thomas‟ work has fallen into what Cameron 
(1995) calls a „correlational fallacy‟ because although Pekerti and Thomas make the 
claim that culture is closely connected to communication style, they do not actually 
provide any evidence to indicate how the correlation is made. Without explaining how 
culture is related to communication style, it is therefore not clear how, or if, culture 
and communication style are related to each other. 
By drawing on Relevance Theory, as I discussed in the previous sections, 
communication style of cultures that have been categorised as HC and those that have 
been categorised as LC is indirect, in that understanding utterances produced by 
speakers from both types of cultures involves inference. In order to help hearers to 
identify the intended meaning of their utterances, both sets of callers use markers of 
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procedural meaning to guide the interpretation process. The evidence that 
communication style of both types of cultures is indirect indicates that there is no 
direct connection between culture and communication style. This, in turn, indicates 
that cultural difference does not result from the use of direct and indirect 
communication style. This is in strong opposition to the view held by Pekerti and 
Thomas. In the light of Relevance Theory and evidence from my study, I argue that 
Pekerti and Thomas‟ argument that culture is connected to communication style is 
problematic.  
Hence, Relevance Theory provides me with a theoretical framework which has an 
explicit vocabulary that enables me to reveal that there is no direct connection 
between culture and communication style.  
7.2.2.3 Conclusion 
My argument in this section has been that my present research, which draws on 
Relevance Theory, provides a way that allows me to demonstrate that the styles of HC 
and LC cultures are both indirect, in that the inferential processes are involved in 
interpreting utterances produced by callers from both China and Britain. Both set of 
callers use markers of procedural meaning to help hearers identify the problems they 
were constructing. On the basis of this evidence, I have also argued that there is no 
direct and positive correlation between the style used in communication and the 
underlying culture.  
In the light of Relevance Theory and my above discussion, I argue that the direct and 
indirect dichotomy needs to be questioned if the relationship between culture and 
communication is to be understood. Given that the claims made by the existing 
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studies of culture and communication ignore a fundamental aspect of communication 
process, I argue that moving from a focus on how an utterance is produced in terms of 
style to the study of how meaning of an utterance is generated may yield new insights 
into the relationship between culture and communication. My study seeks to open up 
a debate about cultural differences by focusing on what hearers actually do. The goal 
of the next section is to discuss what the relevance theoretic approach that I adopted 
in this thesis can add to existing studies of culture and communication, and the 
analysis of interpretation in particular.   
7.2.3 On differences in interpretation 
In this section, I show that my data provide evidence to indicate that different 
interpretations are available if hearers choose different contextual assumptions as 
evidence to interpret a given utterance. I also show that evidence from my study 
indicates that bicultural individuals are flexible in the use of the knowledge they 
access in response to an utterance.  
In the section that follows, I begin my discussion of differences in interpretation with 
the notion of context, since context or contextual assumptions play a crucial role in 
understanding how a hearer generates an interpretation and how different 
interpretations are generated in a specific context.   
7.2.3.1 Context selection is a dynamic process 
In this section, I show that Relevance Theory provides a framework that enables me 
to explain that context selection is a dynamic part of the process of working out what 
a speaker is saying. I show that since the approaches adopted in previous studies of 
culture and communication view context as an element determined before the process 
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of comprehension, they are unable to explain how meaning is generated in a context. I 
show that the relevance-theoretic approach that I adopted in this thesis studies context 
as resulting from the dynamic process of selection, more specifically, I show that the 
dynamic constructivist approach that I adopted in this study views culture as a 
meaning system that can be accessed by a cultural group, I am therefore not only able 
to explain how a hearer generates an interpretation in a specific context, but also how 
culture is dynamic.  
In Section 2.2.2.3, I showed that while addressing cultural differences in 
communication, relevant studies of culture and communication argue that there are 
differences in interpretation between people with distinct cultural backgrounds. For 
example, Ting-Toomey (1998, 125) argues that in the „airport ride request‟ scenes 
below, Americans and Chinese generate different interpretations for an utterance that 
expresses the same propositional content.  
[7.10] 
Scene 1: 
American 1: We‟re going to New Orleans this weekend. 
American 2: What fun!  I wish we were going with you. How long are you going to 
be there? [If she wants a ride, she will ask] 
American 1: Three days. By the way, we may need a ride to the airport. Do you think 
you can take us? 
American 2: Sure. What time? 
American 1: 10:30 pm, this coming Saturday. 
 
 
 
 
 270 
 
Scene 2: 
Chinese 1: We‟re going to New Orleans this weekend. 
Chinese 2: What fun!  I wish we were going with you. How long are you going to be 
there? 
Chinese 1: Three days [I hope she‟ll offer me a ride to the airport]. 
Chinese 2: [She may want me to give her a ride] Do you need a ride to the airport? I‟ll 
take you. 
Chinese 1: Are you sure it‟s not too much trouble? 
Chinese 2: It‟s no trouble at all.  
(Ting-Toomey 1999, 104 adapted, and also see Section 2.2.2.3 of this thesis). 
According to Ting-Toomey (1999, 104), if an American wants a ride, she will ask 
directly, and consequently, inference is not necessary. In contrast, „in the Chinese 
culture such requests for help are likely to be implied rather than stated explicitly and 
directly‟, and as a result, hearers have to make some inference to identify whether the 
communicator needs a ride to the airport. This claim assumes a strong correlation 
between cultural background and difference in interpretation. 
However, Ting-Toomey does not explain how culture impacts on interpretation. Since 
a speaker does not explicitly state that her utterance is intended to generate different 
interpretations, if a hearer from any culture is to understand the proposition expressed 
in the speaker‟s utterance, he must carry out some degree of inference. Without an 
explanation that draws upon a hearer‟s inferential work, the approach adopted by 
Ting-Toomey would only suggest that the speaker‟s utterance itself would 
automatically give rise to predictable and distinct interpretations. The implication of 
this is that culture is static, context is determined before the interpretation process 
starts, and therefore interpretation can be predicted, according to the cultural 
background of the speaker.  
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However, from the perspective of Relevance Theory, context is „seen as a matter of 
choice and as part of the interpretation process itself‟ (Sperber and Wilson 1995, 141). 
An utterance can only achieve contextual effects if the newly presented information 
interacts with a context of existing assumptions in the way of either strengthening, or 
contradicting and eliminating, or combining with an existing assumption. This means 
that within the framework of Relevance Theory, interpretation of any utterance 
involves, on the part of a hearer, the selection of particular contextual assumptions in 
order to achieve contextual effects. More importantly, context within Relevance 
Theory „is not limited to information about the immediate physical environment or the 
immediately preceding utterances‟ and it may also include „general cultural 
assumptions‟ (Sperber and Wilson 1995, 16). By drawing on the argument made by 
Hong (2009) in her dynamic constructivist approach that culture guides our 
information processing only when cultural assumptions are triggered or activated in 
response to a stimulus, I argue that culture is dynamic because people draw on 
cultural knowledge to interpret an utterance. This dynamic view of culture stands in 
strong contrast with the static view of culture Ting-Toomey holds.  
Applying Relevance Theory to the analysis of the above „airport ride request‟ scenes, 
it is relatively easy to see that context defines the way how the same utterance is 
perceived as I show below:  
From the perspective of Relevance Theory, while interpreting an utterance like „three 
days‟ in Ting-Toomey‟s above data, both American 2 and Chinese 2 would first 
assume that the information carried in this utterance is relevant to them, and they 
would then enrich „three days‟ by assuming that „three days‟ refers to „we’re going to 
New Orleans for three days this weekend’. The American 2 (or Chinese 2) would 
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assume that the pronoun „we‟ refers to the group including American 1 (or Chinese 1) 
and that „New Orleans‟ is the city different from where American 1‟s (or Chinese 1‟s) 
group is living, and that „this weekend‟ refers to the coming weekend after the 
utterance is being made. The American 2 would then identify the following resulting 
proposition: 
(a) The American 1‟s group is going to New Orleans for three days at the 
weekend after the utterance is being made. 
The recovery of the proposition in (a) makes the following contextual assumption 
immediately accessible: 
(b) In normal circumstances, if people go to somewhere at the weekend, they 
will have a great time.  
The two assumptions in (a) and (b) together would lead American 2 to draw the 
contextual implication that: 
(c) The American 1‟s group will have a great time in New Orleans. 
In contrast, having resolved the ambiguities in the utterance produced by Chinese 1, 
Chinese 2 would identify the following resulting proposition: 
(d) The Chinese 1‟s group is going to New Orleans for three days at the 
weekend after the utterance is being made.  
The recovery of the proposition in (d) makes the following contextual assumption 
immediately accessible:  
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(e) In Chinese society, if an individual is going to a city foreign to one‟s own, 
then the individual needs a ride to the airport to take the flight; 
(f) Even if the individual requests help, it is not polite to ask directly. 
(g) The interlocutors need to ask whether the individual requests help in order to 
show respect. 
By combining the assumptions in (d) and (e-g), Chinese 2 draws the following 
contextual implication: 
(h) I need to ask if Chinese 1 needs a ride to the airport.  
The interpretation in (h) is supported by the question raised by Chinese 2 in Ting-
Toomey‟s data: do you need a ride to the airport? I‟ll take you.  
From the above analysis, it is evident that although Ting-Toomey might be right, in 
that there is no evidence that American 2 is making inferences about the need to offer 
a lift, my analysis has shown that American 2 would still be required to make some 
inferences. As my analysis shows, the identification of the intended interpretations as 
in (c) and (h) respectively by American 2 and Chinese 2 clearly depends on their 
choice of context respectively in the assumptions in (b) and (e-g), which in this case 
appear to be their respective cultural specific knowledge, and that the choice of 
context is part of the comprehension process. As I have shown, both American 2 and 
Chinese 2 draw on their respective cultural knowledge to interpret the same utterance, 
this indicates that culture is indeed dynamic. Since Ting-Toomey assumes that culture 
is a fixed set of values and norms, and that context is a feature determined in advance 
of the comprehension process, she is therefore unable to explain how differences in 
interpretation are caused by cultures.  
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There is a great deal of evidence in my data to indicate that context is a result of a 
dynamic process of selection. I now take only one among the many as an illustration.  
[7.11] 
C:  昨天       又     吵    起来         了. 
     Yesterday     again    argue      up      (sentence final particle) 
     We argued  again yesterday.  
 
H: 嗯. 
    Em 
Ok 
   (C03HM) 
As I have shown in Section 5.2.2.3, when interpreting the caller‟s utterance in this 
case, it is easy to assume that the immediate contextual assumptions I as a hearer 
would choose (under the guidance of prosody assigned to „again‟) are that (i) it is not 
the first time the caller and her husband argued; (ii) in Chinese society where family 
harmony is strongly valued, it is seen as a big problem if husbands and wives argue. 
Processed in the context containing the assumptions (i) and (ii), the caller‟s utterance 
would yield contextual effect (iii) that the caller and her husband often argue, which is 
a serious problem for the couple. In this scenario, it is hard for me to pin down what 
other interpretation would be relevant enough to justify the caller‟s speech and the 
interpretation in (iii) is basically the only possible one.  
Hence, the relevance-theoretic approach that I adopted in my thesis not only allows 
me to reveal and explain that  
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[I]t is not that first the context is determined, and then relevance is assessed. On 
the contrary, people hope that the assumption being processed is relevant (or else 
they would not bother to process it at all), and they try to select a context which 
will justify the hope: a context which will maximise relevance. In verbal 
comprehension in particular, it is relevance which is treated as given, and context 
which is treated as a variable (Sperber and Wilson 1995, 142). 
It also enables me to reveal and explain that an interpretation is „a synthesis of old and 
new information, a result of interaction between the two‟ (Sperber and Wilson 1995, 
108). More specifically, by drawing on both Relevance Theory and a dynamic 
constructivist approach, I am able to explain that people draw on cultural knowledge 
in response to an utterance. Because of this, culture is dynamic. Since Ting-Toomey is 
constrained by her assumptions that culture is static, and that context is a feature 
determined in advance of the process of comprehension, she is unable to provide 
empirical data to indicate how an interpretation is generated. On the basis of my 
empirical evidence, I argue that although Ting-Toomey makes the claim about 
differences in interpretation between hearers from different cultures, without access to 
data which would indicate how a hearer makes sense of what a speaker says, her 
discovery of differences in interpretations is of limited value.  
In the next section, I show that studying context as a result of a dynamic process of 
selection has a significant effect on our understanding of differences in interpretation 
between hearers from different cultures, which is important for our understanding the 
relationship between culture and communication.  
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7.2.3.2 Differences in contextual assumptions lead to differences in 
interpretation 
In this section, I draw on my data analysis to indicate that the claim made by previous 
studies of culture and communication that there are differences in interpretation can 
be addressed by contextual assumptions hearers draw on in response to an utterance. I 
show how evidence from my study indicates that different interpretations are 
available if hearers use distinct contextual assumptions to infer the relevance of what 
a speaker has said.  
As I noted in the previous section, Ting-Toomey is limited by her methodology, 
working as it does on the assumption that culture is static and that context is 
determined before the process of comprehension gets under way, and therefore she is 
unable to explain how meaning is generated dynamically. Based on the premise that 
there is no evidence to indicate how an interpretation actually occurs, it would be 
impossible to sustain her claim about the differences in interpretations between 
cultures once the process of interpretation is foregrounded.  
Applying Relevance Theory to my study, I argue that, as indicated in Section 3.1.2, in 
order for hearers to generate the same interpretations, there must be some degree of 
overlap in their cognitive environment, since they draw on this when generating 
contextual assumptions. If people have been brought up in different cultures, they 
may not overlap in their cognitive environment. Consequently, „they can construct 
different representations and make different inferences‟ (Sperber and Wilson 1995, 
38). When interpreting „a given utterance‟, they may interpret it in different ways, in 
that they use distinct contextual assumptions in response to an utterance. What this 
adds to Ting-Toomey‟s „airport ride request‟ scenes is that the variations in 
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interpretations between two U.S. Americans and two Chinese can be addressed by 
focusing on contextual assumptions. From the perspective of Relevance Theory, we 
can see that Chinese 2 and American 2 use distinct contextual assumptions in 
response to the utterance „three days‟. The differences in contextual assumptions 
available to them can be seen in my analysis in Section 7.2.2.1. As my analysis 
indicates, because the cognitive environment of American 2 does not overlap with 
that of Chinese 2, American 2 does not have the assumptions activated by Chinese 2 
that (i) if an individual is going to a city foreign to one‟s own, then the individual 
needs a ride to the airport to take the flight, that (ii) even if the individual requests  
help, it is not polite to ask directly, and that (iii) the interlocutors need to ask whether 
the individual needs help in order to show respect. As a result, according to Ting-
Toomey, Chinese 2 and American 2 understand the utterance of „three days‟ in 
different ways: Chinese 2 sees the utterance of „three days‟ as designed to 
communicate an assumption that Chinese 2 needs to ask if Chinese 1 needs a lift to 
the airport. In contrast, American 2 sees the same utterance as designed to 
communicate an assumption that American 1‟s group will have a great time in New 
Orleans. Thus, only if context is seen as a result of a dynamic process is it possible to 
show how differences in interpretation between hearers from different cultures are 
caused by the contextual assumptions the hearers activate. Since differences in 
contextual assumptions lead to differences in interpretations between hearers from 
different cultures, this shows that it is not the utterance that is direct or indirect (it is 
the same utterance in each case), it is the contextual assumptions that are generated by 
the Chinese speaker that cause different interpretations in the English version. This 
indicates that cultural differences do not lie in communication styles, but are realised 
by activating different contextual assumptions in response to an utterance that 
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expresses the same propositional content. I argue that such findings are significant 
because they indicate that in an intercultural encounter, there may be a great risk of 
misunderstanding if people from different cultures draw on different contextual 
assumptions in response to an utterance. They further suggest that intercultural 
misunderstanding can be minimized if hearers from different cultures share more 
contextual assumptions.   
There are many instances in my data that indicate that differences in contextual 
assumptions lead to differences in interpretation. As my analysis in Chapter Six 
shows, my interview with the two groups of students with distinct cultural 
backgrounds brought out differences both between and within the groups, but there 
were consistent patterns that indicate that members of the English group were drawing 
on a set of assumptions about the issues raised by the callers that were not available to 
the Chinese group. In particular, what this indicates is that the two groups interpreted 
those issues raised by the callers in radically different ways. This also indicates that 
culture has an impact on interpretation. For example, in Section 6.2.1.1, I showed that 
because the cognitive environments of the Chinese group did not overlap with that of 
the caller in the same way that those of the English group appeared to, they did not 
access the contextual assumptions about „oral sex‟ that the caller‟s utterances 
appeared to require if they were to be understood in the same way that (based on my 
own understanding) the caller intended. Although both groups understood the caller‟s 
utterances as implying that he was thinking about the relationship between a pierced 
tongue and the couple‟s sex life, their understanding of the problem the caller was 
expressing was distinct: the English group as a whole saw the caller‟s utterances as 
not so much as designed to communicate a problem, but rather, to elicit a second 
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opinion. The Chinese group, however, saw the caller‟s utterances as designed to solve 
the problem of whether a pierced tongue would, indeed, adversely affect his physical 
expression of love.   
Thus, Relevance Theory has a descriptive vocabulary that allows me to explain the 
impact that culture has on interpretation, whereas the approach adopted by Ting-
Toomey does not.  
To sum up, in this section, I have shown that although the study by Ting-Toomey 
(1999) argues that there are differences in interpretation between hearers from 
different cultures, it does not actually explain how culture has an impact on 
interpretation. I have shown that the relevance theoretic approach I adopted in this 
thesis enables me to explain that culture has an impact on interpretation if hearers 
with diverse cultural backgrounds draw on different contextual assumptions in 
response to an utterance.  
7.2.3.3 Interpretation varies from individual to individual  
In this section, my aim is to show that, in opposition to the assumption made by 
studies of culture and communication that people in the same culture produce the 
same interpretation for a given utterance, my data provides evidence that indicates 
that interpretation, in fact, varies from individual to individual.  
In Section 2.2.2.3, I reviewed the fact that when claiming that there are variations in 
interpretation between hearers from distinct cultural backgrounds, studies of culture 
and communication seem to suggest that a speaker‟s utterance would generate the 
same line of interpretation for every individual in the same culture. For example, 
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Cohen (2004, 41) argues that for Malaysians, Keating‟s (the prime minister of 
Australian) utterance that I don’t know and I don’t care in the context of the 
Malaysian prime minister‟s presence was meant to „insult‟ the prime minister of 
Malaysia. In contrast, for Australians, „this outspoken language is acceptable in 
Australian society‟, or in Keating‟s own words, his remarks „were not meant to be 
offensive…they cannot be interpreted as being offensive‟ (Cohen 2004, 41). By 
arguing this, Cohen (2004) implies that although not made explicit, all individuals in 
the same culture produce the same interpretation for a given utterance.  
However, as I discussed in the previous section, the same interpretation can be 
generated only if hearers overlap with each other in their cognitive environment. 
Within the framework of Relevance theory, „people never share their total cognitive 
environments‟ (Sperber and Wilson 1995, 41), and even members of the same 
linguistic communities converging on the same language do not share the same 
assumptions, since no two people share identical „life history‟ (Sperber and Wilson 
1995,16). Because of this, in Blakemore‟s (1992, 18) words, „there are always 
differences which lead not only to differences in the events memorized, but also to 
different interpretation of the same event‟.  
My data contains numerous instances that indicate that interpretation varies from 
individual to individual. Even in a simple case, where parents expect their children‟s 
call in Chinese New Year, as I have shown in Section 6.2.2.3, members within the 
English group who share the cognitive environment generate different interpretations. 
For example, one of them felt it to be unacceptable that the caller had a strong 
expectation about her child‟s initiating a call. Another member stressed that if 
mothers do not call their children, they should not expect their children to call them. 
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In opposition to their views, one member insisted that children should call their 
parents during the New Year to show respect for the parents. Moreover, there is 
evidence that none of the groups produced interpretations that were the same as my 
own, although our interpretations did bear some resemblance at some point to 
interpret the caller‟s intentions. For example, the Chinese group in this case appeared 
to indicate that they were interpreting the caller‟s problem in the same way as I had, 
in that we all inferred that the caller wanted to know whether she should call her 
child, but we differed in that this group extended the issue raised by the caller to her 
problematic relationship with her daughter, which I did not. Therefore, as my analysis 
has shown, the caller‟s single utterance was taken to convey different meanings by 
different hearers.  
Similarly, in Section 6.2.1.2, I have shown that in inferring the problem constructed 
by the caller, members within the English group understood what the caller intended 
to solve in radically different ways. For example, the caller‟s utterance was perceived 
to convey a problem that (a) the caller wanted to know whether or not he should be 
with his girlfriend, or (b) that the caller was confused about how he should react to the 
situation he was in, or (c) that the caller wanted to know if it was wrong for his 
girlfriend to cheat on him. Therefore, the relevance theoretic approach that I adopted 
in this thesis enables me to explain that the fact „that two people share a cognitive 
environment does not imply that they make the same assumption: merely that they are 
capable of doing so‟ (Sperber and Wilson 1995, 41).  
In the light of Relevance Theory and evidence from my own data, it is now clear that 
interpretation varies from individual to individual, from culture to culture, and that 
people from the same culture do not necessarily produce the same interpretation for a 
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given utterance. Since Cohen (2004) assumes that an utterance will generate the same 
line of interpretation for people from the same culture, I therefore argue that his view 
can only provide us with limited insights into how hearers interpret what a speaker 
says.  
7.2.3.4 Flexibility in the use of bicultural meaning systems 
In this section, I show that the relevance-theoretic approach and also the dynamic 
constructivist approach that I adopted in this thesis are important additions to existing 
studies of culture and communication, in that they enable me to explain how culture 
informs behaviours of bicultural individuals in a way that previous culture and 
communication scholarship does not.  
In Section 2.2.2.2, I have shown that when bicultural individuals are involved in 
intercultural communication, previous literature on culture and communication is 
unable to examine how culture informs their behaviours. For example, based on their 
analysis of communication style reflected in the communicative behaviours of the 
bicultural participants, Pekerti and Thomas (2003, 145) argue that  
Overall, the results of our analysis provide support for the hypothesis … [that] 
cultural differences in communication styles… were evident across cultures. An 
idiocentric communication style was dominant for Pakeha…In contrast, a 
sociocentric style was dominant for Asians (2003, 145). 
As I argued in Section 2.2.2.2, although Pekerti and Thomas claim that there is a 
correlation between culture and communication style, in that idiocentric 
communication style was dominant for Pakeha and a sociocentric style was dominant 
for Asians, they do not actually explain how the correlation is made. As a result, this 
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study has fallen into the „correlational fallacy‟ (Cameron 1995, 85). I also argued 
there that the reason that Pekerti and Thomas felt unable to explain the correlation is 
that the approach they adopted in this study assumes that people who belong to a 
specific culture are a homogeneous group, and therefore those who have been 
exposed to two different cultures are not included.  
However, in the light of the premise that context is a result of a dynamic process of 
selection, it includes general cultural knowledge hearers draw on in response to an 
utterance. Specifically, my study also adopts the dynamic constructivist approach and 
proposes that culture is a given meaning system shared among members of a cultural 
group, and therefore I am able to explain how culture informs the behaviors of 
bicultural individuals.  
As my analysis in Chapter Six shows, when the two groups of bicultural participants 
in my interview study responded to my questions, there is evidence that the bicultural 
individuals display a tendency to flexibly switch their bicultural meaning systems 
according to contextual clues (an utterance). For example, in Section 6.2.1.1, I 
showed that in inferring the problem the English caller intended to solve when he was 
describing that he was concerned with the effect his girlfriend‟s pierced tongue would 
have on his sex life, one of the members in the Chinese group appeared to shift her 
knowledge of English culture to the Chinese knowledge she holds, and contrasted the 
experience the caller recounted with her own life and inferred that „in our country we 
don‟t do that sort of thing with tongue‟, but because she was in a group with other MC 
speakers, she quickly switched back and inferred that the caller was more concerned 
with whether or not he could still have sex with his girlfriend. This indicates that she 
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appeared to have access to her knowledge of both cultural meaning systems, and 
flexibly use them to interpret the given utterance. Because she was in a group with 
other MC speakers, she selected to access their meaning system rather than the BE 
meaning system. 
A similar case is seen in Section 6.2.1.2, where the English caller was telling the 
audience that his girlfriend told him that she had slept with somebody else. The 
responses to my question as to what problem the caller intended to solve indicate that 
one of the members in the Chinese group appeared to switch her knowledge of 
English culture immediately to her knowledge of Chinese and inferred that, if a 
Chinese man were in the caller‟s position, he was not meant to solve any problem, but 
was just trying to find some way to express his anger. This indicates that this member 
had access to the bicultural meaning systems she holds, but depended on her 
knowledge of Chinese culture to infer the issue raised by the English caller. As I 
discussed above, in both cases, the bicultural individuals appeared to draw on their 
bicultural knowledge to contrast the issues raised by the callers with what they 
experienced in their own countries. What evidence such as this indicates is that 
culture is indeed dynamic rather than static. It also indicates that the bicultural 
individuals are very sensitive to their deeply-rooted cultural norms, beliefs and values 
that inform them how to behave in a particular situation.  
Therefore, both the relevance theoretic approach and the dynamic constructivist 
approach that I adopted in this thesis enable me to add a new insight to the study by 
Pekerti and Thomas, in that I am able to reveal that bicultural individuals depend on 
their bicultural knowledge, and switch between them, to interpret an utterance. More 
specifically, my findings add a level of explanation to the approach proposed by Hong 
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and her colleagues, in that my findings indicate that the bicultural individuals not only 
depend on their bicultural meaning systems as proposed by Hong and her colleagues, 
but also „flexibly‟ switch them in the process of interpretation. Since the characteristic 
of „flexibility‟ is not discussed in Hong‟s approach, my findings therefore provide 
richer data on the use of cultural meaning system than that of Hong‟s approach. 
7.2.3.5 Conclusion 
My argument in this section has been that my study adds several layers of important 
explanations to existing studies of culture and communication, and the analysis in 
interpretation in particular. I have shown that studies of culture and communication 
assume that culture is static and that context is determined before the process of 
comprehension takes place. As a result, they are unable to explain how meaning is 
generated and how culture impacts on interpretation. I have shown that my study, 
which is based on Sperber and Wilson‟s Relevance Theory and also the dynamic 
constructivist approach to culture, stresses that (a) context is a result of a dynamic 
process of selection, and (b) culture is a meaning system that can be accessed by a 
cultural group. Consequently, I am able to explain that (i) meaning can be generated 
only if the newly presented information interacts with the old information (in the form 
of contextual assumptions), (ii) culture is dynamic, and (iii) culture has an impact on 
interpretation if hearers from different cultures draw on different contextual 
assumptions in response to an utterance that expresses the same propositional content, 
and (iv) that interpretation varies from individual to individual, and even people who 
share the cognitive environment do not necessarily interpret what a speaker says in 
the same way. I have shown that the studies of culture and communication assume 
that people who belong to a specific culture are a homogeneous group and therefore 
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those who hold bicultural meaning systems are not included, and as a result, they are 
unable to explain how culture informs the behaviour of those bicultural individuals. I 
have shown that my study draws on both Relevance Theory and the dynamic 
constructivist approach, and consequently, I am able to explain that the bicultural 
individuals are very flexible in their use of bicultural meaning systems in response to 
an utterance.  
In the next section, I show how my findings contribute to our understanding of 
cultural differences by focusing on China and Britain.  
7.3 Differences in communication between speakers of MC and BE 
As I explained in Section 3.3, the overall aim of this thesis is to investigate: 
(a) Is there evidence from actual language use to indicate that both MC and BE use 
markers of procedural meaning? 
(b) Is there evidence that when interpreting naturally occurring conversations, 
hearers from different cultures do actually come up with different 
interpretations because they are drawing on a different cognitive environment? 
From a relevance-theoretic point of view, what this indicates is that my study focuses 
on the complete act of communication, but sees this „from two different points of 
view: that of the communicator who is involved in ostension and that of the audience 
who is involved in inference‟ (Sperber and Wilson 1995, 54). In what follows, I 
examine, in terms of the two perspectives, the differences in communication between 
MC and BE in the context of a radio talk show.  
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7.3.1 Evidence from both communicator and audience 
In my study, the question of whether markers of procedural meaning are used by MC 
and BE is directly related to the question of whether there are similarities or 
differences between China and Britain in the use of communication styles, which I 
explained in Section 7.2.1. The question of whether there is evidence that when 
interpreting naturally occurring conversations, hearers from different cultures  come 
up with different interpretations because they are drawing on a different cognitive 
environment is related to the issue of how culture impacts on interpretation, which I 
explained in Section 7.2.3. 
As I have shown in Chapter Five and discussed in Section 7.2.1, the styles of MC and 
BE are both indirect, in that (a) utterances produced by speakers of MC and BE must 
be interpreted in a context; (b) inferential processes are involved in interpreting 
utterances produced by callers from both China and Britain; and (c) both sets of 
callers use markers of procedural meaning to help hearers identify with the least 
processing effort the problems they were attempting to express. These findings 
indicate that there is no direct correlation between culture and the communication 
style underlying the culture, which I discussed in Section 7.2.2.  
As I have shown in Chapter Six and discussed in Section 7.2.3, there is evidence in 
my data that indicates that hearers from China and Britain do come up with different 
interpretations for the utterance produced by a caller, because they were drawing on 
distinct contextual assumptions. In particular, what this indicates is that hearers from 
both cultures interpret the problem the caller was articulating in radically different 
ways. The implication of such findings is that culture has an impact on interpretation, 
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which in turn indicates that cultural differences are realised through activating 
different contextual assumptions.  
My analysis has shown that although there is some degree of overlap between people 
within the same cultural group, my empirical findings indicate that their 
understanding of relevance of what a caller was saying is sometimes distinct. What 
this indicates is that an utterance generates different interpretations for different 
hearers, and even people who share the same cognitive environment do not construct 
meanings of the same utterance in the same ways.  
My analysis has further demonstrated that, culture is dynamic rather than static. More 
specifically, I have shown that in interpreting a given utterance, the bicultural 
individuals indeed draw on their bicultural knowledge to make inference. However, as 
I have also shown, they are very flexible in switching their bicultural meaning 
systems, in that they sometimes depend on their knowledge of Chinese culture to 
interpret an issue raised by an English caller, and vice versa. 
In the next section, I will show, on the basis of the above evidence, how the 
differences in communication between MC and BE are realised in the context of radio 
advice talk shows. 
7.3.2 Cultural differences result from differences in contextual 
assumptions 
My aim in this section is to show that research to date has not yet formulated a clear 
answer as to how cultural differences are realised by focusing on how an utterance is 
produced and interpreted, my study is designed to provide evidence to indicate how 
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cultural differences in communication are realised by focusing on what hearers 
actually do.  
As I showed in Section 2.2.1.2, previous studies of culture and communication (e.g. 
Adair and Brett 2004; Brew and Cairns 2004; Cohen 2004; Ting-Toomey 1999) argue 
that cultures can be distinguished according to the use of direct and indirect style. 
However, they do not actually explain how one style can be categorized as direct and 
another style can be categorized as indirect. I argue that only if we make explicit how 
such categorizations are made can we be in a position to determine how, or if cultural 
differences are realised through the use of style. 
As I showed in Section 2.2.2.2, previous studies of culture and communication (e.g.  
Adair and Brett 2004; Fujishin 2007; Pekerti and Thomas 2003; Neuliep 2006) argue 
that there is a correlation between culture and the communication style underlying the 
culture. However, they do not actually explain how the connection is made. I argue 
that only when we have a clear idea of how culture is linked to the use of style can we 
examine whether cultural differences are related to the use of style. 
As I showed in Section 2.2.2.3, previous studies of culture and communication (e.g. 
Cohen 2004; Gao and Ting-Toomey 1998; Cohen 2004; Scollon and Scollon 1995; 
Ting-Toomey 1999) argue that there are differences in interpretation between hearers 
from different cultures. However, they do not explain how culture has an impact on 
interpretation. I argue that we are able to determine whether or how cultural 
differences are realised through differences in interpretation only if we make explicit 
how culture has an impact on interpretation. 
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On this premise, I am faced with the question of how we can investigate the 
relationship between culture and communication.  
I believe that my research has opened up a debate for the question of how the 
relationship between culture and communication can be studied.  
First, my study raises the question of whether the claim that cultures can be 
distinguished according to the use of style can be substantiated. Drawing on Sperber 
and Wilson‟s argument that there is no such thing as direct communication at all in 
any communication, my present thesis is able to address the issue of communication 
style by focusing on makers of procedural meaning. As my analysis in Chapter Five 
indicates, utterances produced by callers from both China and Britain involve 
inferential work being carried out on the part of a hearer, and to that extent, both are 
indirect. In order to help hearers to identify the problems the callers were constructing 
with least processing effort, both sets of callers rely on markers of procedural 
meaning to guide the interpretation process. On the basis of my empirical findings, I 
argue that if communication styles of China and Britain are both indirect, this 
indicates that there is no direct correlation between culture and communication style. 
This also precludes the possibility that cultural differences can be addressed according 
to this criterion.  Consequently, the focus on communication styles would not, or 
would no longer, be appropriate as a means of characterising cultures. Meanwhile, it 
is obvious that an understanding of cultural differences requires further evidence that 
is not particularly tied to styles. 
Second, my research raises the question of whether the claim that culture impacts on 
interpretation can be substantiated. Drawing on Sperber and Wilson‟s argument that 
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communication is a matter of degree, and therefore communicators need to take 
account of cognitive environment of their addressees when they formulate their 
utterances, my current thesis is able to address how culture might impact on 
interpretation by focusing on the contextual assumptions that hearers draw on in 
response to an utterance. As my analysis in Chapter Six shows, hearers from China 
and Britain sometimes draw on different contextual assumptions in response to an 
utterance that apparently expresses the same propositional content. In particular, what 
this indicates is that they understand the problem a caller was constructing in radically 
different ways. It also indicates that culture has an impact on interpretation. I argue 
that it is the difference in contextual assumptions that is the cause of variations in 
interpretation, and it is the cause of perceived variations in „style‟ as Ting-Toomey‟s 
example about the ride to the airport illustrates. Therefore, it is the difference in 
contextual assumptions that hearers from different cultures draw on that is the cause 
of cultural differences in communication.  
I suggest that these findings have important implications for further research, in that 
my findings indicate that if a hearer in one culture does not already access the 
contextual assumptions that are available to hearers from the other culture, then 
intercultural communication between them will run the risk of misinterpretation. My 
findings also indicate the significance of developing pragmatic awareness, in that they 
suggest that if people with distinct cultural backgrounds share more contextual 
assumptions, they will generate more similar interpretations, and consequently a risk 
of misinterpretation can be significantly reduced.  
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In Chapter Two, my literature review showed that studies of culture and 
communication claim that cultures can be distinguished according to the use of direct 
and indirect style (e.g. Adair and Brett 2004; Brew and Cairns 2004; Cohen 2004; 
Ting-Toomey 1999), and that there is a correlation between culture and 
communication style (e.g. Adair and Brett 2004; Fujishin 2007; Pekerti and Thomas 
2003; Neuliep 2006). On the basis of the findings from my study and my discussion 
here, I argue that (a) it is the difference in contextual assumptions that hearers from 
different cultures draw on in response to an utterance that is the major contributor to 
cultural differences in communication, (b) there is no connection between culture and 
communication style, and (c) the distinction between direct and indirect 
communication is not appropriate for characterizing cultures.  
7.3.3 Summary 
In this section, I have discussed that (a) the findings from my empirical research 
indicate that there are similarities in communication styles between speakers from 
China and Britain, in that they are both indirect, and (b) if people from different 
cultures draw on different contextual assumptions in response to an utterance, they 
interpret the utterance in different ways. On this basis, I have discussed the 
relationship between culture and communication. I have argued, in the light of 
Relevance Theory and evidence from my data analysis, that cultural differences in 
communication are caused by differences in contextual assumptions, and therefore the 
direct and indirect distinction is not appropriate for characterising cultures.  
7.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have shown that studies of culture and communication argue that 
cultures can be distinguished according to the use of direct and indirect style. By 
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drawing on Relevance Theory, I have shown that communication style of cultures that 
have been categorised as HC and LC is indirect. I have shown that studies of culture 
and communication argue that there is a strong correlation between culture and the 
communication style underlying the culture. By drawing on Relevance Theory, I have 
shown that communication style of cultures that have been categorised as HC and LC 
is indirect, and therefore there is no direct connection between culture and 
communication style. I have also shown that studies of culture and communication 
argue that there are differences in interpretation between people from different 
cultures. By drawing on Relevance Theory, I have shown that differences in 
interpretation can be better addressed by focusing on contextual assumptions hearers 
draw on in response to an utterance. On this basis, I have discussed the relationship 
between culture and communication focusing on China and Britain. I argue that 
cultural difference in communication is caused by differences in contextual 
assumptions that hearers from different cultures activate in response to an utterance. I 
also argue that culture is not related to communication style and that the distinction 
between direct and indirect style is not appropriate as a means of characterising 
cultures.  
I conclude my present research in the next chapter.  
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
In this thesis, I have reported on my research into cultural differences in 
communication by focusing on interpretations of broadcast talk by native speakers of 
Mandarin Chinese and British English.  
In Chapter Two, I reviewed the literature relating to culture and communication. I 
have focused on two strands of thought that have had an impact on research in the 
field. I argued that one line of research has tended to focus on addressing cultural 
differences according to the distinction between direct and indirect styles. A second 
line of research addresses cultural differences by assuming that there are differences 
between people from different cultures in the way they are likely to interpret a given 
utterance in a specific context. I argued that both lines of research have limitations. 
More specifically, I demonstrated that those studies that claim that cultures can be 
distinguished according to the use of direct and indirect styles (e.g. Adair and Brett 
2004; Brew and Cairns 2004; Cohen 2004; Ting-Toomey 1999) do not actually 
explain how one style can be categorised as direct and another style can be 
categorised as indirect. Because of this, I argued that it is not clear how, or if, cultural 
differences in communication are realised through the use of style. I showed that 
those studies make the claim that culture has a strong connection with communication 
style (e.g. Adair and Brett 2004; Fujishin 2007; Neuliep 2006; Pekerti and Thomas 
2003) do not provide a convincing case for whether culture is correlated with 
communication style. I also demonstrated that those studies which claim that there are 
differences in interpretation between people from different cultures do not actually 
address how culture impacts on interpretation (e.g. Cohen 2004; Gao and Ting-
Toomey 1998; Scollon and Scollon 1995; Ting-Toomey, 1999). My claim was that 
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we are not able to examine whether or how cultural differences are realised through 
different interpretation until we have a clear idea of how culture impacts on 
interpretation. I argued that explanations offered by these studies are limited by the 
theories they apply and the methods of analysis they use. My conclusion at the end of 
Chapter Two was that, if we aim to address the limitations indicated in the previous 
literature on culture and communication, we need a different theoretical framework 
and method of analysis. In Chapter Three, by drawing on Relevance Theory, I argued 
that the claim that there are differences in interpretation between people from 
different cultures made by previous studies of culture and communication can be 
addressed by focusing on contextual assumptions. I also argued that the claim that 
cultures vary according to the use of direct and indirect style made by previous 
literature can be more effectively addressed by focusing on the markers of procedural 
meaning.  
Given that the studies of culture and communication that I addressed in Chapter Two 
draw on invented examples and arguments, rather than empirical studies, I set up an 
empirical study to re-investigate the relationship between culture and communication, 
by focusing on native speakers of Mandarin Chinese and British English. 
In Chapter Four, I described how I audio-recorded host-caller spontaneous 
interactions of speakers of MC and speakers of BE online, and transcribed and 
translated the recorded materials. I then adopted a relevance theoretic approach and 
employed a dynamic constructivist view of culture as a supplementary approach to 
analyse my two sets of data. I looked at whether or not there is evidence that callers 
from China and Britain use markers of procedural meaning to guide their hearers‟ 
interpretation process. I also looked at whether or not hearers from China and Britain 
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did actually come up with different interpretations when they heard the callers‟ 
utterances. My findings (see Chapter Five) indicated that understanding utterances 
produced by callers from the two cultures involves a lot of inferential work. Both sets 
of callers use markers of procedural meaning to guide the interpretation process. To 
that extent, I showed that communication styles of both cultures are indirect. My 
findings indicated that there is no connection between culture and the use of 
communication style. By analysing hearers‟ interpretations of the utterances produced 
by the callers (see Chapter Six), I found that different interpretations are available if 
different contextual assumptions are activated in response to an utterance. I also found 
that interpretation varies from individual to individual as well as from culture to 
culture. My findings showed that even members whose cognitive environments 
overlap with each other sometimes interpret the same utterance in different ways.  
Moreover, through a combination of a relevance theoretic approach proposed by 
Sperber and Wilson and the dynamic constructivist approach proposed by Hong and 
her colleagues, I found that bicultural individuals can be very flexible in the use of 
cultural meaning systems they access in the process of communication. 
I summarised my major findings from my empirical study as follows: cultural 
differences in communication are realised through activating different contextual 
assumptions in response to an utterance. Specifically, my findings are: 
(a) Communication styles of MC and BE are both indirect, in that the two sets of 
callers use prosody and discourse connectives to indicate how their utterances are 
to be processed; 
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(b) There is no simple correlation between culture and the use of direct or indirect 
styles, because communication style in cultures that have been categorised as HC 
and LC is indirect; 
(c)  Hearers from China and Britain come up with different interpretations because 
they are drawing on different contextual assumptions.  
On the basis of above findings, I discussed the relationship between culture and 
communication from the perspectives of speakers and hearers. I concluded that 
cultural differences in communication do not lie in communication styles used in 
different cultures, but in differences in contextual assumptions that hearers with 
distinct cultural backgrounds draw on in response to an utterance. It is this difference 
that leads to the difference in interpretation of a given utterance in a specific context, 
and  it is also the cause of the perceived differences in „style‟ identified by existing 
studies of culture and communication. I also concluded that the distinction between 
direct and indirect communication is not appropriate as a means of characterising 
cultures.  
I believe that my present research contributes to our understanding of the 
phenomenon of cultural differences in communication in several ways. Firstly, my 
study changes the way of studying and analysing cultural differences in 
communication. As my literature review shows, scholarship in culture and 
communication tends to address cultural differences in communication according to 
the distinction between direct and indirect styles. However, as I also show in Chapter 
Five, communication styles used by callers from China and Britain are both indirect. 
These findings suggest therefore that cultural differences in communication are not 
directly related to the communication style. And as a result, the analysis of directness 
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and indirectness in communication cannot reveal the way in which cultural 
differences are realised in real life interactions. My argument is that a focus on 
hearers‟ interpretative processes enables an analyst to show that cultural differences in 
communication can be traced to differences in the contextual assumptions hearers 
from different cultures draw on in response to an utterance. My findings have 
important implications for our understanding of cultural differences in 
communication, in that they suggest that further research in the similar field should 
focus on what hearers actually do in the process of communication. Since the data in 
this empirical study is of a relatively small size, discussions and conclusions are based 
on data collected from two cultures only. This has led to, however, some suggestions 
that larger-scale studies of cultural differences in communication are needed in the 
future. If larger-scale studies reveal similar trends that communication styles of 
speakers across cultures are all indirect, and that cultural differences in 
communication result from differences in contextual assumptions hearers with 
different cultural backgrounds draw on in response to an utterance, then this will add 
new strength to my findings.  
Secondly, my study adds several levels of new explanations to the approaches 
adopted by the existing literature of culture and communication. My literature review 
shows that earlier studies of culture and communication assume that inference is only 
required for communication in collectivistic (HC) cultures, but not necessary for 
communication in individualistic (LC) cultures. By drawing on Relevance Theory, my 
present study reveals that understanding utterances produced by speakers from 
cultures that have been categorised as collectivistic (HC) and individualistic (LC) 
involves some degree of inference in a context. Only when one draws some inference 
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in a context can one identify the meaning intended by the speaker. As I have shown, 
previous studies of culture and communication see context as an element that exists 
before the interpretation process takes place, and as a result they are unable to explain 
how meaning is generated in a specific context. I have also shown that such studies 
assume that culture is a fixed set of values and norms, and that people who belong to a 
specific culture are a homogeneous group and therefore those bicultural individuals 
are not included. Because of these assumptions, as I have shown, these studies are 
unable to explain how culture informs the behaviours of the bicultural individuals. In 
the light of the rapid progress of globalisation and an increasing phenomenon of 
biculturalism or even multiculturalism, I argue that this is a significant omission. I 
also argue that the very significant omission must be considered by all who work in 
the area of culture and communication.  By drawing on Relevance Theory, my study 
engages with the systematic way in which that theory addresses how context is a 
product of dynamic process of selection, and an interpretation is a synthesis of old and 
new information, a result of interaction between the two. By drawing on the insights 
from Relevance Theory and by adopting a dynamic constructivist approach, my study 
reveals that culture is dynamic, in that hearers draw on general cultural knowledge as 
their contextual assumptions in their construction of meaning. My study also reveals 
that culture informs the behaviours of bicultural individuals, in that it shows how the 
bicultural individuals rely on two distinct sets of cultural knowledge and shift between 
them in response to an utterance, as proposed by Hong and her colleagues. However, 
an important insight that my study adds to Hong‟s approach is that it demonstrates 
that the bicultural individuals are very flexible in using their two cultural meaning 
systems. They may use their English cultural knowledge in response to a Chinese 
cultural clue, and vice versa. Since the characteristic of flexibility has not been 
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discussed in Hong‟s approach, I believe that my present research has brought into 
play a fruitful new approach to studying cultural differences in real life interactions.  
Thirdly, my research provides data which enriches our understanding of cultural 
differences in interpretation. My literature review shows that previous literature on 
culture and communication suggests that people from the same culture will generate 
the same interpretation for the same utterance. Drawing on Relevance Theory, my 
study reveals that interpretation varies from individual to individual as well as from 
culture to culture. I show that even two people whose cognitive environments overlap 
with each other do not always generate the same interpretation, in that if they draw on 
different contextual assumptions in response to an utterance, they will generate 
different implications. As my analysis shows, when this occurs, they interpret the 
utterance in radically different ways. This also indicates that in intercultural 
communication encounters, the difference in contextual assumptions people from 
different cultures draw on is likely to lead to intercultural misunderstanding. Since the 
primary aim of studying cultural differences is to learn as much as possible about 
ourselves and others in order to avoid misunderstanding (Hall 1983, 185), I regard the 
identification of differences in interpretation as important, because it offers supporting 
evidence for any claims about differences in interpretation between cultures. 
The findings from my empirical study have implications for the way in which culture 
and its relationship with communication can be explored further, in that my findings 
suggest that contextual assumptions are important contributors to cultural differences 
in communication. My assertion is that contextual assumptions that hearers from 
different cultures draw on should be studied systematically.  
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We have moved into a new century, and biculturalism or even multiculturalism is 
prevailing in many parts of the world. With rapid globalization in the world, there is a 
need for more precise theorization of cultural influence on communication. Therefore, 
I argue that it may no longer be useful to treat the distinction between direct and 
indirect communication as the way to characterize cultures. Rather, the differences in 
the use of communication styles between cultural groups revealed in previous studies 
of culture and communication could serve as a point of departure from which 
researchers further their exploration of the process of interpretation which gives rise 
to different contextual assumptions.  
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Appendix 1: Conventions of transcriptions 
              
. The utterance is uttered with a falling contour. 
, The utterance is uttered with a low-rise contour. 
? The utterance is uttered with a high-rise contour. 
(.)   A micropause of less than one tenth of a second is heard. 
//    An interruption occurs. 
! The utterance is uttered with an exclamative tone. 
< > The speech between them is noticeably slower than surrounding speech. 
> < The speech between them is noticeably quicker than surrounding speech. 
…     A longer than usual pause is heard.        
AA The capitalised word or phrase is uttered with extra loudness or extra 
duration. 
[ha  heh]         Laughter is heard.          
AA       The bolded word or phrase in Chinese is uttered with a lengthened        
duration. 
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Appendix 2: English extract 1 (E01GT) 
H:   I believe that you‟re with your partner for sometime how long. 
C:   All in all about (.) 6 years. 
H:   6 years ok. 
C:   Yeah. 
H:   Were you living together? 
C:   No no. I‟ve I‟ve  never had (.) not really had a place of my own to live in. 
H:   Ok so you were living at home with parents were you? 
C:  No (.) I‟m living in a shared house… this is the second time I‟ve had to do   
this…coz I‟ve had nowhere else. 
H:   Ok now I believe that he was borrowing money from you. 
C:   Yeah. 
H:   how much money we‟re talking about. 
C:  Quite a lot of money… probably about < > over five hundred pounds I would 
think really altogether cos. 
H:   So what was what was he borrowed five hundred quid for. 
C:  Oh (.) it was always something he needed, and oh crikey (heh) money for his  
phone sometimes <   >  I‟m trying to think what else. 
H:   Was he working at the time to fund his … // 
C:   //He is al (.) this is it, he‟s he‟s ALWAYS ALWAYS working.   
H:   Alright so why was he borrowing cash off you then. 
C:   Oh … I‟m trying to think what he used to come out with. 
H:   But there was always an excuse for him borrowing cash off you. 
C:  Yeah money wasn‟t BORROWED from me (.) which he was doing such a lot (.) 
there is another…my back was turned if I was making a couple of tea or 
something. He‟s taking money anyway …as well. 
H:   What? outta of your purse. 
C:   Yeah yeah (.) I know it‟s horrible.  
H:   Well (.)  what did you say to him about this. 
C:   Well for a long time I (.) I couldn‟t say anything you know. 
H:  Why. 
C:   I (.) I don‟t know (.) I. 
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H:  Couldn‟t you say…when I‟m making you a couple of tea you know and I‟m 
turning my back and you‟re nicking money outta my purse > < what are you 
doing.  
C:   It‟s just something about his manner and everything (.) and. 
H:   In what way, what do you mean. 
C:   I don‟t know, I just couldn‟t. 
H:  What‟s controlling over you? 
C: Yeah he‟s got the funny sort of personality, I dunno, but on one occasion I 
deliberately chucked my purse outta my bag to make him a cup of tea and he saw 
me doing it. And you know (.) I know his mood (.) I know his face and I know 
his expressions and everything so well, but it really make, but I could tell I gave 
him a bit of shock.  
H:   Now I know that you‟ve split up haven‟t you. 
C:   Yeah. 
H:   And he owes you money? 
C:   Yeah. 
H:   Money you need? 
C:  Yeah. I mean sometimes I‟ve I‟ve been quite in urgent need of money. I have a   
hundred pounds a week to live on for everything, and some sometimes just not (.) 
not quite enough.  
H:  Well let‟s let‟s face it, we all need money don‟t we, really.  
C:  Yeah, yeah.  
H:  And if someone‟s been nicking money off us we want it back. and what do you 
intend to do, (.) what do you intend to do Lisa about all these. 
C:  I don‟t know. I just (.) the only thing I … the only thing I could think of was to  
put a quite big notice on the front door where I‟m living now, pinned it on 
…saying I don‟t want to see you anymore.  
H:  And you think that will work? 
C:  Well, he came back three times, about half past two in the morning, ringing and   
ringing my front door bell, and I wouldn‟t answer and the people who I live with 
wouldn‟t answer it either.  
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H:   So is this the issue here, I‟m trying to get my head what the issue actually is here 
Lisa, are you trying to finish with him // 
C:   //Yeah.  
H:   Or are you just trying to get the money off him? What are you trying to do? 
C:   well it‟s (.) it‟s going to be waste of time get trying to get the money off him. I 
just I want him out of my life, and he‟s hurt me so much, I‟ve lost all my feelings 
to him.  
H:  So the question the question tonight is how do you get rid of the man that you 
don‟t want any longer, yeah? 
C:   Yeah. 
H:  Ok. Well let‟s ask the question tonight on late night love, Lisa wants this man out 
of her life, he‟s nicking money off her, he is causing all sorts of problems, what 
does Lisa do, how does she get shut off this guy, give us a call  let‟s share what 
we can do, all right?  
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Appendix 3: English extract 2 (E01JD) 
H:   Hello there (.) what‟s happening with you at the moment then. 
C:  Well we would (.) we were invited to my niece for Christmas, she lives quite away 
from us. 
H:   This is your niece‟s house. 
C:   Yeah. 
H:   Right. 
C:   Yeah. we‟ve ALWAYS spent family (.) family Christmas together ALWAYS. 
H:   Um-hum. 
C:   But as I say they‟ve just recently moved away. Now my husband …because OUR 
two children aren‟t going although our two children have left home with their 
partners, they are going to their (.) their girlfriends‟ mothers. Because they are not 
going he is refusing to go. 
H:  Right. 
C: Which now causes the problem we just …because I can‟t get to my niece 
otherwise I would have GONE. So now my my other sister and my mother said 
that they are not gonna to go there now because they don‟t want to leave ME on 
my own. 
H:  No of course. so the situation is ramification and (.) and causing all sorts of splits 
and problems. 
C:   Yes it is. big time. 
H:  Oh dear. 
C:  You know it really causes family argument. 
H:  Ok Lindsey I (.) I have …I have to go to the news now, but will you < > hang on 
there  // 
C:   //Yeah. 
H:  And we‟ll come back to your story in a moment and we‟ll get Mo to take on that 
for you just a few minutes time. Sorry that …we‟ve just we are coming up to the 
news, so I‟ve got to take this quick break (.) but we‟ll come back to Lindsey‟s 
story in just a moment Mo, if that‟s all right.  
E:   That‟s // 
H:  //And …get you to take on it. 
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      (Advertisement is omitted) 
H:  Just before the news, we got a glimpse of Lindsey in Hillingdon‟s story. Let‟s get 
straight back to that. Lindsey, thank you for holding over the news for me. 
C:   Ok. 
H:  Let‟s just quickly reiterate the story for those who have just joined this and you‟ve 
been invited to your niece‟s for Christmas, but because she lives quite a way 
away …that‟s causing some problem, because your husband doesn‟t want to go 
that far and it‟s  creating a bit of split in the family. 
C:   That‟s right. 
H:   So that‟s the the situation in the nutshell shall we say. 
C:   A disaster (heh heh). 
H:  Yeah. Well just before I get to Mo and Mo takes on your situation (.)  Lindsey,  
how (.) how are you feeling about it. What what would you really want to do. 
C:   I would like to be sort of all together like we normally do. As I said both of my 
children have left home, he really wants children to co, to come here. 
H:   Um-hum. 
C:   And make our other arrangement.  
H:   Right. 
C: And so I think you know it‟s been like … but you know because of what‟s 
happening, but you know (.) I‟m not doing anything else. 
H:  So what do (.) what‟s what‟s the likely scenario at the moment that you you and 
he will be at home alone over Christmas? 
C:  We‟ll we‟ll be home and now … my mother and my other sister who were to go to 
my niece, and now goanna to stay local to me. 
H:   Um-hum.  
C:   So (.) that her (.) you know (.) they are about for (.)  for my sake really.  
H:  Ok but obviously it‟s causing you a little bit tension between the rest of the 
family. 
C:   Oh yes, yeah, yeah. 
H:  Ok all right Mo, this is the situation you‟ve probably come across in (.) in various 
different permutations over the year, what do you make it to Lindsey‟s story? 
E:   Right, it‟s it‟s one of the examples of many of how difficult Christmas can be, and 
how it can affect the extended families, affect couples and so on and so forth. 
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Appendix 4: English extract 3 (E07AD) 
H:   So what do you want to talk about Margo? 
C:   I‟ve just had a baby about eight weeks ago. 
H:  Congratulations.  
C:  Thank you (heh, heh). And my partner Mark (.) he is ok. I love him to pieces and 
all that, but he is just … he‟s not very happy with like all the stretch marks and all 
that. We haven‟t made love about eight weeks. 
H:   Right, so he < > he thinks that you‟ve kind of changed physically. 
C:  Yeah, he‟s not happy with the figure and everything. He thinks that I‟ve put on a 
lot of weight during pregnancy. 
H:  Have you spoken to him about it have you actually talked to him about it?  
C:  Yeah. I‟ve talked about it, the stuff he just said …you know… maybe when you 
can exercise a bit, but it‟s just very different between us since we‟ve had the baby 
and everything. 
H: You know this happens to quite a few people, you‟re not (.) you‟re not on your 
own there. 
C:  I feel like I am. 
H:   I know it does, but you know… just to remind you … this is (.)  this is a perfectly 
normal situation to find yourself in afterwards. I think the part of the problem 
though is that, really he needs to well he needs to think a little before he speaks,  
because it sounds like he‟s done quite a bit damage by saying this to you.  
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Appendix 5: English extract 4 (E08AD) 
C:   Well I hope you can help me tonight. 
H:   Well come on and tell us your story, maybe I will. 
C:    I confronted her the other day. 
H:  Em. 
C:   And I phoned her today for lunch. 
H:  Em. 
C:  And of course she denied it, and you know (.) you know how women are they 
never treat straightly, they never ruin anything else. 
H:   What what did she deny. 
C:  Wh (.) Anthony you won‟t …please promise not to laugh. 
H: Well I promise not to tell anyone, I can‟t guarantee I won‟t laugh Mitch. I won‟t 
tell anyone. 
C:   Ah it‟s so, I don‟t know if I should be worried about it. 
H:  Well, just tell me what it is and I will be the judge there. 
C:   Well, what it is yeah. 
H:  What is it. 
C:  Basically the < > she‟s getting her tongue pierced, and I‟m just thinking it‟s going  
to ruin my SEX LIFE, you know well the. 
H:   Well sorry, ba ba ba ba. 
C:   (heh) yeah  (heh) I know. 
H:  Ba ba ba ba, let‟s just rewind < > rewind, excuse me, both of listeners, let‟s just 
rewind for a moment if we can. 
C:   I know it‟s silly //isn‟t it. 
H:   //No no zip it. she‟s get her tongue pierced, 
C:  Yeah. 
H:  That‟s all of these about you‟re worried her get her tongue pierced is going to 
your sex life, 
C:   Yeah but wouldn‟t it, Am I worried too much? 
H:   Mitch, have you goanna sex life before you worried about a pierced tongue. 
C:   But seriously Anthony. 
H:   //look. 
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C:   //You think about it, 
H:  You have to understand some of the sexist people in the world you and myself 
excluded, of course, for the purpose of this conversation. 
C:   (hah,hah). 
H:  Have some sort of piercing whether it be in the tongue or in the navel or on the ear 
or elsewhere, the point is that it is (.) it is the sign Mitch (.) of enhancing 
sexuality and desire. 
C:  Yeah. 
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Appendix 6: English extract 5 (E08GT) 
H:  Ok you‟re a twenty-three year old guy and have been for (.) a relationship with 
your girlfriend for about six months now yeah? 
C:   Yeah six months exactly actually this month.  
H:   Ok and she‟s just turned around and said what to you. 
C:  She told me yesterday morning that she‟s been seeing and < > having um sexual 
relationships … with ANOTHER MAN.   
H:  Ok not the sort of information you want to hear from your girlfriend is it. 
C:  No. I was very hurt and I feel very troubled by it, I‟m you know just wondering, I 
mean she is behaving like she‟s a complete cow. 
H:  Em.   
C:  And I‟m just you know I  I I love her, and I‟m not sure how to take this, because I 
don‟t want to take it lying down, I want to do something about it.  
H:   Em. 
C:   And I‟m not sure what. 
H:  Ok so (.) your girlfriend of six months said to you yesterday I‟ve been sleeping 
around and having sex with an another guy, you know another guy or another 
guyS? 
C:  Yeah it was it was TWO men, I  I mean she said she‟s been doing some rather 
ridiculous things, she (.) she she even said she‟s been in (.) relationships with two 
men at one time in (.) in one room. She‟s had (threesome) with two men. 
H:   Right ok (.) well my question to you is, do you want to be in a relationship with a 
girl like that? 
 C:   I‟m not sure because I love her ever so dearly.  
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Appendix 7: English extract 6 (E03JD) 
H:   Hi there what‟s happening in your life at the moment then. 
C:  Well basically (.) I‟ve been on a (.) I‟ve seen this guy eight times over two 
months. 
H:   Um-hum. 
C:  And he‟s kind of like DUMPED me and said that the connection doesn‟t feel 
right.  
H:   Right. 
C:    He‟s gone abroad for three weeks and // 
H:   //When when did this happen. When did he (.) when did he finish with you. 
C:   About a week and a half ago. 
H:   Ok. that‟s so fairly fresh then. 
C:  Yeah. And basically he (.) he‟s currently like a kind of saying < > the connection 
doesn‟t feel right. But he …while we were dating, he did make a big thing about 
how would be great to be friends of somebody first …and even when he dumped 
me (.) said we can still be friends, but I didn‟t say anything cos I was upset. 
H:  Ok. 
C:  Basically, I‟m just wondering I‟m thinking about, maybe calling him when he < > 
comes back and saying < > well, be nice and clearly I want to be friends, but I‟m 
thinking is that too needy, or is that a good way to try to win somebody back. 
H:  It‟s difficult isn‟t it. I know exactly what you mean I mean if he‟s called (.) you 
know called it a day you know.   
C:  Yeah. 
H:  I‟ll be tempted to to say, well you know (.) fair enough, that‟s the decision, that‟s 
it,  move on, but you still feel that some kind of connection there.  
C:   I do. 
H:  That‟s worth investigating and I can understand very much that urge that want to 
contact him. Mo, what do you, what do you think. 
Expert (Mo): Well, I think, it‟s, it‟s very interesting. It sounds to me, like, you Kelly 
would very much like to have a relationship with him.  
C:   Yeah. 
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Appendix 8: Chinese extract 1 (C03SX) 
C: 我   有     个  我  遇到   个       难               题,   我   想, 
      I   have   a     I     meet   a     difficult      issue     I   think 
      I have a problem and hope you can help me. 
 
H: 你   請   说. 
     You please say     
     Please go ahead. 
 
C: 我   处 了       一个   男      朋友, 我   是     离婚的. 
     I    get along   a      male  friend     I     be     divorced 
I‟m divorced, and now I have a boyfriend. 
 
H: 噢. 
      Oh. 
     Right. 
 
C: 我   是      90    年      离婚的.  
       I    be    1990  year  divorced. 
      I got divorced in 1990. 
 
H: 噢. 
      Oh. 
      Right. 
 
C:  离婚了   以后     我    处了    一个 男    同志   他 六十  来     岁 我 五十  多    岁.  
     Divorced  after    I  get along  a   male friend  he 60  come year  I   50  over year. 
    After divorce, I have had a boyfriend. He is about sixty and I am over fifty. 
 
H: 噢. 
    Oh. 
      Ok. 
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C: 我 发现  他   有    家,       我 就     退             出来        了. 
      I   find   he  has family   I  so  withdraw   come     sentence final particle. 
  I‟ve found he is married, so I withdrew. 
 
H: 嗯. 
     Em 
     Em. 
 
C: 我  从       那    时候      起,  我  就  不   理        他           了. 
      I   from  that  time    begin    I   so  no notice  him    (sentence final particle) 
       From then on I just ignore him.  
 
H: 嗯. 
     Em 
     Em. 
 
C: 我 不理       他,      可   他  现在     总             赖着     我. 
     I    ignore   he      but   he  now  always     cling to me. 
     I ignore him, but he keeps harassing me. 
 
H: 那    不行.  你   必须得  告诉 他, 你    有       家,      你   本身   就  欺骗了我,  
   That  no   you   must   tell  him  you have family you itself  be  cheat  me 
     Oh no. You must tell him that since he‟s married, he‟s cheated on you. 
 
     这 是 非常 不道德的.  第二    你    有     家,    我 本身 是 不可以  去 扮演  第三者的. 
     This is very immoral second you have home I itself  be no may  go play third   of 
      This is immoral. Second, tell him „I don‟t intend to play a role of a third party‟. 
 
   所以 我必须  退出来. 如果 你   要     再来   纠缠     我 那   我 就 可以  报警了.  
      So   I must withdraw  if   you want again  harass  I  then  I  so  can  call the police 
      So you must withdraw. If he keeps harassing you, then you can call the police.  
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C: 可是, 他   现在  跟     我  在一个  屋里  住       呀. 
     But    he   now and    I    in   a    room  live   !  
     But now he lives in the same room with me. 
 
H: 那   不行.     你  必须   让  他    出去. 
     That  no      you must let  him out 
     Oh no. You must let him move out. 
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Appendix 9: Chinese extract 2 (C02LY) 
C: 我   有     一桩  感情的      事儿,   我    想     跟     你    说    一   说. 
       I   have   a      love        issue     I   want  and   you  say  a   say  
      I have a problem of love that I‟d like to talk with you. 
 
H: 好. 
     Good. 
     Ok.    
 
C: 我 是一个  打工的,       我  是  一个   农村            打   工     的. 
      I   be   a  causal employee  I  be      a  countryside    hit work   of 
      I am from a rural area and doing some casual work here.  
 
H: 嗯. 
     Em 
     Em. 
 
C: 我   今    年    22   岁. 
     I    this year   22   year  
     I am twenty-two.    
 
H: 嗯. 
     Em 
     Em. 
 
C: 怎么  说呢? 我 喜欢上  了   一个   比    我  大   一 轮      的    一个  女的. 
     How  say      I   like    (particle)  a   than   I  big  a round  of      a       lady  
     How to put it?   I‟m in a relationship with a lady a round older than me. 
 
H: 噢 (hah hah hah). 
     Oh (hah hah hah)  
     Oh (hah hah hah). 
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C: 她    有     家,   也      有      孩子. 
     She have home  also  have  children 
     She is married and has children as well.   
 
H: 嗯. 
     Em 
     Em. 
 
C: 她    是  一个    开    商店   的, 我  这个  单位   离    她    很   近    就 是    隔壁 
     She  be   a     open  shop  of    I    this   unit  away she  very near  so  be  next door  
She has a shop very close to where I am working, only next-door.  
 
我们   时间  长了   我们      就         喜欢  上     对方了. 
We    time    long    we     then      like   up    opposite 
Gradually we love each other.  
 
H: 嗯. 
     Em 
     Em. 
 
C: 我们  现在   已经     相处了        将近       二     年了      并   发生了   关系. 
     We    now already  get along    nearly   two   years   and   happen   relation 
     We‟ve been in a relationship for about two years and have sex life together. 
 
H: 嗯. 
     Em 
 Em. 
 
C: 这    件事儿,   我   应该   怎么    处理        呢? 
     This issue      I   should  how    deal with         ? 
     Do you think I should maintain the relationship and become closer to her? 
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H: 你  必须得   撤         出来   呀!  这  是 一种  错       爱.    人家   有     家庭   孩子. 
    You must withdraw out      !     this be  a   wrong love  other have family  children 
You must withdraw. This is wrong love since she is married and has children. 
 
     你   再      介入,       你   就  是    第三     者,    你   就 是  扮演了 不道德 的 角色. 
    You again involve  you so  be   third  person you so be  play  immoral of   role 
   If you are involved in her family, you are playing an immoral role of third party. 
 
   而且,           你们   两个    人         也   不   会    有     前途    啊. 
    Moreover     you   two    person  also  no can  have future   ! 
Moreover, you two can‟t have a future. 
 
C: 嗯. 
     Em 
 Em.    
 
H:所以,  要      和        对方        马    上     一 刀      两    断. 
    So     must and    opposite    horse   up    a  knife  two break. 
    So you must end the relationship with the lady straightaway. 
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Appendix 10: Chinese extract 3 (C03HM) 
C: 我   现在    特别   困惑,         早       就     想       给      你    打       个    电话. 
      I    now   very  perplexed     early   so  want   give   you    hit     a      call 
      I‟m now very perplexed, and I wanted to phone you a long time ago. 
 
H: 啊. 
      Ah 
      Ah. 
 
 C: 性格,            你   应该       能   听    出来,  但   爱人吧   性格            挺    暴噪的. 
      Personality  you  should  can hear  out    but  lover   personality  quite  hot   
     My temper is ok, but my husband‟s temper is very bad. 
 
H: 嗯. 
Em 
     Em    
 
C: 但是,   他  是一个  顾     家       的     男人,   不 能      说   他   不   好. 
      But     he   be   a  care  home  of     man     not can   say   he  no good 
     But he does care about the family, so he is ok. 
 
H: 明白.       这样   的   男人   也     不      少 (heh,heh). 
      Understand     such   of   man   too  not    few 
     I understand. There are a lot of men like this. 
 
C: 对.        我   现在   有   一个  很    伤心的   事儿. 
     Right     I    now  have  a    very   upset      thing 
     Yeah. But now I am very upset. 
 
H: 嗯. 
     Em 
     Em. 
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C: 就      是   我们   俩     常常   吵架,   哎呀  无    法       形容. 
     Just   be   we     two   often  argue  ah     no   way   describe 
     We often argue, fight. It‟s hard to describe. 
 
H: 嗯 
Em 
     Em 
 
C: 昨天              又         打      起来了,     吵        起来了       
     Yesterday   again   fight     up         argue     up     
     Yesterday we argued again.  
 
H: 嗯. 
     Em 
     Em. 
 
C: 我们    俩     打           嘴            仗. 
      We   two  fight     mouth    fight 
      We two just argue. 
 
H: 你        应该      和    他     谈      谈      谈    过? 
     You   should  and   he    talk    talk    talk past 
     You should  have a talk with him. Have you talked to him about this? 
 
C: 没有.  我  都    麻木了. 
     No.     I    all   numb. 
     No. I even feel numb. 
 
H: 你        应该     在  他    心情      好     的    时候     和      他    谈       谈 
     You    should   in   he   mood  good   of   when   and    he    talk   talk 
You should talk to him when he is in a good mood. 
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Appendix 11: Chinese extract 4 (C01LY) 
C: 我  想       问    一件  事儿. 
      I  think    ask    a      issue 
     I have something to ask you for help. 
 
H: 好.        你    请       讲. 
     Good  you please talk 
     Ok, please go ahead. 
 
C: 我认识 一个 比   我    小     五     岁   的  男人.  我 想    和   他   在一起. 
     I  know  a   than  I   small five year of  man   I want  and  he   in  together  
     I know a man five years younger than myself. I want to be with him. 
 
     可    他的   家里      不    愿意,     我 该        怎么 办? 
     But   his    family  no   will      I should     how  do 
     but his family do not agree. How should I do? 
 
 H: (heh,heh) 他  家里     不   愿意,      你    今    年      多     大了? 
                      He family no   agree    you  this year  many big 
      His family do not agree, then how old are you? 
 
C: 二      十      七. 
     Two ten   seven  
     Twenty-seven. 
 
H: 啊   你   今      年     二    十     七        岁了. 
     Ah you  this  year two  ten   seven  year  
Oh. You‟re already twenty seven. 
 
C: 嗯. 
     Em 
     Em.   
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H: 对方       才      二    十   二     岁,    是     吗? 
     Other   only two ten   two  year     be    ? 
     Your young man is only twenty-two, right? 
 
C: 嗯. 
    Em 
Em. 
 
H: 那   你   俩  年纪 的确   相差  五  岁呀  人家   说  五    岁    就     有        代           沟了. 
   That you two age indeed gap  five year other say five year just have  generation gap 
   But you two indeed have a five-year age gap. People often say five-year age gap is a  
generation gap.  
 
C: 是  吗? 
     Be  (?) 
     Really? 
 
H: 当然,         我们 说  爱情   是   不   受          年龄    限制   的. 
    Of course   we   say love    be  no  receive   age  limitation of 
    Of course we always say love is not constrained by age. 
 
C: 对   呀. 
     Right (!) 
     Yeah. 
 
H: 但是 毕竟呢, 年龄 差距         比较       大  的   话        就  会   有       代      沟.  
     But  after all  age distance compare  big of  words  so may have generation gap 
But after all, if there is a big age gap, then there will be a generation gap. 
 
他  今     年    才   刚刚  22 岁,  但 你    27  岁,    应该     说 是 一个成熟的  年令 段了. 
He this year just only 22 year but you 27 year should say be  a    ripe     age  period   
He is only twenty-two, but you are already twenty-seven, which is a mature age.  
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Appendix 12: Chinese extract 5 (C08SX) 
C: 我  有 点    事    想    麻烦    你. 
     I    have  bit  thing    want    bother  you  
I have something to bother you. 
 
H: 好,      说    吧. 
     Good   say     (!) 
     Please go ahead.      
 
C: 我  有     个  女  朋友,   跟    她       相处        有      半    年       多了. 
     I   have  a    girl friend  and  she   get along  have  half  year    more 
     I have a girlfriend, and we‟ve been together for about half a year. 
 
H: 嗯. 
     Em 
     Em. 
 
C: 现在, 她     怀孕       有     四    个    半      月        定      好了   今天  去     打胎, 
      Now  she  pregnant have four  a   half   month  book  good  today go   abortion 
     Now she‟s been pregnant for four months. We‟ve agreed she should have an    
abortion today. 
 
     可   她    现在    躲避   我.     她 现在 准备   把  孩子    生     下来,   
     But she  now    hide  me     she now  prepare hold  child     bear  down 
     but she is hiding from me. She is now planning to give birth to the baby, 
 
   然后  把  孩子  给  我  家   送去       
      then   hold  child give my home   send 
      and then take it to my home. 
H:  你      倆     是    谈  恋爱 還是 你  有   家庭      ? 
       You  two  be   talk  love  or   you    have  family 
      Are you in a relationship or are you married? 
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C:  没有   家. 
      No  family 
      No, I‟m not married. 
 
H: 那       你      俩          是  在  恋爱? 
     Then you   two      be    in   love 
     Then you two are in a relationship? 
 
C: 对. 
     Right 
     Yeah. 
 
H: 噢.  那      你     本来     也   不   应该    和    她   发生     这     种       关系呀! 
     Oh. That  you original too  no  should and  her happen this  kind    relationship 
     Oh. Even if you are in a relationship, you shouldn‟t have had sex relations now! 
 
C: 如果 她 把   孩子    生  下来   那  我   该    怎么   办  呢 
       If   she  hold   child  bear   down    then   I    should    how   do    ?   
       If she gives birth to the baby, what should I do? 
 
 H:  那   就   是 一个  法律的  问题了 你  可以 不  娶     她 
   That  then  be    a          law      issue     you  may   no   marry  her 
       Then that‟s the issue of law. You can decide not to marry her. 
 
      但 你   是  孩子  的  父亲  你   必须得    承担  法律的  责任了  
      But you are child  of   father   you   must   undertake  law  responsibility 
      But you are the father, and you must take legal responsibility for the child. 
 
C: 对.          你   看      这      件        事儿,     我   该        怎么     办? 
     Right.   You  see  this   piece   thing      I   should  how  do? 
     Year.  What do you think I should do now? 
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 H: 这个  问题    非常   麻烦. 我  建议  只有   你  先  找到   她  才     能    谈    下   一 步       
      This   issue  very tough I suggest only you first find she only can talk down a step 
      This is indeed a problem. I suggest you can only talk about what you will do next   
if you can find her.  
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Appendix 13: Chinese extract 6 (C02HM) 
C: 我 给 你  打  过  电话  的 我和  我  前   夫  的 女儿 向 我 要  电脑的    事. 
     I give you hit past call  of  I and I  before man of  girl    to  I  ask computer issue 
  I phoned you before, regarding that the daughter that I have with my ex-husband 
asked me for a computer. 
 
H: 噢.   我  想     起来了. 
     Oh. I   think   up    
     Oh. I remember that. 
 
 C:但 是 孩子,      春      节            之   前,      我  见了   一次  面, 
      But   child    spring holiday   of  before   I  see      a     meeting 
      I saw the child once before the New Year. 
 
H: 嗯. 
Em 
Em.      
 
C: 给了     她        三        千               元            钱. 
     Give   she    three  thousand     yuan     money 
     I gave her three thousand yuan. 
 
H: 嗯. 
     Em 
     Em.    
   
C: 这  孩子     到  现在  过了   春        节       这么  长   时间了,  
   The child    till now gone spring holiday such long time  
Even such a long time after the New Year,   
一直         也   不        给   我   来  个 电话.    就  是   等   我 给   她    挂     电话             
Always  too   no    give  I   come a    call     so   be wait    I  give she  hang  call 
    She hasn‟t given me a call yet. She just waits for ME to call HER.      
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H: 嗯. 
     Em 
     Em. 
 
C: 我 心里   不    平衡         红梅,        我  现在  给    不   给     她   挂     这  个 电话? 
      I  heart  no   balance  Hong Mei   I   now  give  no  give her hang this a   call 
     I‟m very upset HongMei, do you think I need to call her? 
 
H: 你     现在  给    她    发       短       信         吗? 
     You now give her  send  short   letter      ? 
     Have you sent her a message? 
 
C: 我一直   也   没   给   她    挂,   也  没   给   发     短      信.    现在   是    春       节 
    I always too no give she hang too no give send short letter. Now  be  spring holiday 
No. Now it‟s New Year.  
   她    没   给    我   挂    个 电话,  也    没  叫   个妈妈. 
    She no give I    hang a   call    too   no call a   mum 
She has neither phoned me nor called me mum. 
 
H: 我想     这样   从     今天    开始    每天        给      她      发     短     信, 
     I  think such from today begin everyday give    she  send short letter 
     Shall we do it this way? You send her messages everyday from today, 
     
    问候   她,     看     她   如何   反应. 
    ask    she    see  she   how   react 
greeting her and see how she will react to it. 
